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Abstract: Enlarging Justice:  Miroslav Volf’s theology of embrace and the 
problem of justice in post-conflict Bosnia and Croatia 
This thesis seeks to develop an enlarged understanding of justice which 
reduces future conflict rather than feeding it and which seeks to ground human 
practices and notions of justice more firmly in divine justice. At the heart of this 
project is Miroslav Volf’s theology of embrace.  The thesis attempts to question 
what this theology offers to the present day context of Croatia and Bosnia from 
which it emerged in the 1990s.  
Firstly, I draw on field work and NGO work to suggest that justice is a pressing 
issue in post-conflict Bosnia and Croatia, and that current approaches to justice 
are problematic. I draw on Volf’s work to assess the key problems and suggest 
that turning to his eschatological vision of justice may provide fruitful answers as 
to how justice should be pursued for the future. 
Secondly, I suggest that identity needs to be reconfigured in order that justice 
might be pursued. I suggest that this should occur along the lines of Volf’s 
understanding of identity as embrace. Identities can be reconfigured through 
enlarged thinking. Seeking to shape the other and for the other to shape the self 
is key to pursuing justice collaboratively. 
Thirdly, I address the theological roots of Volf’s work in examining the Trinity. I 
suggest that Volf’s work can offer an understanding of the Trinity which has 
significant implications for the pursuit of justice. I read Volf’s work as allowing 
for a sense of justice residing within the Trinity. I seek to draw out the ways in 
which human life can image the triune life of justice and the parameters of this 
mirroring.  Finally, I propose that the type of justice I have suggested, in 
collaboration with Volf, means that the pursuit of justice should be centred on 
restoring right relationships, going beyond what is due and is a continuous 
process rather than discrete actions. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis consists of three significant strands. Firstly, the key text, Miroslav 
Volf’s Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, 
and Reconciliation and in particular, the theology of embrace which this book 
sets out. Secondly, I will be looking at post-conflict Bosnia and Croatia as the 
context within which to explore Volf’s theology and the potential it has to be 
developed in a way which addresses ongoing issues of conflict. Thirdly, I will be 
focusing my reading and analysis towards the post-conflict issue of justice. I will 
therefore be reading Volf in an effort to discover what his theology says to 
address this particular issue.  
Justice is impossible in the order of calculating, equalizing, 
legalizing, and universalizing actions. If you want justice and 
nothing but justice, you will inevitably get injustice. If you want 
justice without injustice, you must want love.1 
 
In this sweeping statement Miroslav Volf dismisses the basis of a wide range of 
theories of justice. His rejection of calculating and legalistic justice asks for an 
enlarged account of justice which goes beyond that which can be accounted for 
through a weighing up of potential goods or can be contained within a scheme 
of law or bill of rights. Yet his rejection of both equality as the central concern of 
justice and the possibility of a universal account of justice suggests that a 
different type of justice is required. Attempts to define the practices of justice in 
these ways can only result in injustice Volf argues.2 His point is that justice 
cannot be contained. Instead, Volf’s theology suggests at the heart of a 
Christian understanding of justice is the love of the Trinity which is lived out as 
embrace.3 
This thesis will similarly argue that theories of justice whether based on 
utilitarian, liberal or any other principle will almost always amount to a sense of 
                                            
1
 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and 
Reconciliation, Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1996, 223. 
2
 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 202. 
3
 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 126ff. 
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justice as an economic transaction, a balancing of the goods to give one 
another an appropriate amount of freedom or equality or any other good. I will 
suggest that this balancing act can be seen as detrimental or at best ineffective 
in terms of the restoration of relationship between the parties concerned and 
the establishment of a long lasting state of peace and justice. This thesis will 
argue instead that a notion of justice built upon Volf’s theology of embrace 
might better serve the needs of those attempting to move on from injustice and 
conflict. At the very least it offers a better understanding of what a Christian 
response to injustice might look like.  
In making this case the focus will be on Miroslav Volf’s theology of embrace. In 
Exclusion and Embrace Volf critiques theories of justice altogether although 
focusing on the 20th Century. His critique is sweeping and sometimes vague.4  
Yet he does offer the beginnings of a new understanding of justice based on 
eschatological and trinitarian terms. Whilst in many ways Volf shies away from 
specifics, seeking to avoid the pitfalls of setting out a practical approach to 
justice, I want to examine whether his theology can offer this. In order to do this 
I have chosen to turn to the context from which Volf’s theology emerged. As a 
Croat much of Volf’s theology of embrace is written in response to the 1990s 
conflict in Croatia and Bosnia. In asking how the theology of embrace might 
offer a new approach to the pursuit of justice I have returned to the current 
uneasy situation in Croatia and Bosnia, where cries for justice have failed to find 
a steady peace or an end in reconciliation. 
I will suggest that Volf’s rejection of theories of justice based upon calculating 
that which is due to another is both right and necessary. I will argue that the 
problems of justice in the post-conflict Balkans can be seen as symptomatic of 
an over emphasis on understandings of justice as a form of transaction. I will 
propose that Volf’s theology of embrace offers valuable resources from which 
an enlarged sense of justice might be developed. I will suggest that thinking of 
justice in primarily relational terms might offer a greater chance of moving 
towards reconciliation and a stable peace. 
                                            
4
 For example Volf talks about ‘the prevalent account of justice’ as being impartial. Miroslav Volf, 
Exclusion and Embrace, 220. 
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The following is intended firstly to introduce Volf’s work and introduce Moltmann 
as a key dialogue partner and then to express the aims and approach of this 
thesis. 
 
Section 1 -  Miroslav Volf 
 
1.1 Biography 
 
Miroslav Volf’s background is one of diversity. Born in Osijek, Croatia in 1956 
he spent most of his childhood living in Novi Sad, Serbia (both part of 
Yugoslavia at the time). His father, Dragutin Volf, was half-German whilst his 
mother was part of the Czech minority.5 In this he represents the mixed 
background of many former Yugoslavians. His experiences as the child of a 
Pentecostal pastor were more unusual however.6 To be a practising Christian at 
all was a difficult position to be in, to be identified with evangelical Christians 
instead of with the traditional Serbian Orthodox or Croatian Catholic churches 
was even more unusual and remains so. Certainly Volf found the associations 
embarrassing and difficult.7 Yet this context as an outsider, marginalised by the 
communist regime, gave Volf a unique perspective which informed his later 
work.  
 
The responses of his family to both the hostile communist state and to the 
personal tragedy of the death of Volf’s older brother at the age of five are the 
                                            
5
 Mark Oppenheimer, ‘Miroslav Volf Spans Conflicting Worlds’, The Christian Century, January 
11, 2003, 18-23 from www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2688, 12/03/2008 
6
 Peter Kuzmič has commented that ‘Pentecostal churches emphasize gifts of the spirit over the 
apostolic spirit of the transcendent church. . . . But in Tito’s Yugoslavia, we were part of an 
evangelical world that was more a subculture. We were in a unique position to become bridge 
builders and reconcilers. If you listen to the Croatian Catholics, you can come to think God is 
Catholic. The Serbian Orthodox seem to worship a Serbian god. But the evangelicals there 
don’t have a tribal religion, they don’t serve an ethnic God.’ Mark Oppenheimer, ‘Miroslav Volf 
Spans Conflicting Worlds’. 
7
 Becky Garrison, ‘War and the Christians: An Interview with Miroslav Volf’, 
http://www.theturning.org/folder/volf.html, 16/06/2008 
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major influences on Volf’s understanding of Christian responses to injustice. He 
has indicated that his work is in one sense a theological response to the life and 
actions of his parents to these circumstances. 
The attitudes and the practices toward "the enemy" and "the 
persecutor" I learned in my dad's church and in our home, shaped 
profoundly my whole theological thinking. The "enemy" ought to be 
loved, his or her enmity notwithstanding. There is a whole way of 
life and a whole theological program contained in that simple 
command.8 
 
Volf’s parents would regularly open their home to Christians and the 
marginalised. The death of his brother whilst playing with local soldiers was also 
met with forgiveness by his parents. Writing about the subsequent court case 
Volf noted that  
My father insisted that he and my mother…had forgiven. They 
wouldn’t press charges, he said. Why should one more mother be 
plunged into grief, this time because the life of her son, a good boy 
but careless in a crucial moment, was ruined by the hands of 
justice.9 
 
This personal experience, and others, is central in the formation and focus of 
Volf’s theology. The key issues of forgiveness and justice, of living with the 
enemy and reaching out to the marginalised and the wrong doer have been 
issues Volf has lived with all his life. It is this long history of reflection and lived 
responses to such difficult circumstances which gives Volf’s theological 
reflections on the same issues such depth.  
Volf’s role as something of an outsider continued through much of his young 
adult life as he moved to the US, Germany and briefly returned to Yugoslavia 
for military service. As a soldier his foreign connections and Christian beliefs 
made him a target for psychological torture. This experience and his 
subsequent struggles to forgive, written about extensively in The End of 
                                            
8
 Becky Garrison, ‘War and the Christians’. 
9
 Miroslav Volf, Free of Charge: Giving and Forgiving in a Culture Stripped of Grace, Zondervan, 
Grand Rapids, 2005, 122.  
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Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World, gives Volf’s reflections on the 
role of victims in justice particular weight. 
Volf’s first theological steps were overseen by Peter Kuzmič, his brother-in-law 
and Director of the Evangelical Theology Faculty in Osijek. Graduating with his 
BA in 1977 Volf moved on to do his MA at Fuller Theological Seminary 
(graduating in 1979) followed by his PhD at Tubingen under Jürgen Moltmann 
focusing on a Marxist understanding of work (completed in 1986).10 Whilst 
cultural background is important for understanding Volf’s concerns and 
background influence, Moltmann can be seen as the biggest theological 
influence for Volf. Much of Volf’s writing is underpinned by the systematic 
Trinitarian and eschatological theology of Moltmann. In many ways Volf’s work 
can be read as ‘after Moltmann’ in the sense that his work begins where 
Moltmann has left off.11  
During his further education he kept close links with Croatia, returning as 
Lecturer and then Professor in Systematic Theology from 1984-1991. He 
progressed quickly up the career ladder, moving back to teach at Fuller from 
1991-1998. He was in high demand and was offered positions at Heidelberg, 
Duke and Yale as well as being in the running for a position at Harvard.12 In 
1998 Volf settled on the role of Henry B. Wright Professor of Systematic 
Theology and Director of the Centre for Faith and Culture at Yale. This role 
seems to have been chosen in part because it allowed him the freedom to 
continue his theological work in constant engagement with culture. His concern 
with keeping theological reflection relevant is demonstrated in his popular 
pastoral articles in Christian Century and his involvement in the publication of ‘A 
Common Word’ document promoting positive and peaceful Muslim-Christian 
relations.13 The Centre engages those beyond the theological academy 
including ministers and business leaders. This reflects Volf’s concern that 
                                            
10
 Miroslav Volf CV 
http://divinity.yale.edu/sites/default/files/faculty_cv/MV%20Vita%20Updated%204-2010.pdf , 
30/01/2012.  
11
 Miroslav Volf, ‘After Moltmann’, 231-257. 
12
 A. James Reimer, ‘Miroslav Volf: One of the New Theologians’, The Conrad Grebel Review, 
Vol. 18 no. 3, Autumn 2000, 8 and Mark Oppenheimer, ‘Miroslav Volf Spans Conflicting Worlds’. 
13
 ed. Miroslav Volf, Ghazi bin Muhammad and Melissa Yarrington, A Common Word: Muslims 
and Christians on Loving God and Neighbor, William B Eerdmans, 2010. 
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theology is not about intellectual exercise but is about guiding, supporting and 
promoting the practice of faith in everyday life. The centre focuses on research 
into human flourishing, faith in the workplace, reconciliation between Muslims 
and Christians and peaceful co-existence in a globalized world. 14 
Volf’s biography perhaps demonstrates why he is difficult to categorise. Mark 
Oppenheimer comments that ‘Volf has the catholicity of a refugee. He’s 
reluctant to join any camp -- military, ethnic or intellectual.’ Certainly 
categorising Volf theologically is hard. ‘"He is eclectic," says Michael Horton, a 
Reformed evangelical who teaches at Westminster Theological Seminary in 
California. "And in an age that is suspicious of systematization, his eclectic 
borrowing from different traditions gives him certain advantages over more 
traditional ‘school’ theologians. He was raised Pentecostal, but he’s critical of 
Pentecostal ecclesiology. He’s clearly not a Calvinist, but certain themes of 
Reformed theology echo in his work."’15 Certainly Volf has moved away from 
any form of Pentecostal label. He is still broadly categorised as evangelical and 
whilst in the US has been a member of the Epsicopalian Church. His theology 
draws on diverse thinkers however and he would be reluctant to label himself.  
The role of perspective is important in much of Volf’s work. He enjoys engaging 
with multiple perspectives and borrows from thinkers one might expect him to 
dismiss. This ability seems to be related to his experiences as an outsider in 
many ways. The central events of Volf’s life have clearly influenced his 
theological concerns. The fact that his experiences are rather uncommon for a 
theologian perhaps means that their affect on his theological work is merely 
highlighted, rather than the fact that they have an affect being extraordinary in 
itself. Similarly his encounter with Moltmann and their sustained engagement 
over a number of years have played a key role in developing his understanding 
of systematic theology and his emphasis on theological themes developed by 
Moltmann. In more recent years there has been a shift in his influences which 
have been primarily those of American academia and society. Nicholas 
                                            
14
 See Yale centre for Faith and Culture, www.yale.edu/faith, 30/06/2009 
15
 Mark Oppenheimer, ‘Miroslav Volf Spans Conflicting Worlds’. 
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Wolterstorff has been a particularly noteworthy recent influence.16 Volf 
acknowledges that there has been a move in his work towards a concern with 
the problem of ‘a conception of human flourishing as experiential satisfaction, 
and then the drawing in of religion to support the sense of simple experiential 
satisfaction as a good life.’17 This he sees as a problem which does not only 
exist in America but it is perhaps most pressing there. Certainly it seems he is a 
theologian reactive to his surroundings and context. His theological concerns 
are motivated by what he sees to be the most pressing problems of the society 
around him. 
 
1.2 Bibliography 
 
It is useful to examine Volf’s significant publications in order to understand his 
wider theological thinking and to set Exclusion and Embrace, published in 1996, 
in context.18 Here I will introduce each text briefly. I will then draw his work 
together in relation to key themes which are not dealt with individually 
elsewhere in the thesis; eschatology and justice.19 It is also helpful to consider 
briefly Volf’s theological method in order to understand the focus and limitations 
of his work. In the following section I will then focus in on my key text, Exclusion 
and Embrace. 
Volf’s first significant publication, Work in the Spirit: Toward a Theology of Work 
was published in 1991 and was largely a reworking of the material of his 
doctoral thesis. Rejecting Luther’s notion of work as vocation as unable to deal 
with the plurality of contemporary employment practices Volf argued for an 
understanding of work based on charisms, gifts of the Spirit.  
                                            
16
 Bethan Willis, Miroslav Volf Interview, 26/08/2009 
17
 Bethan Willis, Miroslav Volf Interview, 26/08/2009 
18
 I will deal here with Volf’s full length English language books. These books cover all of the 
main themes of Volf’s theology. Other chapters, editorial content, essays and articles (including 
the collected articles published in Against the Tide) will be dealt with as they arise.  
19
 For an overview of Volf’s theology of Identity and Trinity see section 1 of the relevant 
chapters. 
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After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity was published in 
1996 in German and 1998 in English.20 This was again work done under 
Moltmann’s supervision and was submitted as Volf’s Habilitationsschrift. It 
sought to stand as a corrective to overly individualistic understandings (and 
practices) of Protestant ecclesiology. In dialogue with Joseph Ratzinger and 
John Zizioulas, Volf set out to ground a Protestant Free Church ecclesiology in 
the Trinitarian communion whilst maintaining a critical distance from the 
hierarchical implications of both men’s work.  
In 1996 Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, 
Otherness and Reconciliation was published to wide acclaim having been 
written towards the end of the 1990s conflict in the Balkans. It offered an 
understanding of human identity modelled on the Trinity’s mutual self-giving. 
For Volf, the means to pursue and embody this fullness of human identity could 
largely be understood in terms of the practice of embrace.  
The topics of giving and forgiving were covered further in the more devotional 
work Free of Charge: Giving and Forgiving in a Culture Stripped of Grace in 
2005. Here Volf again seeks to offer a corrective to a prevalent understanding 
of God’s grace. He attempts to counter the popular notion of God as Santa 
Claus and instead offers a more nuanced reading of the ways in which God 
gives and the call to the Christian to give as God gives. This text also marks a 
change in Volf’s thinking on justice. Here retributive justice is contrasted with 
forgiveness rather than the re-envisioning of justice found in Exclusion and 
Embrace.21 Whilst Volf denies explicitly writing with an audience in mind, the 
                                            
20
 There is some confusion over the precedence of After Our Likeness and Exclusion and 
Embrace. The German language version of After Our Likeness was published in 1996, the 
same year as Exclusion and Embrace. Volf notes that he wrote much of the former during a 
fellowship held from 1989-1991 and that the material is almost identical with that submitted as a 
Habilitationsschrift in 1994,whilst the latter text was still being fine tuned in late 1996. Therefore 
whilst the publication dates might suggest After Our Likeness follows after Exclusion and 
Embrace it seems safe to assume the opposite is true although of course there is some overlap 
in the theological themes of community and Trinity. See Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The 
Church as the Image of the Trinity, William. B. Eerdmans, Cambridge, 1998, xif and Miroslav 
Volf’s CV. 
21
 Miroslav Volf, Free of Charge,160 ff. 
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context of this, and later works, feels much more American rather than the 
European slant of his earlier works.22   
In 2006 came The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World in 
some senses the sequel to Exclusion and Embrace. It deals with the way 
memories of injustice shape identity and the possibilities of remembering events 
without reigniting the pain of injustice suffered. Eschatology comes to the fore 
again as Volf seeks to understand how one’s identity may remain whilst painful 
sins are eradicated. Volf edited several other volumes as well as publishing a 
book of collected articles in Against the Tide in 2009 and contributing a number 
of articles to journals. These secondary texts will be dealt with in the thesis as 
they arise.  
 
1.2a Eschatology 
 
Eschatology is central to Volf’s theology. In Work in the Spirit, Volf builds on 
Moltmann’s work drawing specifically on Theology of Hope to place the concept 
of new creation at the centre of his theology of work.23 This new creation is ‘the 
end of all God’s purposes with the universe, and as such, either explicitly or 
implicitly is the necessary criterion for all human action’.24 This sets up a major 
category in Volf’s theological thought. In Exclusion and Embrace he often works 
backwards from a vision of eschatological perfection in order to understand the 
end goal of present action.25 In The End of Memory there is a similar emphasis 
on the continuity of present action with the establishment of God’s future 
kingdom. This lends Volf’s theology a dynamic quality in that it is always 
                                            
22
 Miroslav Volf Interview with Bethan Willis, 26/08/2009. There is a significant gap between 
these publication dates during which there seems to be a noticable shift in perspective. Whilst 
Volf’s first two works were written in Europe and Exclusion and Embrace seems to be mostly 
informed by the Balkan context and European writers,later works occurred after a period during 
which Volf became an American citizen (1997) and settled permanently at Yale (1998).  
23
 Miroslav Volf, Work in the Spirit, Wipf and Stock, Eugene, Oregon, 1991, 79 
24
 Miroslav Volf, Work in the Spirit, 81. 
25
 For example Volf’s vision of justice in Exclusion and Embrace is an eschatological one. Volf, 
Exclusion and Embrace, 223 
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anticipating and pursuing the new creation. This new creation is not fully fleshed 
out by Volf but is perhaps short hand for Moltmann’s eschatology.26  
Work in the Spirit argues for a transformative eschatological view and against 
the idea of the destruction of the world. Volf suggests that ‘without a 
theologically grounded belief in the intrinsic value and goodness of creation, 
positive cultural involvement hangs theologically in the air.’27 He seems to 
suggest that eschatology is the underlying difference between theologies of 
work which value work for its inherent worth and those who see work’s value as 
in the way it may or may not further evangelisation or sanctification. Most 
importantly Volf emphasises the idea of continuity between action in the present 
and the future kingdom.28 An important element of this eschatological view is 
that works which go unnoticed in the world are not lost forever but what they 
create is valued and celebrated in the new creation.29 
Volf also suggests in this text that protological theologies of work are less 
complete than eschatological but insists that protology is not to be ignored since 
‘the new creation comes about through a transformation of the first creation, 
cooperation with God in the preservation of the world must be an integral part of 
cooperation with God in the transformation of the world.’30 This perhaps 
suggests why, in Exclusion and Embrace Volf makes the unusual move to 
reflect on justice in terms of an eschatological vision rather than the more 
typical approach of looking first to the idea of created human beings which more 
typically stands at the roots of Christian endeavours to understand justice as 
human rights for example. Volf also suggests that protological accounts will 
tend to uphold the status quo.31 In terms of justice theory this may well also be 
true. Certainly Volf’s eschatological vision breaks free of the normal bounds of 
thinking about the content of justice. 
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In After Our Likeness Volf maintains the claims made in Work in the Spirit that 
‘the all-embracing framework for an appropriate understanding of the church is 
God’s eschatological new creation.’32 For Volf the eschatological vision for the 
Church is about ‘the mutual indwelling of the triune God and his glorified people 
in a new heaven and a new earth.’33 However this mutual indwelling is only 
partial. The catholicity of the church (and presumably individuals) will be fully 
realised only eschatologically. There is a weaker sense (than found in Exclusion 
and Embrace) of Volf working back from an eschatological vision. He states that 
a close (sibling like) yet open (to enemies and strangers) relationship of 
congregants is required since ‘only such an open fellowship is commensurate 
with the ultimate vision of the church as the eschatological gathering of the 
entire people of God from all tribes and nations.’34 
Volf returns to the language of minimum and maximum previously found in 
Work in the Spirit. In this earlier text he talks of ethical minimums and 
maximums.35  Here the language is used within an eschatological framework. 
He writes that ‘for a sojourning church, only a dynamic understanding of its 
correspondence to the Trinity is meaningful. If the church remains at a statically 
understood minimum of correspondence to the Trinity, it misses possibilities 
God has given it along with its being; if by contrast it reaches for a statically 
understood maximum, it risks missing its historical reality, and certainly if it 
claims to realize this maximum, its self-understanding turns into ideology.’36 
This statement shows Volf seeing to emphasise the eschatological nature of the 
Christian life which pushes beyond human limits and boundaries whilst 
tempering this with a warning that the eschatological kingdom can only be 
pursued in the present, it cannot be fully realised. This understanding comes 
through in Exclusion and Embrace particularly in reference to justice. The 
language of minimum and maximum correspondence is therefore particularly 
useful in further consideration of this subject (see chapter 4 4.2b). 
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In Exclusion and Embrace eschatology also comes to the fore. It is clearly 
linked to Volf’s understanding of the social trinity. Volf’s understanding of the 
Trinitarian life informs his vision of eschatological life in that human beings will 
enter into the life of the Trinity. The Trinity is therefore at the heart of Volf’s 
eschatology. It is therefore possible that the vision of eschatological justice he 
puts forward could also be understood as a vision of justice within the Trinity 
(see chapter 4 4.2). 
 
1.2b Justice 
 
Volf touches on the subjects of justice and love in regard to eschatology. He 
suggests that the new creation ‘implies certain principles that cannot be set 
aside if justice is to prevail…the “ethical minimum”. But the new creation also 
implies principles which point beyond the way of love, which we might call the 
“ethical maximum”.37 The minimum provides the basis of forming structures; the 
maximum is the ‘regulative ideal’. Whilst in Exclusion and Embrace there is a 
certain blurring of these boundaries (followed by a hardening of them in Volf’s 
recent thought), this clearer delineation is helpful.38 This thesis will argue for a 
greater emphasis on the ‘regulative ideal’ in justice practice. However, Volf 
warns that ‘the ethical maximum may not be zealously transmuted from 
regulative ideal to sacrosanct criterion. As one uses the ethical maximum to 
optimise structures, one must take soberly into account what is practically 
realizable.’39 To make the ideal maximum into law creates an impossible state 
to attain and becomes oppressive. Indeed the maximum is beyond the law 
because it is to be pursued ‘inspired by the sacrificial love of Christ 
demonstrated on the cross and guided by the vision of the new creation.’40 
Essentially the ideal can be pursued only with the help of the Spirit.41  
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Volf writes ‘at the same time it is crucial not to set love aside as useless in 
social ethics. Even if one does not only operate with a procedural understanding 
of justice (as I do not), the practice of justice alone will not be sufficient to create 
a humane society. For without love, there is no shalom.’42 This clearer 
separation of love and justice is one Volf returns to later. Yet it demonstrates 
Volf’s understanding of the inseparability of justice and love. In his 
understanding of the minimum and maximum demands of justice there is 
evidence of justice giving way to love in a way which foreshadows the blurring 
of the two in Exclusion and Embrace. 
In other ways however the language of justice in this text is very different. 
Justice is rooted in biblical texts which demand the acceptance of ‘economic 
responsibility for others’.43 Volf talks about the right to sustenance and later, the 
right to leisure. He also seems to suggest that justice requires more than 
generosity.44 Volf draws on Nicholas Wolterstorff to conclude that ‘“the deepest 
answer to the question ‘why care about the poor?’ is that if we do not, we are 
violating the God-given rights of other people.”’45 This rights language is not a 
feature of Exclusion and Embrace where Volf grounds justice primarily in 
eschatology (not biblical texts) and suggests that rights will no longer exist.46 In 
some ways we might see the position stated in Work in the Spirit as one Volf 
returns to much later making Exclusion and Embrace an aberration. 
The key difference between Exclusion and Embrace and Free of Charge is the 
definition of justice. In Exclusion and Embrace ‘justice’ freely overlaps with ‘love’ 
and ‘forgiveness’. In Free of Charge we see a hierarchy starting with revenge, 
judged morally wrong, above which lies ‘(retributive) justice’ which is 
superseded by ‘forgiveness’.47 The non-academic nature of Free of Charge 
makes it difficult to pin down the shift in Volf’s position with great subtlety. Yet 
he is aware of the shift.48 
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Volf expands on this idea. ‘Instead of forgiving and restoring relationship, 
litigants seek to punish and to extract maximal compensation. More than just 
insisting on their rights, they seek to maximise their profits at other’s expense. 
Far from being concerned with justice, they are often driven by vengeance and 
greed.’ 49 Here Volf argues that far from pursuing forgiveness, even dues based 
justice (represented by rights) is failing to be pursued. Indeed justice itself is 
barely in focus as individuals pursue their own advantage.  
In this text Volf seeks to respond to the problems of justice in the context of the 
‘mushrooming litigiousness in the United States.’50 In many ways the problems 
are the same as those of the Balkan context, justice unfulfilled. However in this 
context Volf sees fit to separate out the justice from forgiveness.51 In some 
ways this is a useful corrective to the largely poorly defined ‘justice’ of Exclusion 
and Embrace. However, despite Volf’s protestations it falls into the trap of pitting 
forgiveness against justice rather than seeing the two as largely overlapping. 
This leaves significant theological problems. It also relies more heavily on 
existing accounts of justice rather than doing the type of theology Volf 
champions, that is, beginning from an understanding of the Trinity and 
eschatology and building up from there. Whilst this method has significant 
problems of definition it does provide much deeper theological roots. In this 
thesis I will argue that justice should be understood in terms of eschatological 
vision, as initially set out by Volf. I will seek to expand on the understanding of 
justice found in Exclusion and Embrace and make it a plausible basis for 
practical action. It is, however, useful to bear in mind the corrective of Free of 
Charge in order that we might think of minimal and maximal understandings of 
justice. 
It is difficult to assess why the marked difference in emphasis between these 
two texts exists. Volf acknowledges he is influenced greatly by context and 
writes in response to his own current cultural concerns. Perhaps then the 
difference is due to the fact that both texts are offered as correctives to differing 
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contexts. Perhaps the United States can afford to live with the indifference that 
is that result of adherence to minimal justice (rights, fairness, law). There is no 
‘great project’ which requires co-operation, the giving up of oneself for another. 
The cushion of economic wealth, political stability and peace (on home soil at 
least) means individualism is not necessarily a problem. In more volatile 
situations such as the Balkans, and at this time Bosnia particularly, the cost of 
this indifference cannot be borne. The consequences  economically, politically 
and socially are too great. Justice in this context must be centred on 
reconciliation. 
There may also be a point of difference in perspective in that the American 
environment places Volf in a position of relative power which means he 
identifies as one of a group who do or distribute justice. The Bosnian and 
Croatian context is more centred on those who need to make claims for justice 
to be done to them. 
 
1.2c Method 
 
In Work in the Spirit Volf clearly sets out many themes and methodological 
approaches which recur and develop in his later works.52 Finding the 
predominant theological understanding of work as vocation inadequate for a 
post-industrial era of plural employment, Volf aims to find a theology of work 
grounded in the Spirit and based on the notion of charismas. Volf argues that 
work should be understood as co-operation with God and as ultimately working 
towards the new creation of the eschaton. It should utilise the gifting of the 
worker and promote their development and encourage their input or autonomy. 
 
From Work in the Spirit it is helpful to take forward the idea that Volf is chiefly 
set on building theological frameworks. He is reluctant to be too particular or 
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prescriptive and believes that structural change is a secondary development 
which should occur in light of guiding theological principles such as those he 
establishes. Work in the Spirit is in many ways clearer and better defined than 
Exclusion and Embrace. This is partly due to the subject matter. In treating the 
subject of work Volf progresses clearly through a number of already well 
defined subject areas (economics, unemployment, child labour) highlighting the 
problems before he moves on to a more systematic consideration of the 
literature and then a theological response. In Exclusion and Embrace the 
subject matter is much more personal and whilst there is progression from 
understanding the problem towards offering a theological proposition, it feels 
more instinctive and slightly erratic rather than methodical.53  
Work in the Spirit has a strong biographical influence in that the inevitable 
socialist influences on Volf’s upbringing, in this instance a Marxist 
understanding of the importance of work, are brought into dialogue with his 
adult encounters with the Western world, here represented by Adam Smith and 
free market economies. This bringing together of disparate ideas or ideologies 
is typical of Volf.  
Methodologically there are several points of note in this work. Firstly, Volf sets 
out to create a ‘comprehensive and technical theological investigation of the 
problem of work in contemporary society.’54 This approach continues throughout 
Volf’s later work. His aim is not to offer a particular account of work but to 
rethink and rebuild the theology which might underpin these sorts of accounts. 
In this way his work seeks to avoid the problems of being overly prescriptive in 
order that he can make more universal claims. In focusing on this ‘theological 
framework’ Volf aims to give the reader the ability to enter any particular 
situation with the tools to act and shape practices in a theological way. 55 Volf 
writes that ‘for a Christian the answer to the question of how to function 
responsibly in each particular sphere of life depends on the answer to the 
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question of how one should responsibly live one’s life as a whole.’56 In this 
instance Volf uses this argument to defend his reflection on work as a broad 
category, rather than focusing specifically on particular types of work. However, 
the culmination of this approach is seen in Exclusion and Embrace, where the 
Theology of Embrace becomes the basis for thinking about the Godly life.  
Volf is not denying the need for specific theological responses. He suggests 
here and elsewhere that these are the jobs of specialists in those fields in 
dialogue with theologians.57 The job of theologians when working alone is to 
provide broad theological frameworks not to draw detailed accounts of action 
and practices unless they are named as particular and rooted in a specific 
context. Volf rejects the idea that he can speak both universally and 
prescriptively. His work suggests that either one can talk universally, in broad 
theological concepts to be interpreted within particular contexts, or one can 
write particularly on specific contexts, but this work must not then claim 
universal applicability. 
Volf draws a clear distinction between the need for an ethic of work and a 
theology of work.58 He argues that  
It is insufficient merely to interpret the biblical statements on 
work, distill from them transculturally binding ethical principles, 
and combine them into a consistent statement on how a 
Christian should work. It is also insufficient to ask what 
individual Christian doctrines (such as the doctrine of creation 
and anthropology) imply for our ethical assessment of human 
work. It is rather necessary to develop a comprehensive 
theology of work. A theology of work…situates the questions of 
how one should or should not work, and what one should 
produce, in the larger context of reflection on the meaning of 
work in the history of God with the world and on the place of 
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work in human beings’ relation to their own nature, to their 
fellow human beings, and to the natural world.59   
 
Volf argues that pursuing a theological perspective rather than an ethical one 
roots work more deeply in seeing it as part of God’s creative purposes and that 
ethical reflection on work is too changeable in that practices of work are 
constantly changing. Reflection on the more permanent aspects of work needs 
to be done.60 This is not to say that Volf sees no need for ethical principles. He 
suggests these will be implicit in the theological framework.61 Volf is aware of 
the problems of failing to explicitly set out ethical principles. He notes 
MacIntyre’s critique that ‘we have not yet fully understood the claims of any 
moral philosophy until we have spelled out what its social embodiment would 
be.’62 Nevertheless Volf sees the pitfalls of being explicit in terms of ethical 
practices as greater than those of refusing to make such a move. This method 
is one Volf continues with throughout his theological work. It later becomes a 
significant criticism of Exclusion and Embrace in that it fails to deliver a more 
specific understanding of the social embodiment of the practice of embrace.63 It 
is this problem which I will endeavour to tackle in relation to embodying the 
Theology of Embrace in justice praxis. 
After Our Likeness is, as with all Volf’s work, influenced by his background. This 
time the influence of the Church in Novi Sad, run by his father.64 The 
engagement with Catholic and Orthodox voices (Ratzinger and Zizioulas) is a 
reflection of Volf’s developing interest in ecumenism (which has more recently 
given way to interfaith dialogue) and the theme of Trinitarian communion which 
underpinned it.65 The way in which Volf engages with these ‘other’ voices is a 
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method which reflects the theological proposition of embrace in that Volf seeks 
to respect and learn from the other and adjusts his own position in light of 
engagement with the other without renouncing his own Protestant identity and 
commitments.66 
Volf sees himself, in this text at least, as doing constructive theology.67  
 
1.3 Exclusion and Embrace 
 
Volf rose to prominence on the publication (in 1996) of his book Exclusion and 
Embrace which was widely lauded. It was counted as one of the top 100 
theological works of the 20th Century by Christianity Today alongside 
Gutierrez’s A Theology of Liberation and Moltmann’s The Crucified God.68 Volf’s 
work brought a unique perspective to issues of identity, exclusion, conflict and 
forgiveness in particular drawing heavily on his background as a Croat in 
Communist Yugoslavia and in the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s.  
Volf set out to respond to the issue of conflict in an intensely personal way. His 
central question is ‘How does one remain loyal both to the demand of the 
oppressed for justice and to the gift of forgiveness that the Crucified offered the 
perpetrators?’69 Yet he tackles it within the context of his own experience as a 
Croat watching his country being torn apart and his attempt to find a way to 
embrace his ultimate ‘other’, the Serbian fighters known as ‘četnik’ who were 
raping, imprisoning, killing and destroying the homes of Croats and Bosnian 
Muslims (Bosniacs).  
The combination of rigorous theology and deeply personal wrestling with the 
possibilities of justice, forgiveness and reconciliation is perhaps the chief 
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attraction.70 It lends this particular work some of the urgency and importance of 
theologians such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer. It is theology which was not an 
intellectual exercise of interest but a necessity and spoke directly to the crises 
at hand. In many ways Volf’s work still speaks clearly to the continuing ‘messy’ 
post- conflict situation in Bosnia- Hercegovina and parts of Croatia. It is this 
interaction between Volf’s theology and context that will be the focus of this 
thesis. 
Whilst this thesis will stress the ways in which Volf’s work contributes to our 
understanding of justice, Exclusion and Embrace is not primarily about justice. 
Instead Volf characterises ethnic and cultural conflicts as being chiefly about 
identity and the negotiation of difference.71 Volf has subsequently noted that 
‘what is unique to the book is that these two set of tensions [justice versus 
forgiveness and identity versus otherness] are addressed together.’72 Volf 
suggests that a theology of human identity must come first. The secondary 
place of justice to the issue of identity offers a very different vantage point from 
which to begin thinking about justice, one which will be reflected throughout this 
thesis.  
Volf characterises the problematic notions of identity and difference as centred 
around a desire for exclusion. He begins with the ethnic cleansing as the most 
obvious and significant example of exclusion. It is a drive for ‘purity’, an attempt 
to live without the other. It is this refusal to make space for the other within 
one’s own sense of identity which Volf brands as exclusion. ‘Instead of 
reconfiguring myself to make space for the other, I seek to reshape the other 
into who I want her to be in order that in relation to her I may be who I want to 
be.’73 It is this desire to put the self first, to define oneself without reference to 
the other, or without reference to the other as she currently exists, which Volf 
argues can slide into violence. Less prominent are his brief comments on 
exclusion of the self. He argues that those who suffer may also have 
exclusionary identities, that is they may give over their own will to the other. 
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This is the ‘exclusion of their own self to be oneself….it is not so much sin as it 
is an evil that cries for remedy.’74  Volf is reluctant to name exclusion as the 
main form or source of sin, yet he is clear that it is that which ‘permeates a good 
many sins we commit against our neighbors.’75 Volf notes that the term 
exclusion is particularly useful in that it often highlights sins which are often 
named as virtues. He regards the term as reflecting Jesus’ practice of 
embracing the outcast whilst pointing to the sin of those who cast them out.76 
The opposite of exclusionary identities and modes of behaviour Volf labels 
‘embrace’. Embrace is termed a practice but in many senses it is also a type of 
identity, a way of understanding oneself and one’s relationships to others. Volf 
grounds this type of identity theologically. He looks first, as his theology always 
does, to Christ’s crucifixion and the Trinitarian love it expresses.  
Exclusion and Embrace was well received, to the extent that though a well 
known theological text, there is very little critical commentary. Mark 
Oppenheimer notes that ‘Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Volf’s career 
as a theologian is that there are no fights between Volfians and anti-Volfians. 
There don’t even seem to be any anti-Volfians.’77 Richard Mouw suggests that 
the lack of bad reviews is perhaps because ‘his is such a rare voice that no one 
wants to exclude him from the conversation.’78 Mild criticisms have been made 
of the way in which the non-violent thrust of Volf’s theology is not followed 
through to a full commitment to pacifism and some question the Trinitarian 
underpinnings of the theology of embrace (both are issues taken up within this 
thesis). 
This lack of serious sustained critique is perhaps because Volf’s diagnoses of 
the problems are well regarded, yet his solutions are sufficiently vague, or 
perhaps just so foundational (and largely apolitical) that few find fault. Instead 
they are at liberty to read his theology of embrace in such a way as to fit their 
own particular theological and political commitments. Of course in a sense this 
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is also what I will be doing. In doing so however I want to stress the ways in 
which I think Volf’s work has not been understood as the potentially radical text 
that it is. If his rejection of the status quo is to be taken seriously then our very 
understanding of the shape and character of justice, not just the practices of 
justice, must be significantly altered. In this sense the reading I suggest would 
provoke greater criticism, indeed it is a reading which Volf acknowledges exists 
in the book but from which he himself has now moved on.79 
 
1.4 Miroslav Volf and Jürgen Moltmann  
 
Volf’s own (named) dialogue partners are often philosophers rather than 
theologians. This is particularly true in Exclusion and Embrace in which the 
purpose is to reject a whole way of thinking which Volf saw as permeating both 
secular and much of Christian culture.  It also allowed Volf to set up his 
theological alternative as radically in opposition to the cultural norms of both 
modernity and postmodernity. However Volf has little sustained engagement 
with these writers, instead choosing a piecemeal approach. This is not to say 
Volf’s work is written without reference to other theologians. Moltmann is a huge 
influence on Volf’s work. The idea of eschatology and new creation which runs 
through Volf’s writing is almost entirely attributable to Moltmann. Indeed Volf 
explicitly sees himself as building on Moltmann’s eschatology.80 
Volf’s work can be seen as following on from Moltmann something Volf 
acknowledges in God Will Be All in All as well as in  Exclusion and Embrace 
where his task is in part a development of a new turn in Moltmann’s theology 
identified by Volf in The Spirit of Life. In the Spirit of Life  Moltmann turns to the 
idea of Christ’s atonement for perpatrators alongside his more traditional 
emphasis on solidarity with victims.81 Volf’s response is to ‘pick up and develop 
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the theme of divine self-donation for the enemies and their reception into the 
eternal communion of God.’82 
Moltmann and Volf both share a claim to take particular experiences as the 
‘initial source’ of their theology.83 Moltmann’s comes from his time as a prisoner 
of war in 1945-48 during which he became a Christian, his experience of the 
bombing of Dresden, and his subsequent desire to respond to complex post war 
issues. In a similar sense Volf is very much formed by his experiences as a 
Christian family in a communist state, a conscripted soldier and as a witness to 
the Croatian conflict of the early 1990s.  
There is a great similarity between the concerns of Volf and Moltmann. 
Moltmann’s words in The Trinity and the Kingdom seem in particular to 
foreshadow Volf’s theology of embrace. Moltmann writes in reference to 
knowledge of the Trinity that  
by knowing or perceiving one participates in the life of the other. 
Here knowing does not transform the counterpart into the property 
of the knower; the knower does not appropriate what he knows. On 
the contrary, he is transformed through sympathy, becoming a 
participator in what he perceives. Knowledge confers fellowship. 
That is why, knowing, perception, only goes as far as love, 
sympathy and participation reach. Where the theological 
perception of God and his history is concerned, there will be a 
modern discovery of trinitarian thinking  when there is at the same 
time a fundamental change in modern reason -  a change from 
lordship to fellowship, from conquest to participation, from 
production to receptivity. The new theological penetration of the 
trinitarian history of God ought also to free the reason that has 
been made operational – free it from receptive perception of its 
Other, free it for participation in that Other.84 
 
Along with these striking similarities, there are significant differences. This is 
particularly evident in the way that Volf’s work carries on Moltmann’s but in a 
less explicitly or concretely, political way. Moltmann’s aim is to relate the Trinity 
to society – but he also had to do much of the groundwork in order that this 
relationship (of the Trinity to society) should be explained, which Volf does not. 
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Once this is done Moltmann seems to move towards the language of liberation 
(which Volf is wary of) and to suggest more specific political action than Volf 
would be comfortable with. For example, Moltmann writes that ‘in so far as the 
vicious circle of poverty is produced by exploitation and class domination, social 
justice can only be achieved by a redistribution of economic power….socialism 
is the symbol for the liberation of men from the vicious cycle of poverty.’85 
Similarly he declares that ‘the Declaration of Human Rights may be taken as a 
standard for democratic justice.’86 Again, Volf would be uncomfortable with such 
a firm statement. Volf is insistent that as a theologian he should ‘refrain from 
making proposals about how these ethical principles should be translated into 
concrete policy.’87 Volf repeats this type of statement many times and is very 
wary of taking Trinitarian theology and analogy too far and claiming divine 
approval for any social system or political ideology. 
 
Section 2 - Aims and Methodology of Thesis   
 
The relationship of Miroslav Volf’s work to its context has inspired both the aims 
and the methodology of this thesis. It suggests that engaging Volf’s work in the 
present Balkan context may be fruitful in drawing out the implications of his 
theology, and that his theology has resources to offer back to the context. 
Volf’s theology is always engaged with context. In Exclusion and Embrace this 
context is the final stages of the Balkan conflict.88 For Volf, the idea that context 
should form his theological engagement seems obvious. He writes that ‘I chose 
not even to try the impossible. I, a citizen of a world at war and a follower of 
Jesus Christ, could not hang up my commitments, desires, rebellions, 
resignations, and uncertainties like a coat on a coat rack before entering my 
study, to be taken up and put on when the work of the day was over.’89 Volf’s 
point here is not that the context of the Balkan conflict was significant enough to 
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warrant reflection, rather that Christian theology should begin from experience 
of the Christian way of life and should seek to offer something back to that way 
of life.90 Reflecting on the ways in which Christian life can be understood in 
response to the context in which it is to be lived out is therefore integral to Volf’s 
theological approach. 
 Volf writes as a member of a wounded nation and ethnic group, but also as one 
with responsibility to find a way of relating to former enemies. As has been 
noted, the question of how Volf might personally respond to the conflict is the 
motivating factor in the theology of embrace.91 In later works such as Free of 
Charge (2006) context also plays a significant role as Volf seeks to offer a 
corrective to the American (or perhaps simply affluent Western) tendency to 
understand God in consumerist terms.92 In a different way After Our Likeness  
responds to a specific church context.93  
In allowing context to shape and inform his work, Volf is not labelling himself as 
a ‘contextual theologian’ however.94 His work does fit a broad category of 
contextual theology ‘understood as the interpretation of Christian faith which is 
conscious of the situation and connection for shaping theology.’95 However, 
despite origins in the Balkan context Volf’s work is not a contextual theology in 
the sense of ‘completely determined by its context.’96  This is because, whilst 
Volf does speak back to the initial context, he moves away from it in seeking to 
come to more universal claims rather than particular claims related only to the 
context in hand.97  
In Exclusion and Embrace there is an express wish to respond to the issues 
raised by the Balkan conflict. However, as the work progresses his aim is to 
work in broader terms which also speak to other situations of conflict and 
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ultimately to all human beings ensnared in sinful relationships.98 Volf’s work is 
therefore informed by but not limited to its own context. 
In Exclusion and Embrace the Balkan conflict clearly instigates Volf’s reflection 
and it is this which gives his theology a sense of urgency and necessity. The 
context is kept in sight as a situation which requires a theological response. 
Whilst Volf uses the context as a starting point and proceeds to make 
theological points with a broader application, he does still seek (to some extent) 
to address the context in his conclusions. These suggest that ‘consistent non-
retaliation and nonviolence will be impossible in the world of violence’ but that 
violence should not ‘seek legitimation in the religion that worships the crucified 
Messiah.’99 This limited return to address the context can seem partial and 
vague. A. James Reimer has critiqued the notion of embrace as not offering 
‘concrete terms’ for practice.100 In response, I aim to take an approach which 
seeks to complete the movement from context to theology by returning back to 
context. I aim to go some way towards completing the relationship of context 
and theology by seeking to show the impact Volf’s work could potentially have.  
The central aim of this thesis is therefore to draw from Volf’s theology an 
understanding of justice which is informed by, and offers a practical response 
to, the context of the Balkan conflict. The relationship of theology and context 
found in Volf’s work informs my own project and thus also informs the methods 
and approaches I have taken. This thesis seeks to move from a dialogue 
between Volf’s theology and the post-conflict Balkan context towards an 
understanding of the character of justice and finally practices of justice which 
might in turn serve that context. My approach is therefore strongly defined by 
the need to understand and engage with the context of Croatia and Bosnia in 
the present. 
In this section I will firstly set out the aims of the thesis. Tackling these aims first 
should in turn illuminate the need for the methodological approach taken. 
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Secondly, I will set out my method. I have chosen a particular approach 
including interviews and engagement with anthropological material. This is in 
order that the aims of the thesis might be achieved more thoroughly and with a 
greater level of contextual understanding and engagement than might otherwise 
have been possible.  
In the following I will set out my own approach to engaging the context of post-
conflict Croatia and Bosnia. This is both through interviews and through my use 
of non-theological sources such as anthropological studies and NGO 
documents.  
 
2.1 Research Question and Aims 
 
 ‘Can the resources in Volf’s theology of embrace address the problems of post-
conflict justice in Bosnia and Croatia?’ is the question at the heart of this thesis. 
I will suggest in response that Volf’s theology does address the problems of 
justice in three particular ways. Firstly, through identifying the root causes of 
problematic justice as problems of identity. Secondly, Volf’s work offers an 
account of identity which addresses existing hard identities which inhibit justice. 
And, thirdly, through offering a theology of the Trinity which roots his 
understanding of identity and offers resource for an enlarged account of human 
justice. Finally, I will suggest that this account of justice can be understood in 
terms which directly relate to the practice of justice, offering the possibility that 
Volf’s work might reshape and re-orientate practices of justice in the post-
conflict Balkans. 
In the following I will outline how the thesis will seek to answer this central 
question. 
Justice  
The first chapter will seek to explore the problem of justice in Bosnia and 
Croatia and to assess the ways in which Volf’s theology identifies and 
addresses these issues. The thesis aims to find within Volf’s theology of 
embrace, the foundations for an account of justice which deals with the complex 
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and multilayered problems of post-conflict justice in the Balkans. The thesis 
aims to show that Volf’s work, in responding to the conflict of the 1990s, offers 
an analysis of the key issues underlying that conflict which may also apply to 
the post-conflict situation. In identifying the issue of identity as at the core of 
conflicting claims to justice he moves beyond an attempt to address particular 
issues towards an overarching narrative of that which underpins most human 
conflict.101 This means that his work still has great potential to address the 
current issues, specifically post-conflict justice. I aim to show that whilst Volf 
does not offer a full reading and account of justice, his work does offer the 
resources for constructing an account of justice which addresses the needs of 
the current post-conflict situation. 102   
It is widely accepted that there are ongoing problems of justice in the post-
conflict Balkans, the most significant or all-encompassing of these being the 
issue of justice.103 Engagement with NGO reports and anthropological accounts 
of the situation will be used to draw out the nature of these problems.104  
I will suggest that Volf’s understanding of the problems of justice can illuminate 
the roots of the current issues. In doing so, his work offers resources for an 
alternative account of justice which addresses these issues. The thesis will build 
towards the suggestion that Volf’s eschatological vision of justice, rooted in the 
Trinity, potentially offers resources to tackle the problems which currently exist. I 
will then seek to flesh out the characteristics of justice which are suggested by 
my reading of Volf’s work. 
The chapter on justice seeks to define the problems of justice in Bosnia and 
Croatia which require a response and then to illuminate the ways in which Volf’s 
work can respond to these issues. The key fields of discussion in this chapter 
are context and theology. I do not engage extensively with philosophical 
theories of justice. Volf’s own engagement with theories of justice is not one of 
deep engagement. He briefly engages with Rawls and Kant, but only in order to 
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reject the possibility of any theory of justice accounting for justice.105 The 
nuances of different theories of justice have no significance in reading Volf’s 
work because it is not a conversation Volf is involved in. Volf’s own proposal is 
of a different type. It is a theological vision of just living. For this reason I found 
interaction with the theological account of justice found in Nicholas 
Wolterstorff’s work more useful in drawing out the nuances of Volf’s work. 
Drawing out the resources of Volf’s work and engaging them with the context is 
the key aim of this chapter. Comparing accounts of justice is not the central aim. 
 
Identity 
I aim to show that identity is a root cause of the problems of justice identified in 
chapter one. The focus will be on engaging Volf’s work with the contextual 
issues to suggest that identity formation is the central issue, rather than the 
content of identity. I suggest that identities which are formed in ways which 
focus on excluding the other will inhibit the pursuit of justice. If justice requires a 
sense of mutuality, which this thesis will argue, identities which exclude cannot 
be identities which pursue justice. I will suggest that the way identities are 
formed in Bosnia and Croatia needs to be reconfigured in order that future 
pursuit of justice might be fruitful. In Volf’s theology of embrace there is a clear 
resource which addresses the contextual issues. This theology suggests that 
the self and other are inescapably in relationship.106 It suggests that positive 
identities are formed when mutuality is acknowledged and the other is allowed 
to shape the self, yet distinction between persons is maintained. It is an 
understanding of identity which tackles the type of identities which inhibit justice 
in Bosnia and Croatia. The intention in this chapter is to move from an 
engagement with context, which demonstrates the ways in which Volf’s work 
might serve problems of post-conflict justice, towards a theological reading of 
his work on identity which is founded in the Trinity. Identity theories are 
engaged to some degree in order to show what Volf does not do. However, 
Volf’s understanding of human embrace is not formed primarily in dialogue with 
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identity theorists. He writes ‘we, the others... are embraced by the divine 
persons who love us with the same love with which they love each other and 
therefore make space for us within their own eternal embrace.’107 The 
understanding of identity found in embrace emerges from Volf’s theology of the 
Trinity and is thus best understood in reference to Moltmann.108 
 
Trinity 
In rooting Volf’s theology of embrace in the Trinity, I will aim to come to the 
heart of Volf’s theological work. For Volf ‘the triune God stands at the beginning 
and the end...and therefore at the center of Christian faith.’109 Similarly, I will 
seek to draw the discussion of justice and identity into dialogue with Volf’s 
theology of Trinity. It would not be possible to move directly from contextual 
problems of justice to the Trinity. It is the movement from the problems of justice 
to the root issue of identity, understood through Volf’s theological lens, which 
suggest that ultimately it is the Trinity which contains the resources to address 
the problems of justice in the Balkans. It is Volf’s theology of the Trinity that 
order to give a firmly rooted theological account of justice back to the context in 
question, I suggest that it is possible to read Volf’s understanding of embrace, 
the Trinity and justice as locating justice within the life of the Trinity. I will argue 
that this is a logical step which gives the fullest account of justice. I will aim to 
show that Volf’s parameters of divine –human analogy offer a way of 
understanding the justice of the Trinity in human terms. It offers an enlarged 
justice, that is a sense of justice whose end is love and is defined by perfect 
giving and receiving. I aim to show that this notion of justice offers a clear 
response to the problems of post-conflict justice. 
Conclusions 
This thesis poses the question ‘In what ways might Volf’s theology of embrace 
address the problems of post-conflict justice in Bosnia and Croatia?’ The 
response will be that Volf offers multiple resources which address the problems, 
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firstly in naming and identifying the problems which underlie the evident 
problems of justice in practice. These root problems are the way in which 
injustice is named as justice and exclusionary identities inhibit the possibility of 
resolving conflicting justice claims. Volf’s theology is a resource which 
illuminates the problems of identity construction and offers embrace as an 
alternative to address the complex identity issues in Bosnia and Croatia. Finally 
Volf roots his understanding of identity in the Trinity. In this way the Trinity, 
which forms identity, in turn forms the content of justice. It is thus ultimately in 
the Trinity that Volf’s theology becomes the greatest resource for addressing 
the issues of post-conflict justice in Bosnia and Croatia. Volf’s understanding of 
the Trinity can be read as offering an enlarged account of human justice. It is a 
justice which is prioritises human relations, addressing the problems of identity 
and thus goes on to address the problems of justice. It is a resource which is 
both deeply theological and can offer characteristics of justice which might 
shape (or re-shape) practices of justice in the Balkans.  
In chapter four I will offer concluding reflections on the ways in which the 
resources found in Volf’s theology can form specific characteristics of justice. I 
will suggest ways in which those characteristics might shape the practice and 
pursuit of justice in Bosnia and Croatia. 
 
2.2  Methodology: Interviews 
 
As part of the research for this thesis I undertook two sets of interviews 
(November 2007 and December 2008). The central aim was to gain a deeper 
insight into the current situation and the range of perspectives individuals hold 
on post-conflict issues. This approach seemed helpful given that Volf’s work 
engages with issues of identity and relationships which are often intangible and 
not easily captured in historical texts, NGO reports or survey statistics. Whilst I 
use all of these secondary materials in order to give an overview of the current 
situation, I wanted to gain a sense of personal perspectives, of experience, 
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feelings and attitudes. Interviews were proposed as a way of directly engaging 
with personal and emotional responses to post-conflict issues.  
Whilst these aims were fulfilled and the interviews offered a broader 
understanding of the context, difficulties in practice meant that not all interviews 
were able to be fully utilised.  
Aims of the interviews 
The key aim of the interviews was to obtain perceptions of the current situation 
and to get a sense of hopes and fears for the future. The aim was to ‘probe’ and 
to learn rather than to analyse data.110 This aim informed my approach. Instead 
of closed questions or a questionnaire I focused in on topics which had 
emerged from my reading of Volf’s work, media, historical accounts of the 
conflict and information on post-conflict processes such as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). I decided to take a semi-
structured approach to interviews.111 This aimed to give a balance between pre-
determined questions which focused on topics of interest to this research 
project, whilst also allowing flexibility to pursue other issues which might arise in 
interview. A more structured approach would not have allowed for the personal 
responses I want to obtain, although the data might have been more uniform. 
An unstructured interview would have advantages in that interviewees would be 
entirely free to raise their own points.112 This tends to be the choice of 
ethnographers for this reason.113 However, given the limits of time and the need 
to address areas of interest in the thesis, this approach was also rejected.  
With this approach in mind I compiled a series of questions which could begin a 
discussion. The intention was to focus on a topic and to proceed with questions 
or conversation as appropriate. The first set of interviews focused on the 
peaceworkers roles and motivations. In the second set I aimed to address a 
number of issues including justice, reconciliation and memory primarily.114 
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Questions were designed to cover three areas. Firstly, perspectives on 
community experience, reconciliation efforts and the role of religious 
communities. Secondly, I questioned perceptions of national and international 
justice processes and attitudes towards them. Thirdly, I addressed attitudes to 
remembrance. The interviews were focused on obtaining perspectives on 
common events, processes or issues. I had supplementary questions for 
professionals about specific church efforts, peace projects and legal processes. 
The questions were loosely ordered so that introductory questions appeared 
first.115 Not all questions were used since they acted as prompts. 
The semi-structured nature of the interviews meant that whilst the focus was 
defined, I did not expect the answers to fit a particular pattern. The questions as 
a whole aimed to probe whether Volf’s understanding of the key issues as those 
of conflicting justice claims and the root problem of identity were a) shared by 
interviewees or b) an accurate assessment of post-conflict perspectives. I did 
not expect interviewees to name identity as the key issue or to critique the 
justice processes as intrinsically flawed, I did expect that their answers might 
offer support to this view however.  
Interviews in practice 
In practice the interviews were more complicated than planned. I undertook two 
research trips (November 2007 and December 2008). On the first trip I 
conducted three interviews through contacts already known to me. These were 
with peaceworkers encountered in an office environment. These interviewees 
were cognisant with research methods and were happy to be interviewed in a 
formal capacity signing to confirm they were happy for interviews to be used 
and published.116  
In December 2008 I sought a second sample in order to expand the range of 
perspectives obtained beyond professional peace workers. This goal meant that 
the second sample were therefore indirect contacts, previously unknown to me. 
They were not available for email or phone contact in advance and were 
therefore not willing to engage in the formal arrangements necessary to make 
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the interviews publishable, primarily signing a waiver. Whilst this second group 
were happy to engage in conversation, they did not wish to do engage with the 
necessary formalities required to make an interview useable. They did not 
consent to the formal guidelines of an interview. For this reason I am only able 
to directly quote the first group of interviewees. The second sample was thus 
disappointing, although the conversations were still valuable in extending the 
personal knowledge and understanding brought to the contextual questions in 
this thesis. However, their influence remains necessarily in the background of 
this thesis, rather than the foreground.  
 
Result of the interviews  
The results of the interview process were mixed. In informing my own 
perspective and offering insight into the materials under discussion in this 
thesis, they were hugely valuable. However the lack of understanding of the 
required formalities for academic interviews increased by language and cultural 
barriers was problematic when I sought to increase my sample beyond those 
with professional interests. The desire for a sample of perspectives wider than 
my existing contacts meant this was largely inevitable. These practical 
difficulties, mean the second group were merely conversation partners, rather 
than interviewees. On a personal level these contacts and conversations have 
informed my understanding of the context. 
In the interviews with peace workers engagement with Volf’s work was evident. 
Interviews suggested that dialogue was of huge importance and that right 
recognition of the other and truth telling were central to this practice. These 
practices had shown fruit through efforts on behalf of participants to expand 
their relationships beyond the dialogue events themselves.117 This suggested 
that the resources found in Volf’s work could have significant impact when 
understood in terms of practices of justice. 
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Interview with Volf 
In September 2009 I was able to interview Miroslav Volf. This was arranged 
directly with him and he was happy to answer questions. I took a semi-
structured approach again. Questions focused on discrepancies between his 
work in the way it dealt with justice and Volf’s view on the current contextual 
issues. Limitations of time meant that the conversation was not as expansive as 
might have been hoped. However it offered valuable insight into Volf’s current 
perspective on justice which has not yet been explored in his published work.118 
 
2.3 Methodology: Approach to Sources 
 
In seeking to ground the research in an understanding of the post-conflict 
Balkans I have turned to anthropological studies and NGO reports. These texts 
are used to offer support for my own observations and because they offer 
perspectives and comment on the ways in which people groups have interacted 
with and responded to existing justice processes.  They offer a supplement to 
my own research through engaging with more comprehensive overviews of 
wartime experiences, present attitudes and social relations.  
NGO reports (including Amnesty and Human Rights Watch) offer surveys of 
justice issues across regions and countries which would not otherwise be 
available. They offer statistics on criminal processes and observations of how 
processes are conducted.119   
Anthropological material primarily comes from a collected work ‘The New 
Bosnian Mosaic’ which includes a range of participant observation studies.120 121 
That is studies which involve living within the communities in question. In these 
cases the material collected was qualitative. The resulting papers offer insight 
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into the daily lives of particular identity groups and their perspectives on political 
and social changes. This was particularly useful in clarifying the complexity of 
identity in Bosnia as well as indicating a degree of commonality in how those 
identities are expressed, that is in adversarial or exclusionary forms. This 
anthropological material is used to provide evidence for and support to 
contextual assertions made in this thesis. 
In referencing anthropological and NGO data I do not intend to engage in an 
anthropological discussion. I engaged with the evidence which had been 
documented to support the view that justice processes are perceived by main to 
have failed participants. I also reference these materials in order support the 
assertion that identity issues can be seen as having a significant and ongoing 
role in perceptions of justice. 
Having used anthropological and NGO findings in this way the thesis goes on to 
engage primarily with theological literature in order to draw out the key 
theological elements of Volf’s work and to go beyond Volf in constructing a 
response to the contextual problems of justice. I will use theories of justice and 
theories of identity only in so far as they serve to elucidate Volf’s theology. This 
project is not a comparative study of approaches to justice (or identity). It seeks 
to identify and draw out of Volf’s work theological resources which can directly 
engage with problems of justice in the Balkans, but which have not been fully 
developed.  
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Chapter 1: Justice 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Many years after the conflict, several thousand complaints related to 
crimes committed during the war remain unresolved in Bosnia. These 
cases may involve extremely grave crimes and many people who are 
responsible for directly perpetrating atrocities. Victims of these 
crimes, and their families, have been waiting for more than a decade 
to see justice done.’122 
 
The problems of implementing justice are heightened after a conflict such as 
that in Bosnia and Croatia in the early 1990s. Thousands of crimes have gone 
unpunished and many remain unacknowledged. This is due in part to the 
“messy” nature of this type of conflict where neighbours kill and rape each 
other, where one half of the town turns on the other, where the victims and the 
perpetrators become confused. 123 Unsurprisingly the recently warring 
participants in justice find it hard to agree on what a just outcome both for the 
region and for the individuals now standing trial looks like. One person’s war 
criminal is another’s national hero. The problem of continuing (largely non-
violent) conflict between parties may also be due to the fact that no justice will 
ever be complete. It is inevitable that in the race to catch the big name war 
criminals those who committed “only” one small war crime might escape the 
rule of law. In a system where evidence and proof are required the confusion of 
war allows criminals to be named innocent.  
In this chapter I will suggest that this popular opinion, i.e., that justice has not 
been done, is in fact correct; that in Croatia and Bosnia there is a failure of 
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justice. War crimes have gone unpunished and unrecorded; there are injustices 
and ethnic bias within the judicial processes and continuing conflict as to the 
demands of justice. I will also suggest that Miroslav Volf’s theology is a much 
needed response both to these practical and procedural problems and to critical 
issues which the philosophical and ethical theories of justice underlying such 
practices fail to address. I will argue that his theology points towards an 
enlarged understanding of justice. That is an understanding of justice which 
goes beyond procedure and beyond philosophical or ethical theories of justice. I 
will finally argue that this enlarged understanding of justice, founded in Volf’s 
theology, has broad implications for the future practice of justice (with particular 
reference to post-conflict justice). 
Where other chapters examine Volf’s focus on identity and the trinitarian 
foundations of justice, this chapter seeks to draw out an understanding of his 
theology within a context of justice processes in Croatia and Bosnia. Whilst I will 
move in my final chapter to focus on a more systematic theological approach in 
dealing with the Trinity, I will seek here to have a greater emphasis on context 
and practice. The aim is to engage Volf’s theology with the current pressing 
issues of justice in the Balkans so that it might then be possible to assess what 
contribution his theology can make when taken back into the context from which 
it emerged. 
Firstly, drawing on independent observers of the judicial justice processes and 
personal interviews, I will suggest that there is clearly a problem with justice in 
the Balkans. Processes of justice fail to be just both in the eyes of observers 
and in terms of the aims set down by the judiciary themselves. I will use this 
empirical evidence to support Volf’s theological claim that the current pursuit of 
justice fails to be truly just.124 
I will then suggest that analysis of the reasons for the problems differs between 
independent observers such as Human Rights Watch and Volf. That is to say 
Volf sees a need to look beyond the undeniable problems of justice processes 
towards a broader questioning of the philosophical and theological 
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underpinnings of the conceptions of justice which inform such processes. Volf’s 
theology suggests that an inaccurate assumption of the capabilities of human 
beings to carry out justice and a false vision of justice are at the heart of the 
failure of justice to achieve social restoration. Observers are broadly uncritical of 
the theories of justice which underpin the processes themselves. Instead they 
focus on the failure to implement the processes justly. Volf’s theology suggests 
that the failure of justice in practice is due to the fact that the theories of justice 
upon which these practices are based are fundamentally flawed. Such a broad 
critique of human justice theories as a whole is an unusual and radical step. I 
think that if we take Volf’s critiques seriously the parameters of discussion on 
justice need to both shift and broaden. The debate must move from a focus on 
distribution of dues and the inherent notion of justice as about victim versus 
perpetrator towards a notion of justice focused on the restoration of relationship. 
Having identified that there is a problem with justice and compared the 
understandings of why these problems exist I will turn in section 3 to the 
question of whether such problems mean that in some sense justice has failed. 
I will follow Volf’s proposition that human justice does fail and by its very nature 
will always fail. This assertion, that human justice cannot be complete justice, is 
based upon both Volf’s expectations of justice and his understanding of what 
partial justice is (that is justice in the present, before the new creation). Volf’s 
expectations of justice are limited in terms of what can be achieved in the 
present but enlarged in terms of the ultimate scope of justice. -  
Volf’s own attempt to address the failings of justice practices and justice 
theories comes through a theological understanding of justice founded in an 
eschatological vision. Volf inherits from Moltmann an eschatological thread 
which runs through all of his work. For Volf, the question how should we live 
always refers us back to the ‘new creation’ which God has in store.125 He begins 
his understanding of what justice is and should be by seeking to understand 
what justice will be like after the eschaton when human beings participate in the 
justice of God. I will seek to show that Volf’s vision of justice is centred on the 
relational conception of identity founded in the Trinity at the heart of the 
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theology of embrace. That is, that the scope of justice is so great that it 
becomes bound up with and almost equivalent to love and thus embrace. 
Finally I will seek to take Volf’s theological conception of justice back to the 
Balkan context. I will sketch the type of justice his vision may preclude and the 
way in which justice practices might respond to this. These ideas will be drawn 
out more fully in the following chapters. 
Furthermore in this chapter I shall touch on broader themes. Using justice as a 
key, conclusions can be drawn as to the types of theory of practice Volf rejects, 
and why, and the type of theology he would like to do instead. This theological 
approach will be drawn out in chapter three. 
Before tackling the issues and questions set out above it is important to 
understand the way in which justice will be dealt with here, what I mean by the 
term and the different types of justice I will refer to. Secondly, it is important to 
note where justice comes within the larger framework of Volf’s theology of 
embrace. 
 
Three Types of Justice 
It is difficult to engage Miroslav Volf’s work on justice within a broader context. 
There is no one text devoted to the subject although he often touches upon it 
and there is a great deal of his theology which is implicitly relevant. Volf does 
offer some critiques of justice theory, mostly in Exclusion and Embrace. 
However he does not have sustained engagement with any particular theorist. 
Instead he briefly mentions Rawls and many others as representative of a range 
of views most of which he wishes to dismiss as inadequate.126 Volf’s main point 
seems to be that philosophical theories of justice as a whole are wildly 
inadequate for Christians. Their ideas of the good are not ones which can 
simply be co-opted and given a theological gloss. Instead Christian reflection on 
justice must be orientated around and towards the central theological ideas (for 
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Volf at least) of Trinity and eschatology as the time when human beings 
perfectly participate in the triune life.127 
Despite these difficulties of engaging Volf in clear terms with specific justice 
theorists, it is useful to briefly clarify the types of justice referred to in this 
chapter. 
Firstly I will refer to justice in terms of practices of justice or procedural justice. 
These include legal processes, trials, international and national courts, the work 
of the police, efforts to enforce rights and highlight where human rights are 
being abused and even informal mediation and dialogue work. This is the 
narrowest conception of justice. This type of justice in practice is a major 
concern of this chapter where I will seek to demonstrate that justice practices 
are inadequate in post-conflict Bosnia and Croatia. The reason for this 
inadequacy I will suggest is that practices tend to be, knowingly or unknowingly, 
predicated on inadequate philosophical conceptions of justice. 
Secondly I will reference philosophical or ethical conceptions and theories of 
justice. This is the most difficult group to pin down. In using this phrase I will 
intend to indicate the approaches to justice which Volf rejects as inadequate. He 
groups these as accounts of justice which calculate, equalise, legalise or 
universalise actions.128 This rejection, the reasons for it and the type of justice 
which is proposed instead, are issues I will explore in this chapter. The scope of 
the theories he rejects, which can be defined in this way are numerous. The 
language suggests that what Volf is rejecting is an approach to justice which is 
focused on a universal account of actions which if adhered to will produce 
justice. The crux of the argument in this chapter is that no prescription of this 
sort can ever produce justice. Lebacqz offers a more precise critique than Volf 
which is perhaps helpful in illuminating this category of justice. She writes that 
such accounts of justice ‘attempt to reason out a theory of justice that is lacking 
in historical particularity...presumes that there will be one standard of ‘justice’ 
universally applicable to all people in all places and at all times...and that this 
                                            
127
 Miroslav Volf, ‘The Final Reconciliation: Reflections on a Social Dimension of the 
Eschatological Transition’, 106. 
128
 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 223. 
51 
 
standard can be derived by logical deduction from a mindset of assumptions.’129 
It is justice theories which make these assumptions which I will refer to as 
‘theories of justice’. 
Thirdly is the theological account of justice which I aim to propose building upon 
Volf’s theology of embrace which is rooted in the triune God. In this thesis I aim 
to argue for a theological account of justice based on Volf’s theology, but going 
beyond it, that is ‘enlarged justice’. By enlarged I mean a sense of justice which 
goes beyond procedures, practices, philosophy and ethical theories or codes. 
Yet I do not mean entirely a sense of justice which dispenses with these since 
an enlarged sense of justice which cannot offer an understanding of what 
justice might look like in practice is futile. Instead I mean that the sense of 
justice I will be proposing cannot be pinned down by practices or by a 
philosophical theory. More importantly in this thesis I will argue, justice cannot 
be understood primarily in these two senses, and that to base our 
understanding of justice on practices, processes, philosophical theories or 
ethical codes is misguided in that we will fail to understand the full scope and 
content of justice. I will be proposing that an enlarged sense of justice (with 
theological grounds) must always precede an ethical code or the 
implementation of any practice or procedure. This is a central idea in this thesis. 
 
The Place of Justice within the Theology of Embrace 
As I suggested above, there are three key approaches to the subject of justice 
in play here, justice understood in terms of practice, ethical-philosophical 
concepts or theology. Volf’s understanding of justice is firmly rooted in his 
theology. More than this, it is rooted in the doctrine of the Trinity which Volf 
understands as the beginning and end of the Christian faith, the core doctrine 
which informs all else. His theology of embrace is about bridging the gap 
between the triune life and human life. It can be understood as a metaphor for 
both the life of the Trinity and for the way in which human beings can participate 
in and image the Triune life. By rooting justice in the theology of embrace (and 
thus in the central Christian doctrine of the Trinity), and in finding embrace and 
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justice as almost (although importantly not quite) coterminous, Volf is placing 
justice right at the heart of the Christian faith and arguing that it is not a concept 
which can be considered separately or primarily in terms of pragmatics. 
For Volf justice must be understood within the context of the ultimate revelation 
of the triune God in Christ’s death. For Volf, Christ’s death is about God’s desire 
to embrace the world, to bring the world into the communion of the Trinity. If we 
are to understand justice within the context of this revelation then God’s justice 
must also be about a desire to live in total communion with the other. 
Essentially Volf understands the theology of embrace as an attempt to marry 
‘the demand of the oppressed for justice and…the gift of forgiveness that the 
Crucified offered to the perpetrators.’130 His question is “how can justice be 
satisfied but the perpetrator be forgiven?” Volf’s theology of embrace is also an 
attempt to go beyond forgiveness in attempting to answer Jürgen Moltmann’s 
personal question: ‘But can you embrace a četnik?’131  
Here we see two aims within Volf’s theological response. Firstly there is the aim 
to answer the potentially paradoxical need for both justice and forgiveness 
within the Christian faith and to understand God as both just and forgiving. 
Secondly, Volf is seeking to understand how the demands of both forgiveness 
and justice might be simultaneously embodied within his own life and the lives 
of others. 
Volf looks to answer his own question by enlarging our understanding of justice. 
That is, he seeks to understand God’s action of forgiveness and embrace as not 
contrary to but as integral to justice, and justice as integral to embrace. In order 
to marry these two, Volf rejects human theories of justice as both limited in their 
vision of what justice is and destructive in practice.  
As has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, the Trinity is central to all of 
Volf’s theology. Just as it is the Trinitarian life that inspires the image of 
embrace, it is also the Trinitarian life which informs Volf’s understanding of what 
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justice might be. This understanding of justice within the Trinity goes on to 
influence Volf’s vision of eschatological justice.  
Here we see embrace as both including justice and superseding justice. 
Embrace here is about more than forgiveness. It is an acknowledgement of 
justice’s demands but a refusal to pursue what is due and a will for the other to 
enter into embrace. Embrace is about a pursuit of a state of justice or right 
relationship with the other. To get to this understanding of the relationship of 
justice and embrace Volf has to reconsider what justice is, first deconstructing 
human notions of justice and then partially reconstructing justice based on the 
Triune life and an eschatological vision. 
 
Deconstructing Justice 
 
Initially Volf sets out to essentially deconstruct most of our assumptions about 
what justice is and what role justice has in human relationships. This first set of 
questions will focus on the problems of justice and their underlying causes from 
the perspective of NGOs, Volf and other commentators. Whilst considering this 
first section however, it is important to note that Volf’s aim in highlighting these 
issues is to make space for a subsequent partial reconstruction of a positive 
understanding of justice. My identification of this movement in his work is 
supported by the fact that his later writing, from within an American cultural 
context, emphasises a much more traditional dues or rights based 
understanding of justice, a point we will return to.132 The second half of this 
chapter will focus in on Volf’s vision of justice and the role this new 
understanding of justice might play in addressing the issues current justice 
theory and practice fails to deal with. 
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Section 1 - The Problem of Justice in the Balkans  
 
Reports from organisations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) who are 
monitoring war crimes trials in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia indicate that there is 
 bias on the part of judges and prosecutors, poor case preparation by 
prosecutors, inadequate cooperation from the police in the conduct of 
investigations, poor cooperation between the states on judicial 
matters, and ineffective witness protection mechanisms.133 
 
The key elements here are essentially problems of attitude (bias) which are 
closely linked to failures in practice (for example ineffective policing). Findings 
like these indicate that there are serious problems within the transitional justice 
processes of Bosnia and Croatia that need to be addressed. In addressing the 
question of problems within the existing justice system I will suggest that 
whereas most critics of the justice processes in the former Yugoslavia are 
focused on failures in practice and seek to address issues of bias with ‘better’ 
processes, Volf would see the issues in this particular case as merely illustrative 
of a comprehensive failure of all human conceptions of justice to be truly just to 
all. Whereas those such as HRW seem to believe that existing processes can 
be ‘fixed’ Volf would want to say that the evident problems of justice in the 
Balkans mean we need to rethink our understanding of what justice is and how 
we might best pursue it. 
 1.0a Transitional Justice 
Both my observations on justice and those of the nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs) are focused on the judicial aspects of transitional justice. 
This is partly because whilst transitional justice now has a wide remit which 
includes reconciliation practices and non-judicial elements, the judicial 
processes are still the official (government and international community backed) 
means to pursue justice. It is also perhaps the focus in terms of assessing 
justice because such processes seem easier to measure in terms of success 
and failure. It is hard to measure whether justice is achieved through 
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reconciliation practices or other means because the understanding of what 
justice might look like in these situations is much more subjective and 
debateable.  
 In Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina judicial transitional justice consists of 
nationally administrated courts and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).134 The first is seen as by outside commentators as more 
susceptible to pervasive bias because it is administrated primarily by the 
dominant ethnic groups of each country. The later tends to be seen by 
Bosnians, Croats and Serbs as overly politicised and biased towards ‘the other’. 
The perceptions of course conflict. However, it seems that all parties can agree 
to some degree that the existing justice processes have problems. 
1.1 What are the problems of justice in Bosnia and Croatia? 
1.1a Local and National Justice 
 
Case Study: One peace worker from eastern Slavonia (Croatia) told 
me about her efforts to bring a witness to court. He was a Croat who 
had witnessed nineteen Serbs being killed by Croats in a nearby 
village. After some persuasion he eventually made a witness 
statement to this effect. By the time of the court appearance he had 
been threatened and intimidated. He was offered no protection by the 
police. When he finally appeared in (the Croatian) court, before the 
confident accused and the victims’ families, he declared that he knew 
nothing. 135 
 
This interviewee’s story supports the findings of NGOs observing the justice 
processes; that the key issues are bias and failures in procedures. Here we 
have ethnic bias running throughout the process from the level of the individuals 
who has to be persuaded to testify, the community of families who intimidate 
him, the police force who refuse to protect someone who has stood up for the 
                                            
134
 The ICTY was resolved upon in 1993, before the war in Bosnia and Croatia had even 
finished. It is therefore very much an international community initiative rather than having 
significant support or backing from within the groups involved in the conflict. This may be a 
contributing factor to the wide disregard for the ICTY, although commentators tend to see the 
non-partisan origins of the ICTY as beneficial. See Karine Lescure and Florence Trintignac, 
International Justice for the Former Yugoslavia; The Working of the International Criminal 
Tribunal of the Hague, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1996, 3  
135
 Interview November 2007, Appendix 3. 
56 
 
Serb victims and finally the court which fails to uncover the truth and acquits 
men who are known to be guilty. It is primarily ethnic bias that is the motivation 
for the failures to uphold the procedures of justice. Statistics of trials and 
convictions broken down into ethnic groups support this, as well as the reports 
of HRW and Amnesty.136 The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe’s monitoring suggests that 
 cases are processed less effectively and robustly where the 
defendants are members of the majority local community and where 
the prosecution witnesses are from the minority.137 
 
Evidence like this supports the claim that ethnic bias is at the root of a great 
deal of the problems in implementing justice. Similarly the Office of the High 
Representative suggests that 
there appears to be little confidence that such (war crimes) cases 
can be tried impartially, independently, and free of political, criminal 
or other influence or without ethnic bias. There is little faith that 
mono-ethnic courts could deliver impartial judgments. Many 
witnesses are reported to be afraid to testify and some of the officials 
involved are concerned for their own safety because of real or 
imagined threats from those who oppose such prosecutions.138 
 
The widely held negative perception of the justice processes highlighted here 
are also detrimental to the justice system. Essentially witnesses, officials and 
observers all doubt that the existing processes will be able to deliver an 
outcome that is just.  
There are problems at all stages of the judicial process. Pre-trial issues include 
the fact that many war criminals have not been taken to court at all, their crimes 
                                            
136
 Human Rights Watch, Still Waiting: Bringing Justice for War Crimes, Crimes against 
Humanity, and Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Cantonal and District Courts, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/62137/section/2, 08/02/2009 and Amnesty International ‘The 
Balkans:  Summary of Amnesty International’s Concerns in the Region’ January – June 2007, 
http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR050032007?open&of=ENG-2U5, 
12/02/2008 
137
 OSCE, War Crimes Trials Before the Domestic Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Progress 
and Obstacles, March 2005, http://www.oscebih.org/documents/1407-eng.pdf, 10/02/2009 
138
 Office of the High Representative, “The Future of Domestic War Crimes in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, OHR, May 2002 in OSCE, War Crimes Trials Before the Domestic Courts of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Progress and Obstacles, March 2005 
http://www.oscebih.org/documents/1407-eng.pdf, 32 
57 
 
are either not recognised as such or they are protected by their government139 
or there is insufficient evidence.140 During trial there are questions of judicial 
bias, intimidation of witnesses and insufficient evidence to convict. The question 
of judicial bias particularly concerns local courts. Both Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch suggest that bias and corruption are widespread, 
particularly in Bosnia, the worst affected area.141  The main problem with the 
justice processes administered by the countries involved in the conflict is that 
the vast majority of those tried in local trials are not of the majority ethnic group. 
For example statistics show that Serbs in Croatia are disproportionately brought 
to trial. Finally there is often an ethnic bias in the judgements made.  Therefore 
at all stages – pre-trial, in trial and in judgement there are situations of ethnic 
bias and injustice.  
 
1.1b International Justice 
The ICTY is less susceptible (than local and national courts) to individual ethnic 
bias in that it is run by third parties.142 However, whilst the ICTY may appear to 
avoid the consistent bias and human rights infringements of the national and 
local courts there is an issue of real injustice in the ICTY’s failure to prosecute 
all cases, including some of the biggest war criminals, and the fact that where 
cases are brought some perpetrators are still not proven guilty.143 The ICTY 
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takes on few cases; many submissions are refused or sent back to the local 
courts for failure to have sufficient evidence. Evidence suggests that most 
Croats do not understand the burdens of proof required by such courts and feel 
the courts have refused to prosecute cases of real injustice. These issues are at 
least partially responsible for the widely held negative perception of the ICTY.  
The chief problem, however, is that each side believes their ethnic group is 
either disproportionately represented at The Hague (primarily Serbs) or there is 
indignation that their own soldiers should be accused of war crimes at all (all 
sides but particularly Croats and Bosnian Muslims).144145 The ICTY believes 
itself to have reached out to the affected nations and to have a positive 
image.146 However, the interviews I carried out would suggest otherwise. The 
United States Institute for Peace (USIP) also found that ‘a strong current of 
public opinion in the Balkans believes that the court never established its 
legitimacy and is not fulfilling its self-proclaimed purpose.’147 In these cases the 
key problem is the perception of all parties concerned that justice is not being 
done.  
It is important to note the effect of perceptions of injustice. Whilst observers 
concerned with human rights and process may see the ICTY as superior in 
terms of delivering justice, the perception that the ICTY is failing to deliver 
justice amongst both perpetrators and victims is damaging. In giving rise to this 
perception the ICTY is potentially a source of further resentment and division 
between the parties concerned. Conflicting claims to justice have the potential 
to spiral into violence, indeed the Balkan conflicts were based upon such 
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conflicting claims. Claims by both the International and national courts to have 
enacted justice which are perceived by victims or perpetrators as in fact being 
unjust acts have the potential to entrench division and discord. This is a point 
we will return to in considering the validity of Volf’s criticisms of justice.  
Perhaps one might like to argue that this resulting discord is not the concern of 
the courts. They are to be impartial and unswayed by such considerations. 
However, the ICTY itself has declared that it aims ‘to contribute to the 
restoration of peace by promoting reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia.’148 If 
this is true then justice processes are failing on their own terms. 
 
1.1c The NGO Perspective 
Amnesty International has concluded that there are serious problems still 
existing in the Croatian justice system.  
These include the failure of the former Yugoslav republics to arrest 
and hand over indictees and the continuing lack of political will 
among their authorities to investigate and prosecute all war crimes 
stemming from the conflicts in the 1990s. Furthermore… domestic 
legislation relating to war crimes is often not in line with international 
law, victim and witness protection is generally nonexistent or 
insufficient, and provisions on reparations are inadequate. 149 
 
The focus again is on attitude and process. Amnesty is largely uncritical of the 
ICTY, especially in terms of process. However, their concerns about the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed deadline have led Amnesty to 
campaign for the ICTY to be given more time so that all those charged by the 
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ICTY can be brought to a fair trial.150 This addresses one issue that has been 
raised. However Amnesty’s assessments and focus on the human rights issues 
fail to address the underlying issues of perceptions of justice and injustice which 
are a key factor in achieving a justice which promotes social restoration.  
HRW identifies a range of problems in the Bosnian justice system. They broadly 
see the issues in practical and political terms. Practical issues include ‘a lack of 
specialization among prosecutors working on trials for war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, or genocide and inadequate numbers of prosecutors and 
support staff; lack of specialization and expertise among defence attorneys; and 
lack of witness protection or witness support.’ Political factors include ‘problems 
with the ability or willingness of police to investigate crimes and poor 
cooperation between police and prosecutors... failure to arrest and detain 
suspects... failure by prosecutors to make use of available sources of evidence.’ 
They also recognise that there are ‘a large number of unresolved case files.’ 151 
Essentially whilst some of the problems may be purely practical, they are a 
minority and often seem to have a strong link to the fact that those with 
responsibilities within the justice system will allow bias to affect their work – for 
example police expected to protect witnesses. Further to this the larger political 
picture which is built upon ethnic divisions is also responsible for practical 
failures to, for example, reform the police service or standardise legal practice. 
The practical issues they raise seem to rest on wider problems. My interviews 
and research suggest that bias is the key factor in most of the issues identified 
and that human rights are disregarded because of these attitudes towards the 
ethnic other. It is my contention that the practical and human rights issues 
cannot fully be addressed without tackling the deeper issues of bias, justice 
claims and ethnic identities. 
In conclusion it seems evident that there are problems of justice in Bosnia-
Hercegovina and Croatia. These problems are centred on ethnic bias both real 
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and perceived. The problem lies deeper than the processes and the solution 
requires a radical change in attitude towards ‘the other’.  
1.2 What does Volf say about the problem of justice?  
1.2a Plural Justice and Conflicting Claims  
Like HRW, Amnesty International and other NGOs Volf’s critique of justice 
emerges from reflections on the problems of practicing justice. 
Ask any of the warring parties in Bosnia...they will tell you who the 
real barbarian is. You might be surprised to find on the Serb list not 
only Croats and Muslims but also the whole West. That same 
decadent civilization that destroyed millions of native peoples, 
colonized cultures and concocted “the final solution” is showing once 
again its ugly face by imposing sanctions against us, the Serbs, 
whose only crime is that we are defending our homes, our wives, our 
children, against murderous Croats and Muslims who want to take 
what is rightfully ours. Or, listen to the following variation...[Muslim] 
“How can the Christian West just sit and watch us be slaughtered by 
the thousands? How can they refuse to let us at least arm 
ourselves?”152 
 
Here, however, we see a reflection not on process necessarily but on the 
deeper issue of conflicting justice claims. Volf is not beginning from a theoretical 
understanding of the problem of plural justice, but from a witnessing of the 
conflict and violence that can ensue when each group attempts to pursue their 
own conception of what is just. This practical (as opposed to theoretical) 
problem of plural justice and conflict provokes Volf to further consideration of 
what justice is and how we might be able to conceive of a justice which steers a 
path away from the violent clashes of the Balkans and towards a life reconciled 
with the other. 
Understanding that Volf’s theological reflections on the nature of justice emerge 
from an understanding of the problems of justice in practice is important. It 
allows us to understand why Volf’s understanding of justice takes shape in the 
way it does. It also legitimatises my attempt at the end of this chapter to 
evaluate Volf’s response in terms of a practical response to the problems of 
justice in the Balkans. 
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Volf is of course writing in this extract from a perspective of ongoing conflict in 
the early 1990s. His identification of justice claims as a cause of and fuel for 
conflict emerges from this period, rather than the post-conflict period that the 
NGOs and others are seeking to address. However, the difference between the 
two periods, especially in Bosnia is primarily the cessation of ongoing organised 
violence. Volf’s insights are equally relevant in considering the problem of 
justice after the period of active conflict. This is because the post-conflict ethnic 
hostilities are built upon the same accounts of justice (what is due to each 
ethnic group) that provoked the violence. These claims are still standing in the 
way of reconciliation and, in the case of Bosnia-Hercegovina, political and 
economic progress.153  
Essentially it is conflicting accounts of what justice means or entails for each 
group that are at the root of the problems identified by the NGOs. In their 
account conflicting justice claims are labelled as bias. The bias they identify is 
informed by a judgement about which group is victim and which is perpetrator, 
which group is still owed something and which should be penalised. The human 
rights infringements which concern HRW and Amnesty are also primarily a 
result of the bias of the courts and the feeling that justice is about punishing the 
other. Conflicting justice claims then seem to be at the heart of both failures of 
the justice process and the bias running through the courts. 
As we have seen, even the ICTY’s ostensibly unbiased endeavours to do 
justice conflict with the claims of individual ethnic groups as to what justice 
means for them. Volf’s extract demonstrates the same dissatisfaction of the 
parties involved in the conflict with Western intervention in the early 1990’s. The 
ongoing disagreement about what each party deserves from the ICTY can 
further fuel dissatisfaction and reinforce the divisions and ethnically divided 
political processes. It is of course important to acknowledge here that conflicting 
claims also exist within ethnic groups where there are, of course, a variety of 
claims about what justice should look like.  
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In pointing to conflicting justice claims as at the heart of the problem of justice in 
the Balkans Volf is not saying that ‘no account of justice is better than 
another’154. In this sense he would not want to say that the efforts of the HRW or 
Amnesty are wrong. What his work does suggest however is that a focus on 
better processes is not a response to the wider issues underlying both the 
failure in the Balkans and our collective failure as human beings to enact 
justice.  
Volf moves very swiftly from an identification of a problem of justice on the 
ground to an identification of the problem as lying within the conceptions of 
justice themselves. More than this he is identifying not one theory to be false 
but the very idea of a theory of justice to be problematic in practice. Essentially 
Volf has identified that theories of justice inevitably clash and where there is a 
clash of immovable concepts there is conflict and the potential for violence. So 
what is it about conflicting justice claims that inevitably leads to conflict? 
 
1.2b Injustice named as Justice 
 
‘Justice is impossible in the order of calculating, equalizing, 
legalizing, and universalising actions. If you want justice and nothing 
but justice, you will inevitably get injustice’155 
 
Volf makes the strong claim that that justice which permits injustice is not 
justice. Plural conceptions of justice mean that what one person or group 
names as justice is perceived by the other to be injustice. More than this, in the 
pursuit of justice injustice (by our own measure) is inevitably committed. The 
Balkans provides evidence for both of these claims. 
As has been discussed, there is a pervading bias in the national and local 
courts, evidenced in the failure of the judiciary to convict their compatriots and 
their eagerness to indict ‘the other’. In The Hague the body which seeks to bring 
justice has allowed injustice to continue as cases fail to make it to court through 
                                            
154
 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 195. 
155
 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 223. 
64 
 
lack of evidence or focus on only the biggest crimes as well as through failure to 
actually find some of those indicted as well as failure to even identify some of 
the biggest war criminals. 
The common view of the ICTY as unjust is due to the perception of many that 
they are the victim. Consequently many Croats want Serbs to be held 
accountable but excuse themselves as protectors of their homeland.  
‘Nationalist groups in Croatia have raised the political costs of 
cooperation with the ICTY by effectively designing a rhetorical 
strategy which equates the tribunal’s indictments against Croatia’s 
war heroes with attacks on the dignity and legitimacy of the so-called 
Homeland War (domovinski rat) fought on Croatia’s territory against 
breakaway Serbs between 1991 and 1995.’156 
 
Similarly Bosniacs want Croats and Serbs to be held accountable for the war 
crimes committed in Bosnia but as the weakest party cannot see that Bosniacs 
may have committed any crimes themselves. Serbs, as the majority of those 
prosecuted, tend to see the ICTY as unjustly focusing on them and excusing the 
crimes of others.  
Volf’s claim that justice permits injustice is certainly backed up by evidence. It is 
the perception that the other’s conception of justice is in fact unjust or permits 
injustice that is at the heart of conflicting claims to justice and therefore the 
central problem of justice. Volf wants to say, with Niebuhr, that ‘no scheme of 
justice can do full justice to all the variable factors’157 and that ‘neither revenge 
nor reparations can redress old injustices without creating new ones.’158 
Essentially it is inevitable that attempts to enact justice will cause injustice 
through both the failure to consider or deal with the infinite particularities of each 
case or through the fact that the conception itself is human and therefore 
flawed. 
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Here we have moved from identifying the practical problems of justice, to 
understanding conflicting claims as at the root of these problems and finally to 
understanding the cause of conflict as about the claim that our own justice is 
always just to all. Essentially Volf is forcing us to come to terms with the fact 
that every theory of justice allows injustice to occur in the name of justice. This 
is a problem practically in that it is the cause of conflict as those who have 
endured injustice lay claim to a different conception of justice. When injustice 
goes by the name of justice, the victims of injustice are likely to try to redress 
the balance. In this situation, far from being a solution to conflict, justice 
becomes a key player in the “cycle of violence”. It seems that to address this 
problem an understanding of justice would have to either really permit no 
injustice to occur or limit its claims as to the finality and absoluteness of the 
justice being administered and acknowledge the claims of the other. 
 
1.2c Restorative Justice 
So far I have identified that Volf’s focus is on the problem of plural justice claims 
and the closely related problem of injustice named as justice as both potentially 
fuelling conflict (whether violent or not). A further issue Volf addresses is that 
justice which fails to point to or seek to facilitate reconciliation is failing. This is 
because for Volf justice is only one element in the larger project or pursuit of 
love. 
In critiquing ‘strict justice’ Volf argues that  
even if justice could be satisfied, the conflicting parties would 
continue to be at odds with one another. The enforcement of justice 
would rectify past wrongs but it would not create communion 
between victims and perpetrators. Yet some form of communion - 
some form of positive relationship – needs to be established if the 
victim and perpetrator are to be fully healed.159  
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I have already identified that Volf sees it as impossible that human attempts to 
enact justice could in fact satisfy the demands of justice (whether a human 
theory of justice or divine justice). Endeavours to enact justice inevitably involve 
injustice. Here Volf argues that even if human beings were capable of enacting 
justice, the punishment of the perpetrator, or even an attempt to repair the crime 
committed, would not be enough. The restoration of relationship is central for 
Volf. Such a priority places great demands on justice in terms of what it should 
achieve. However Volf is not alone in making these demands; the aim of 
transitional justice and of the ICTY specifically is to promote reconciliation and 
restoration through the justice processes. The evidence discussed earlier 
suggests that justice processes in the Balkans have failed to achieve, or even 
promote, this type of restoration.  
For Volf justice is not the ultimate priority. Justice is always subservient to 
love.160  Justice must therefore be about more than dispensing dues or settling 
claims. Justice for Volf, as I will explain throughout this chapter, is both more 
limited in scope and part of a broader vision than theories of justice based upon 
dues or dispensation of goods. Justice is limited in the sense that it is not to be 
the primary good to be pursued and is enlarged in the fact that the pursuit of 
justice becomes about relationship with the other.  
Both of these ideas will be explored more fully later in the chapter.  However, at 
this point, it is fair to say that whilst Volf sets high standards in terms of what he 
expects justice to be and achieve, and is therefore more likely to see problems 
with current justice, his expectations are not so far from the expectations of 
transitional justice and the aims of the ICTY itself. For the ICTY justice is also 
supposed to be about more than allowing two parties to coexist, there is also a 
expectation that justice should facilitate or contribute to reconciliation between 
the parties. However, my interviews have indicated that the justice processes 
themselves have failed to assist in reconciling ethnic groups. The only 
resources suggesting a potential, moderate contribution of the justice processes 
are informal conversations and one witness quoted by the ICTY. Indeed the 
ICTY had a statement on a previous website stating that its aims included 
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reconciliation.161 There has subsequently been a replacement of these aims 
with the ICTYs achievements. Whilst the new list of achievements correlate 
strongly to the original aims, reconciliation is noticeably absent from this list of 
successes. The evidence points to a conclusion that justice in the Balkans has 
failed to encourage reconciliation. Justice has been a source of at worst 
continued disagreement and dispute and at best a sense of forced coexistence. 
 
1.2d Conclusion 
Whilst Volf aims his criticisms largely at theories of justice in his writing, the 
criticisms clearly emerge from experiences of conflicting justice claims in action 
and the desire to tackle the deep seated, theoretical roots of those claims, 
rather than to simply suggest a shift in practice without tackling our underlying 
assumptions of what justice is as the HRW and Amnesty seem to do. Volf writes 
 I spent some six weeks in war-torn Croatia in the fall of 1992 – its 
territories occupied, its cities and villages destroyed, and its people 
killed and driven out. There it became clear to me what in a sense I 
knew all along: the problem of ethnic and cultural conflicts is part of a 
larger problem of identity and otherness.162 
 
Volf’s criticisms emerge from his understanding of the Balkan conflict and from 
his experience as a Croat. However the problems of justice he identifies go 
beyond the individual practices of the Balkans or the particular justice claims 
found here. Instead Volf looks to find the deeper roots of the problems of justice 
and answer the question “why do conceptions of justice inevitably cause 
injustice and lead to conflict with the other?” This broader understanding of the 
problems of justice claims is illustrated by his introductory reflections on both 
the LA riots and the neo-Nazi rallies in Berlin which were also occurring in the 
early 1990s.163  
Since Volf’s work emerges from the time of ongoing violence in the Balkans his 
focus is on the various claims to justice and the role of conflicting justice claims 
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in the conflict. Whilst my focus is on the post-conflict attempts to do justice I 
have suggested that the underlying issues are the same. The problems of 
implementing justice post-conflict are centred on disagreements about whose 
claims are right and an attempt to use the official processes of justice to 
reinforce a particular ethnic group’s understanding of who was in the right and 
who in the wrong. I have also suggested that just as Volf highlighted the 
problem of perceptions of Western intervention during the conflict, the problem 
of Balkan perceptions of Western justice processes is also of concern in that 
such justice pleases nobody. 
This finding, that present issues continue to have the same roots as the issues 
which provoked the violence and continued during the conflict, supports Volf’s 
claim that our understanding of justice requires a radical rethink. Otherwise 
present justice ‘would bring us peace only as the absence of war...not as the 
harmonious ordering of differences.’164 
Volf has identified the clash of justice claims as central to the problems of 
practicing justice. Further, he suggests that the types of claims made about the 
scope and possibilities of theories of justice might be overreaching what any 
justice can actually deliver. He also suggests that the prioritisation of justice as 
an aim in itself is perhaps wrong and that justice is a broader concept always 
subject to the greater pursuit of love and reconciliation. It is to these issues, of 
the proper scope and breath of justice, that I will turn in section 2. 
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Section 2 - Why do these problems exist? 
 
So far I have suggested that the evidence from Bosnia-Hercegovina and 
Croatia supports the idea that there are serious problems with processes of 
justice. Such practical evidence, supported by NGOs goes some way to 
supporting Volf’s argument that there are fundamental problems with the way 
human notions of justice are constructed and perhaps the very idea of 
constructing a theory of justice at all.  
In this section I want to explore the causes of the problems identified by Volf 
and to engage with those who have found justice problematic on a more 
theoretical level. In exploring these causes further I also want to press towards 
the conclusion that Volf is right in insisting that a radical rethink of human 
conceptions and practices of justice is necessary. 
Firstly I want to examine the issues of identity which, as has been shown in 
earlier chapters, is a central concern for Volf and is perhaps the major way in 
which Volf pushes forward the way justice and reconciliation issues are 
approached. That is, in understanding identity formation and protection of a 
particular identity as crucial in forming conceptions of what justice is and as a 
key player in conflict, Volf’s approach gets to the heart of the problem. 
Secondly I want to look at the issue of the extent to which human beings can 
claim to know and enact justice. For Volf much of the problem of present 
practices of justice is that they claim to be truly just when in fact justice permits 
and perpetrates further injustice. Volf suggests that any attempt to produce an 
abstract theory of justice applicable to all in all circumstances is impossible. 
This leads towards Volf’s proposition that our understanding of justice, now 
deconstructed somewhat, should begin with an eschatological vision. We will 
examine this reconstruction in the second half of the chapter. 
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2.1 Victim Identity 
 
From a distance the world may appear neatly divided into guilty 
perpetrators and the innocent victims. The closer we get however, 
the more the line between the guilty and the innocent blurs and we 
see an intractable maze of small and large hatreds, dishonesties, 
manipulations, and brutalities, each reinforcing the other.165 
 
The messiness of the Balkan conflict makes Volf’s insights into the blurring of 
the lines between victims and perpetrators particularly poignant. In both 
understanding the central importance of identity and in having the legitimacy to 
tackle such a sensitive issue Volf draws heavily on his own experiences. These 
include the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s and his experiences of mental torture 
whilst in the Yugoslavian Army in the 1980s. The former in particular 
demonstrated that all have committed injustices and none are entirely just. The 
latter has enabled him to assert that victims and perpetrators are not clear cut 
categories and that to a greater or lesser extent all of us are both. It is important 
in many ways that Volf comes to this claim through the agony of experience and 
as one who may be labelled a victim of serious injustice. He often expresses 
concern that his theology of embrace be seen as a path of ‘costly grace’ rather 
than cheap platitudes and his experience and personal wrestling with the issues 
means he achieves this to a great extent. 
Volf is careful not to understand the victim and the perpetrator as equally guilty 
or indeed to understand the victim as guilty at all in relation to the specific 
injustice in question. Instead the two share a common sinfulness, or propensity 
to injustice.  
In his partial assimilation of victim and perpetrator Volf makes a significant step 
forward from the clearer cut categories of oppressed-oppressor found in the 
majority of his mentor Moltmann’s theology.166 Volf is very much a theologian 
‘after Moltmann’. That he departs from Moltmann on this point, however 
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gently,167 makes it a point of particular significance.  In making this point Volf 
seeks to encourage the wronged to recognise the perpetrator as a fellow human 
being with a propensity to commit injustice. The use of injustice here is related 
to although not exactly equivalent to ‘sin’. This is important to note as Volf also 
seems to extend the category of justice so that it becomes closely equivalent to 
freedom from injustice or ‘freedom from sin’. This perception of all human 
relationships as marred by injustice means that Volf extends the remit of justice. 
Justice is essentially about relationships which are free from injustice, ‘right 
relationships’. This idea of justice being enlarged to encompass all aspects of 
relationship is a key point. 
The problems of victim and perpetrator as firmly separate categories are 
illuminated by the Balkans. Here each side attempts to maintain an identity as a 
blameless or justified victim. The importance of exposing this identity as 
mythical whilst maintaining a focus on the real injustices that have been done to 
individuals and groups is of crucial importance. Without tackling this issue of 
victim identity it would seem that little in terms of reconciliation could be 
achieved. The problems of the victim culture are closely related to justice in that 
the maintenance of such an identity allows people to give credence to their 
often unjustified claims for justice, particularly in the political sphere and allows 
people to remove responsibility for reconciliation from themselves.  
Interviews suggest that the post-war justice processes have in a sense become 
another arena in which ethnic conflicts are played out. The processes don’t offer 
resolution since they do not deal with the fundamental causes of the conflict. 
Volf’s approach is fresh in that many writers on justice issues in particular either 
approach from a third party (mostly western) perspective and seem to feel a 
need to protect a (weak) group labelled ‘the victims’ in a well intentioned 
although perhaps patronising way.168 Alternatively, as with liberation theology, 
there is a sense that victims need to be empowered in some way in order to 
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address the oppressor or redress injustices. Whilst the influence of Moltmann 
means that Volf is not explicitly rejecting liberation theology, he is seeking to 
move on from the problems of victim-perpetrator and oppressed-oppressor 
categorisation and language. The particular problem with this language and the 
consequent attempts to protect the victim is that it works within existing power 
structures set up by the oppressor. Rather than seeking to break this power 
structure attempts to ‘empower’ the victim (and perhaps disempower the 
perpetrator) play into a cycle of power, which is often closely associated with 
violence.169 Zygmunt Bauman writes that victims often ‘demand the reshuffling 
of the cards, not another game. They do not blame the game, only the stronger 
hand of the adversary.’170 The problem of simply altering the power balance in 
situations (that is putting victims in a position of power and removing the 
perpetrators power) is evident in Croatia particularly. Here Serbs still have 
difficulties in getting jobs, reclaiming homes they may have left and obtaining 
justice for Croatian war crimes. If justice is focused on a redistribution of power 
it can mean a recurrence of injustice as victims seek to oppress their 
oppressors. At the very least it is not conducive to reconciliation. 
The categorisation of groups or individuals as victim or perpetrator then has 
ramifications for the practice of justice. Over-emphasis on these labels leads to 
a confrontational justice of one versus the other. It may also lead to a fostering 
of an identity as a victim which is then used to justify injustice towards the 
perpetrator.   
Volf manages to tread a very fine line in both affirming the injustices done to 
individuals (victims) and maintaining their shared sinful humanity with the 
perpetrator. Others might be wary of such a move as there is a risk in refusing 
to label the victim as blameless that the victim might then be seen as in fact to 
blame for the specific injustice in question which would, of course, itself be an 
injustice. Volf is clear however that the victim’s repentance is for their own 
desires for revenge, their participation in these cycles of violence and desire for 
power over the other. ‘Victims need to repent of the fact that all too often they 
                                            
169
 See Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 116 
170
 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethic, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993, 216 
73 
 
mimic the behaviour of the oppressors, let themselves be shaped in the mirror 
image of the enemy.’171 Repentance then is for thoughts and urges for revenge 
rather than actions. The action of injustice is for the perpetrator to repent of. 
This repentance is then about the victim understanding themselves as a sinful 
human being. It is also about taking a shared responsibility for participation in 
power structures which cause injustice.  
It is important to note here that whilst Volf’s placing of responsibility with the 
victim may appear difficult in terms of demanding so much of the one who has 
been damaged by injustice, in fact such a responsibility could be seen as 
enabling. The theology of embrace allows victims, regardless of political 
situations or their access to official processes to begin to change their situation. 
The victim in this reading is not typecast as weak; they are not reliant upon 
claiming their rights from others or needing the assistance of a third party. The 
will to embrace can begin regardless of the response or unresponsiveness of 
the other. 
 
2.2 Human Knowledge of Justice 
 
 ‘For injustice permeates the behaviour of every human being and 
qualifies all social relations. To live is to be unjust, observed 
Frederich Nietzsche, echoing Martin Luther’s assessment of the 
human condition. The point of this observation is not that human 
beings are unjust through and through, but that the stains of injustice 
mar even the most just of our deeds.’172 
 
In this extract we see a reiteration of the point that justice and injustice are 
inescapably linked together. So far I have identified that for Volf the fact that 
human attempts to do justice, and even human attempts to construct a theory of 
justice, always involve injustice to one group or another. This be becomes 
problematic when injustice is named as justice, attempts to enact justice end up 
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creating victims of injustice. This is both a problem in the sense that it feeds into 
conflict over justice and in a more abstract sense, in that it makes a mockery of 
the good of justice. 
As the extract above says ‘the stains of injustice mar even the most just of our 
deeds’. In making this claim Volf is drawing diversely on Nietzsche and the 
Christian doctrine of original sin, although he is more explicit about the former 
than the latter. Volf does not use the term original sin, however he does talk 
about a “background cacophony of evil”.173 If we accept Volf’s idea of the 
“background cacophony” then the question is “how can we construct an account 
of justice in a sinful world?” 
 
2.3 Expectations of Justice  
So why does injustice end up being named as justice? Firstly I want to address 
the idea that it is because human conceptions of justice claim too much in terms 
of what they can actually achieve. That is, secular accounts of justice which 
have no reference to a higher or better conception of or practice of justice claim 
a sort of absoluteness. Such theories of justice expect a finality that is not 
possible here and now. Classic Christian theology agrees with Volf in that 
justice will only finally be realised eschatologically.174 However there is dispute 
as to what claims the consequently understood “partial justice” should make 
about its finality and relationship to God’s ultimate justice and judgement. 
John Rawls’ believed that human beings might go behind a “veil of ignorance” 
and determine the content of justice from an objective position.175 For Volf the 
evidence of the impossibility of an objective view or an objective third party 
adjudication of conceptions of justice lies in the Balkans. Here the West, 
charged with taking the objective, outsider viewpoint managed to anger all sides 
both during the conflict, with UN action, or lack thereof, and after the conflict 
with the ICTY. This is not to say that Volf believes all perspectives are as 
distorted as another. Some conceptions of justice may be closer to justice 
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(determined by God) than others. The point is however that all human 
perspectives are flawed in that they fail to take account of every perspective.176  
Essentially in demanding that justice should not perpetrate injustice Volf has 
raised expectations of what justice is. Simultaneously he also suggests that 
human accounts and practices of justice fail to meet this high expectation and 
therefore claim too much when they claim to enact or know the content of 
justice. The practice of justice, as has been explored earlier, belies the fact that 
human accounts of justice are inherently unjust. 
For Volf any conception of justice which ‘equalizes and abstracts is an unjust 
justice’.177 This is because no theory can adequately do justice to each 
individual. No theory can account for the particularities of every case and if it 
cannot then it will cause injustice because the individual case will not be treated 
as such but will be treated in the same way as other similar, but ultimately 
different, cases. I have labelled this first half of the chapter “deconstructing 
justice” and it is on this point that Volf draws perhaps most on the work of those 
such as Derrida. Of course Volf is not seeking to deconstruct justice for the 
sake of it nor because he does not believe in the idea or possibility of justice. 
However, his concern for particularity is picked up in Derrida’s work. 
Derrida concluded in later life that ‘deconstruction is justice’.178 His point, 
developed by Caputo was that justice is so particular that any grand theory of 
justice will oppress (or in Volf’s language, cause injustice to) any particular case 
to which it is applied. On this point then Volf is somewhat in step with 
deconstructionists in his concern for particularity and in his identification of the 
central problem of justice which is the infliction of injustice in the name of 
justice. 
It is interesting to see the way Volf critiques both rational universalism and 
postmodern discussions of plurality and deconstruction. In critiquing both of 
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these positions which inform different theories of justice Volf is also seeking to 
find a middle ground in which he can allow the universal justice of God and the 
particular, plural justice claims of human beings to marry and to find a way of 
pursuing divine justice within the confines of human particularity. 
 
2.4 Partial Justice 
Volf’s understanding of rational theories of justice as problematic is based upon 
the idea that theories of justice claim to know what justice is or what justice 
demands when in fact this is too great a claim. Whilst postmodern discussions 
have tended to focus around the idea that we cannot finally know what justice 
is, classical Christian theology perhaps suggests a middle ground, in that whilst 
it is true that human beings cannot claim to enact complete justice as God can, 
they can enact a partial justice. This marries knowledge of God’s justice with an 
acknowledgement that human beings cannot fully enact this justice. 
Classical theology built on this premise might initially seem to suit Volf’s 
purposes and to answer the issues of concern. Indeed Augustine also identified 
the problem of injustice occurring within the practice of justice, placing this down 
to human ignorance. 179 He concludes, as does Volf that the inevitability of 
injustice within justice means that people are unable to practise true justice. 
However Augustine allows much more room for the practise of imperfect justice. 
Essentially it seems Augustine believes we may understand the principles of 
justice, although be unable to enact it. Still what is enacted may be called 
justice. Volf is much less certain that we can know the exact content of justice in 
the way that Augustine understands it. That is, as a justice which allots to each 
their due. Instead Volf argues that we cannot know the precise demands of 
justice, removing justice from human comprehension to some extent. Volf 
differs from Augustinian theology in that he finds the naming of justice which 
commits injustice as just as hugely problematic primarily for the practical 
reasons discussed. 
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This criticism stands even when the justice enacted is acknowledged to be 
partial. This is because for Volf a Christian conception of justice which commits 
injustice is committing injustice in the name of divine justice. The problem then 
in the claim to know the content of divine justice and to enact it even when it is 
acknowledged that human justice is partial.  
We can see in this that Volf’s chief problem is the naming of injustice as justice. 
Any conception of justice which allows this to occur is practically problematic in 
the sense that it lends itself to conflict. Secondly for Volf this is problematic in 
that it commits injustice in the name of God.  
Christian conceptions of justice or claims to be able to enact justice fall into the 
same practical problems we have already identified. They fall prey to exactly the 
same problems of causing injustice in the name of justice, worse in this case as 
injustices are caused in the pursuit of what is called divine justice. Here we 
come to the crux of the problem. Just as with secular theories of justice when 
injustice occurs in the name of justice the very notion of justice one is trying to 
pursue is called into question. In this case when Christians claim to know and 
enact God’s justice in the world and injustice is caused in the pursuit of this 
justice, God himself is called into question. 
Volf would argue that understanding justice in the present as partial justice, thus 
solving the problem of overreaching claims in one sense, does not address the 
problem of injustice being named as justice and is therefore unsatisfactory on 
its own. Whilst Volf agrees that any present action is only partial, in the sense 
that it will be perfected eschatologically, his theology contends that the type of 
partiality found in theological tradition actually divorces present action further 
from eschatological reality and divine action. For Volf a key component of 
justice is that it is free from injustice. If partial justice allows injustice to be 
named as justice then for Volf it is not partial justice but a notion of justice which 
has little to do with divine justice. This leads us towards a consideration of 
where a conception of justice needs to begin, where it should be grounded. 
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2.5 Starting in the wrong place 
 
‘Our coziness with the surrounding culture has made us so blind to 
many of its evils that instead of calling them into question , we offer 
our own versions of them – in God’s name and with a good 
conscience.’180 
 
I have moved through some broad criticisms which Volf lays at the door of a 
wide range of conceptions of justice. As I have said he is tackling the notion that 
a truly just theory of justice can be conceived at all. Since his yardstick is divine 
justice this is perhaps understandable that he should attack secular notions of 
justice. However, in considering the Christian theological tradition of 
understanding justice as partial, it has become clear that Volf sees the same 
problems in many Christian conceptions of justice that he identifies in secular 
ones. In this extract, whilst he is not specifically pointing at Christian justice 
claims as derived from secular culture there is a clear case to say that this 
would be valid criticism. 
Stanley Hauerwas is perhaps the most notable of very few theologians who 
have criticised justice in a fundamental way.181 His criticisms focus on the 
alignment of Christians with secular theories of justice and the consequent over 
prioritisation of justice. Whilst Hauerwas does not have an obvious connection 
with Volf (although perhaps through their mutual use of John Howard Yoder) he 
is interesting in that his criticisms coincide with some of what Volf is trying to 
say especially on this point, that Christians are looking for their accounts of 
justice in the wrong place. 
 Neither Volf nor Hauerwas mean their critiques to suggest that justice really is 
a “bad idea for Christians”. Instead both men, and certainly Volf, want to 
rediscover what justice means. For Volf this is a return to reflection on the Bible 
and the history of the triune God’s interaction with creation.182 Hauerwas writes 
of his project that ‘the challenge is to rediscover how what we say as Christians 
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forces a reconfiguration of our lives in order that we might see the world as 
God’s good creation.’183 Similarly Volf talks about “enlarged thinking”.184 
Nicholas Wolterstorff’s critique of Hauerwas’ position also illuminates something 
about where Volf is standing. Wolterstorff believes that Hauerwas is largely 
rejecting the priority of justice because of the devaluation of justice and rights 
language.185 Wolterstorff  himself bemoans the proliferation of rights language 
but continues to uphold rights.186 Hauerwas’ critique is stronger than that. Both 
Hauerwas and Volf, in Exclusion and Embrace at least, have critiqued current 
justice discourse not just because the language has been overused and lost 
impact, although this may be part of it. It is because that which is named justice 
in the public square, and in Volf’s case, in the Balkans, has nothing to do with 
the justice of God. Justice discourse has become limited to a liberal consensus 
on what justice is about. The sense of needing to start from scratch is perhaps 
stronger than Wolterstorff acknowledges.  
Having spent this time talking about the ways in which Volf wants to deconstruct 
much of the current consensus on how justice should be conceived of or 
constructed, this is not the end. Unlike for Derrida, the deconstruction occurs in 
order that our understanding of justice can be set free to begin again. So where 
does Volf want us to begin this reconstruction? Essentially Volf believes we 
must begin from above, not below. As will be explored in chapter three, for Volf 
it is the life of the Triune God which is the central focus of theology. Volf looks to 
understand justice within God and the justice that creation will experience 
eschatologically. In section 3 I will turn to Volf’s eschatological vision of justice 
and seek to understand how this vision answers the problems of justice 
identified and how it might translate into a practice of justice in the present.  
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A Partial Reconstruction of Justice 
 
In moving on from the discussion of current conceptions and practices of justice 
as inherently flawed, I want to focus on the vision of justice which Volf wants to 
put in the place of the justice which abstracts and equalizes on which justice 
currently tends to focus. 187  In referring to the ‘partial reconstruction’ of justice I 
want to be clear that Volf’s vision does not cover the same remit as the theories 
of justice he has rejected. His proposal is both broader in one sense, in that it 
talks about justice as part of a way of life, and limited in another sense, in that it 
fails to provide an explicit series of actions or sequence of events which 
constitute justice. These differences might mean that we begin to question in 
what sense Volf’s vision is even talking about justice. In talking about a partial 
reconstruction of justice I want to convey this difference in approach which is 
largely informed by the fact that Volf does not believe we can fully conceive of 
the content of justice and that we should not claim to. The most we can claim is 
a partial understanding of the justice that will be after the eschaton. In the 
following I will set out Volf’s vision of justice. However the full implications of his 
vision need to be considered in light of the Trinitarian roots of his theology. This 
work will be covered in chapter three. 
Section 3: What is Volf’s solution?  
 
In this part of the thesis there is some tension between my understanding of the 
implications of Volf’s theology as set out in his theology of embrace and some 
of Volf’s subsequent work. This seems to be predominantly due to a shift in 
Volf’s approach. In the early 1990s when writing Exclusion and Embrace Volf 
was much closer to the concerns of the Croats and the issues raised by the 
conflict occurring in the Balkans at the time as well as physically spending more 
of his time in Europe and Croatia in particular. This lends his work a particular 
poignancy in talking to victims from a place which identifies with their 
victimhood. A decade and more on Volf’s entrenchment in the American 
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religious and academic life is evident in the way his work speaks more directly 
to those in power, those with responsibility to fulfil the rights of the other. 
In the following it is therefore important to keep in mind these tensions. Whilst 
my focus is on the theology of embrace, in proposing my own reading of the 
action such a theology requires I will dialogue with more recent comments of 
Volf’s which I see as diverging from the course he has set out in his earlier 
work. I will be defending my reading of his earlier position and seeking to 
develop it.  
 
3.1 The Vision 
Volf’s response to his critique of theories of justice is essentially to move away 
from the focus on understanding justice as within a context of current practice, 
and the limitations which that obviously entails, to start ‘from scratch’ as it were 
in seeking to understand what justice might look like in the world perfected, after 
the eschaton. This vision, of eschatological life, is based upon Volf’s 
understanding of the revelation of God’s triune self in Christ and therefore 
emerges from his theology of embrace. 
A world of perfect justice is a world of love. It is a world of no 
“rules” in which everyone does what he or she pleases and all are 
pleased by what everyone does; a world of no “rights” because 
there are no wrongs from which to be protected; a world of no 
“legitimate entitlements”, because everything is given and nothing 
withheld; a world with no “equality” because all differences are 
loved in their own appropriate way; a world in which “desert” plays 
no role because all actions stem from superabundant grace. In 
short a world of perfect justice would be a world of transcended 
justice because it would be a world of perfect freedom and love.188 
 
It is worth examining this particular quote in some detail, since it is the closest 
Volf gets to a clear definition of what justice actually is. Firstly I will tackle to 
question of the primacy of love over justice. It is a question I return to in chapter 
three in relation to the Trinity, but which here I will deal with in eschatological 
terms since this is the context of Volf’s vision. Secondly I will turn to the subject 
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of Volf’s rejection of rights and entitlements and suggest the type of justice he 
proposes should take their place. 
 
3.1a The Primacy of Love  
Firstly, in stating that ‘a world of perfect justice is a world of love’ Volf subsumes 
the term justice into a larger category of love. This demonstrates an inextricable 
linking of justice and love in Volf’s thought. It is possible to conclude that justice 
without love is not justice. To reject the idea of the primacy of justice which 
seems to dominate much of current theological discourse on social action is a 
big step. Even Volf himself seems not to see the clear distinction between a 
conception of justice based upon the primacy of justice and the antithetical 
position of seeing justice as always subsumed into, and secondary to, the larger 
category of love.189  Perhaps contrary to Nicholas Wolterstorff’s claim, there 
appear to be only a small minority who explicitly reject the placing of justice as 
the primary good rather than simply seeking to reshape justice around the 
margins.190 The most notable exception is Stanley Hauerwas. He argues that 
‘once “justice” is made a criterion of Christian social strategy, it can too easily 
take on a meaning and life of its own that is not informed by the fundamental 
Christian convictions.’191 This reflects Volf’s own concerns in placing justice as 
the primary pursuit and his subsequent rejection of the pursuit of justice as the 
best means to God’s justice. By locating justice within love Volf is placing justice 
within God who is love. This is an argument I will extend fully later. However, it 
is important to note that in making this love-justice link so strongly, Volf is 
seeking to give any notion of justice derived from this vision roots in central 
Christian doctrine. This is most notably in the Trinity, but also, consequently, the 
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eschatological life which for Volf, as for Moltmann, is human participation in the 
Trinity.192 The vision above, is firstly an eschatological vision.  
In later work Volf clarifies his priorities claiming justice as secondary to the 
salvation of the world (the action of love?): ‘If the salvation of the world, not 
justice, matters the most, it is also understandable that a lover of humanity 
would embrace the grace of the Passion - and suffer the scandal of justice both 
unmistakably affirmed and unequivocally transcended.’193 It is this affirmation 
and transcendence which are the key elements to get to grips with in taking 
Volf’s work forward into practice. These are elements which initially appear to 
be paradoxical. 
Helpful in drawing out the relationship between justice and the ‘world of love’ is 
a dialogue between Volf and Daniel M. Bell Jnr. In it Bell questions the idea of 
affirmation and transcendence suggesting that ‘after the advent of Christ, the 
classic notion of justice is not so much “affirmed and transcended” but 
redeemed.’194 This redemption involves understanding what is due, as that 
which ‘is in complete accord with grace (Augustine). That mercy implements 
perfect justice (Aquinas), and that the rule of God’s justice is mercy 
(Anselm).’195 Bell’s rendering is certainly clearer and fits better with Volf’s 
understanding of continuity in eschatology between the present and the new 
creation.196 It sees justice not as being affirmed and then transcended but being 
reconfigured so that it is defined by grace and mercy, or in Volf’s language 
above, love. In his response Volf acknowledges that Bell’s rendition is largely 
what he intends to convey in Exclusion and Embrace. This is interesting since 
the language in the text above is not the same as Bell’s but Volf suggests Bell’s 
understanding of justice here is close to what he wants to say.  
However, Volf notes that whilst this notion of justice defined by love is the 
intention of this text (above), his belief at the time of the dialogue with Bell 
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(2003) has been shaped by Wolterstorff and is now that justice is in fact 
affirmed and transcended in the sense that Bell here rejects.197 Essentially 
Volf’s view in the quote above is really that justice is redeemed and ‘becomes 
love’ in that sense, despite the perhaps misleading language. His opinion in the 
present time is that justice remains defined by dues and is in fact ‘set aside by 
grace with the advent of Christ.’198 
This hints at a key problem with Volf’s new perspective and a strength of the 
understanding of a continuation of justice in ‘the world that is love’, albeit a 
redeemed justice. This is that in Volf’s new view, the cross is not an expression 
of justice, justice is set aside. This leaves the definition of justice potentially 
outside Godself. This is a question I will address more fully in the chapter on the 
Trinity (chapter 3, sections 3 and 4 in particular). 
 
3.1b Rights, Entitlements and Giving  
In the third chapter of this thesis I will deal with the complications of moving 
from a vision of God’s justice within which human beings participate 
eschatologically to practices of justice in a fallen world. Here however, I want to 
focus upon the vision which suggests that love (along with grace) is the ultimate 
definition of justice. In this vision it seems clear that for Volf rights are 
associated with corrective, temporal justice for in the eschatological ‘world of 
love’ which is without wrongs there are no rights. The eschatological vision of 
justice does not need rights because justice extends beyond rights into love. 
There is a sense of abundance to justice where, in love, it goes far beyond what 
might be seen as ones legitimate entitlement. The key point here is that whilst 
rights or entitlements may serve to show the overflowing measure of 
eschatological justice, they do not constitute eschatological justice. 
This part of Volf’s work suggests a key departure from the main thrust of 
philosophical and ethical theories. Where theories endeavour to pin down the 
means by which justice might be pursued through clear claims between one 
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and the other, for Volf, ultimate justice is abundant; it becomes free giving, or 
justice caught up in love.199 It becomes a part of the life of embrace which is the 
free mutual giving of the Trinity which human beings participate in 
eschatologically.200 
The impact of this vision in practice then is that rights and entitlements are not 
the ultimate end of justice. The end of justice is defined by love. This limits any 
prescriptions of justice to a temporary expedience, rather than supporting the 
idea that justice can be measured out and achieved if correct processes and 
procedures are followed. In Work in the Spirit Volf supports the idea of rights.201 
Yet there he also notes that ‘the new creation is a place where love reigns as 
well [as justice]....there is no general “right” to be loved. One cannot, therefore, 
implement love by structural change and should not attempt to do so.’202 The 
implication of this is that the justice which is caught up in love, the end of human 
justice, and the justice of God, cannot be legislated for. It cannot be contained 
within a scheme of law, rights or ethical principles. However, it does suggest 
that a more limited role for rights can be maintained alongside this 
eschatological vision. 
This contrasts significantly with Wolterstorff’s view which sees rights as 
ultimate. He writes that ‘justice is ultimately grounded in inherent rights’203 For 
Wolterstorff when rights are fulfilled justice is done. Yet he still sees rights in 
terms of ‘normative social relationships.’204 His work suggests perfect 
relationships of justice consist of rights. Yet Volf’s vision is that perfect 
relationships of justice in ‘which everyone does what he or she pleases and all 
are pleased by what everyone does’ are shaped by love; and love, as we have 
noted, cannot be reduced to rights.205 Volf’s review of Justice:Rights and 
Wrongs states that Wolterstorff has simply underplayed love and that he should 
emphasise it more.206 This mild criticism fails to take account of the fact that if 
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justice is to be defined by love, as in Volf’s vision, it cannot then also be 
understood as ultimately composed of fulfilled rights. 
I suggest that once the vision is in place and upheld as the end and focus of 
human justice, although not the present reality, it is possible to reinstate rights, 
entitlements and dues in a limited sense which point towards the free giving of 
justice shaped by love which Volf’s vision suggests. This will be explored further 
in terms of the Trinity. In the final chapter, I will explore the ways in which the 
vision of eschatology might extend backwards towards human practices.   
 
Section 4 - What are the Implications of Volf’s work for 
the future of justice?  
 
In this final section of the chapter on justice I want to briefly draw out the 
features of justice which Volf’s rejection of current practices and theory, coupled 
with his vision of future justice, might suggest. In the following I will suggest that 
Volf’s work implies an urgent need for limiting justice claims. That justice must 
be orientated towards love and the restoration of relationships. That victim and 
perpetrator both need to share in the responsibility to pursue justice. Finally, 
that the cumulative effect of this approach (although most especially the 
primacy of love) means that rights, law and processes can only have a role as 
actions on the way towards justice, not as definers of justice in themselves. 
Firstly, I have noted that Volf sees conflicting justice claims and the related 
issue of naming injustice as justice problematic. These issues of conflicting 
claims are largely bound up with problematic identities which will be dealt with in 
the following chapter.  
Yet the problem of injustice named as justice is not limited to the inability to 
agree on what justice entails and how best to pursue it. Injustice named as 
justice is a permanent problem of human limitations to know and enact justice. 
This is an issue I will return to in chapter three. However, even the narrower 
focus of this chapter on the cyclical nature of injustice named as justice and the 
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way in which it feeds into a cycle of violence suggests that present claims to 
know or do justice must be limited.  
This may be simply a semantic change, yet the implications could be far 
reaching. It is one of the key reasons why Volf’s theology, which envisions 
justice as a future reality and which refuses to allow current conceptions or 
practices to define justice is so important in the context of Bosnia and Croatia, 
especially Bosnia which remains so fragile. The relocation of justice to an 
eschatological reality which can nevertheless be pursued with a sense of 
continuity with the present is helpful and will be explored fully in chapter 3. 
Secondly, Volf’s vision of justice suggests that justice is defined finally by love. 
Love must shape the contours of justice in the sense that it gives justice a 
sense of limitless giving. Rami Mani, writing about post-conflict justice, makes 
the interesting observation that ‘the minimalist conception of the rule of law, 
despite its advantages of being clear and bounded, may not be appropriate in 
post-conflict settings...a maximalist conception may be more fitting.’207 Volf’s 
work elevates the vision of justice beyond the level of minor adjustments, which 
is the focus of NGOs in particular. He offers a vision of perfect justice which has 
become love. This sort of hope in a different sort of justice can be particularly 
important in post-conflict situations. By suggesting that justice becomes love, 
Volf’s work conversely suggests that justice in the present should be shaped by 
love. 
What justice shaped by love means will become evident as we continue in the 
following chapters. Love and embrace are closely entwined for Volf and it is the 
practice of embrace which explicates the content of love. It involves the 
reconfiguring of the self and other, a different type of relationship which images 
the triune relationship of love. In terms of practice the most notable feature must 
be that justice shaped by love precludes pursuing justice in an adversarial 
manner. The first step towards this must be that victims share a sense of 
responsibility to pursue justice alongside the perpetrator. 
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Justice goes beyond any account of rights or entitlements, although these may 
have a temporal value in that they point towards the fuller measure of justice 
which will be in the new creation. I have suggested in this chapter that love as 
the end of justice precludes the ultimacy of rights or any other sense of justice 
as contract. Instead Volf’s work suggests a sense of justice as covenant, as 
relationship first and foremost.208 This sense of justice contributes to the limiting 
of claims to enact or do justice, which in turn helps prevent the naming of 
injustice as justice and therefore minimises the potential of ‘justice’ processes to 
reinforce or reaffirm tensions between post-conflict groups.  
Any legal processes must be shaped with a knowledge of their impermanence, 
inherent injustice and should be orientated towards the justice which becomes 
love. This includes the prioritisation of the restoration of relationships and 
reconciliation over the prioritisation of the processes of justice in and of 
themselves. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have suggested that there are significant problems of justice in 
post conflict Bosnia and Croatia. I have suggested that Volf’s reading of the 
problems of justice fits this context well. I have presented his vision as a starting 
point from which I might move forward to further consideration of the ways in 
which justice needs to be reshaped. In moving forward with this thesis I will turn 
next to addressing the problem of identity. This has emerged as the central 
issue of the problems of justice, as well as central to Volf’s vision of justice as 
love. Identity needs to be considered and reconfigured in order that a relational 
account of justice may be pursued. In my final chapter I will then progress to 
consider the foundation for that identity, the Trinity. I will also draw out the full 
impact of Volf’s vision of justice which has only been sketched out here. I will 
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suggest that the vision of justice proposed here has deep roots in the Trinity 
and is a vision which human beings participate in as they enter the triune life in 
the new creation.  
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Chapter 2: Identity 
 
Introduction 
 
So far this thesis has identified problems of justice in post-conflict Bosnia and 
Croatia and suggested that Volf’s theology offers resources to understand these 
problems and may offer the beginnings of an alternative approach to pursuing 
justice. In this chapter I will follow a similar pattern. Firstly, I will set out the 
problems of identity in the post-conflict Balkans and relate them to the problems 
of justice. Secondly, I will suggest that Volf’s theology offers an understanding 
of the extent of the issues, which are not confined to surface differences of 
ethnic background, but which are rooted in a problematic understanding of 
human identity and relationships. Thirdly, I will suggest that Volf’s 
understanding of embrace offers a much needed understanding of identity 
which can underpin the alternative, ‘enlarged’, approach to justice which I will 
advocate in this thesis. 
It is evident, and well acknowledged, that ethnic identity had a huge role to play 
in the Balkan conflict of the 1990s. Kenneth Anderson highlights this looking at 
‘…the case of the Serb paterfamilias who, on the outbreak of war, 
went home and shot and killed his Croat wife and daughter. He was 
apparently unable to bear the idea (if any “explanation” can be put 
upon such madness) that by marrying a Croat, he had put himself 
outside the tribe, so to speak. Equally crucially, he had no other 
identity, no identity given to him by modernity, with which to counter-
balance his sudden horrifying discovery of “outsideness”. Neither 
individual identity nor identity with his family was enough to save 
him or them.’209 
 
This scenario demonstrates the power of ethnic identities. It also 
suggests the extreme exclusionary form which ethnic identities have 
taken. The man understood identity as clearly defined: he could be 
wholly Serb or not at all. If he were to remain himself (Serb) he had no 
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way of identifying with his wife and child who were “different” or “other”. 
His self identity could not exist with the other. It could only exist against 
or without the “other”. This link between identity and the destruction of 
the other is not new. In many ways this case is the lived reality of Hegel’s 
account of identity in which identity is formed and maintained at the cost 
of the destruction of the other. 210 This story demonstrates that exclusion 
of the other ethnic group (in this case Croats) becomes an intrinsic 
element of maintaining one’s own ethnic identity (in this case Serbian). It 
is this problematic, and ultimately destructive, way of perceiving and 
constructing identity which will be the first focus of this chapter. I will also 
seek to find resources within Volf’s theology of embrace for a different 
type of identity which counters the ‘sudden horrifying discovery of 
“outsideness”’.211 
Just as the issue of destructive ethnic identity is not new, it is also not a 
problem which ended with the end of the Bosnian and Croatian wars. 
Whilst outright violence has ceased in the region, the problems of identity 
based chiefly around difference and separation from the other remain. 
The Dayton Agreement carved up Bosnia along broadly ethnic lines 
giving greater powers to the regional administrations than to the central 
government, reinforcing difference on a political and institutional level.212 
Self imposed distancing of daily interactions between ethnic groups also 
occurs.213 Understandings of post-conflict justice and claims as to how 
justice should be implemented are strongly linked to one’s identity as a 
Serb, a Croat, a Muslim and as a victim, a civilian, a soldier or a 
paramilitary.214 One’s identity becomes a dividing line in politics, 
geography, schooling, housing and socialising.215  
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Just as identity lies at the heart of these multiple dividing lines, so it is a 
major factor in informing divisive justice claims. Therefore, in order to 
begin to formulate a constructive response to the problems of justice 
(identified in the previous chapter) it is necessary to examine the context 
within which divisive justice claims arise. This chapter will suggest that 
justice claims arise within a context of self and group identity. One’s 
sense of identity, both individual and communal, will determine how one 
sees oneself in relation to the other and consequently, the type of claims 
one party will make upon another. Identity informs justice. 
In examining the problem of identity (and its relation to justice), I will seek 
to move from the more obvious and well documented issue of ethnic 
identity in Bosnia and Croatia, to a broader understanding of the 
underlying problem of how those identities are constructed. I will suggest 
that a common theme is that of exclusionary identities, identities built 
around difference from and a desire to exclude the other. The idea of 
exclusionary identities is clearly central in Volf’s work.216 However whilst 
Volf’s dialogue takes place primarily within a postmodern philosophical 
context, this chapter will initially seek to identify the problem of 
exclusionary identities within an anthropological context.  Anthropological 
research engages with the reality of everyday lived experiences in post 
conflict Bosnia and Croatia to give support to my own observations. 
However, I will not engage with an extended analysis of this 
anthropological material on a theoretical level. Instead, I will seek to 
engage Volf’s work with thinkers with whom he engages and with those 
who are relevant to the points made in this chapter. 
In the following sections I will firstly seek to flesh out Volf’s understanding of 
identity drawing on a range of his works and identifying his influences. 
Secondly, I will examine the problems and issues of identity which surround 
post-conflict justice in the Balkans. In this second section I will note that there 
are problems of identity in Bosnia and Croatia. I will propose that the problems 
are not ones of the content of ethnic identities, as a superficial examination may 
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suggest. Instead, the problems go beyond ethnic identity; they are problems of 
identity construction. I will turn to Volf’s reading of problematic identities centred 
on exclusion as supporting this view, that current identities are exclusionary. In 
the third section, I will highlight victim identities as the key expression of 
exclusionary post-conflict identities which need to be tackled. I will be seeking to 
demonstrate that identity issues are hugely important in reference to pursuing 
post-conflict justice, particularly if justice is to be envisioned as fundamentally 
about right relationships. Finally, I will turn to elements of Volf’s theology of 
embrace which offer resources to tackle these issues. I will look to understand 
Volf’s conclusions on the importance of a Trinitarian, relational model for human 
identity in terms of how such a model might move a pursuit or understanding of 
post-conflict justice forward. 
 
Section 1: Volf and Identity 
 
1.1 Volf’s theology of identity  
 
Before discussing the problems of identity in the Balkans and Volf’s 
understanding of their root cause, it is important to have a basic understanding 
of Volf’s work on identity. In all of his work on identity, the roots of identity are 
founded in the Trinity. Whilst the Trinity itself will be dealt with more fully in the 
next chapter, it is impossible to talk of Volf’s understanding of identity without 
some reference to it. Volf believes that the triune nature of God in itself counters 
the problem of “hard” or, as referred to elsewhere, exclusionary identities.217 He 
agrees with the basic principle behind Regina Schwartz’ assessment of the 
problem of a monotheistic conception of God which ‘whether as singleness 
(God against the others) or totality (this is all the God there is)...abhors, reviles, 
rejects and ejects whatever it defines as outside its compass.’218 This critique of 
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monotheism reflects the same sorts of critiques Volf makes of human identities, 
which exclude either through a sole emphasis on difference (what Schwarz 
labels here as singleness), or through an emphasis on sameness which refuses 
to allow space for another to assert their own identity. In grounding his work on 
identity in the Trinity, Volf is therefore rejecting these types of identities he 
labels as exclusionary and seeks to forge a sense of human identity which 
images the triune God who is both three distinct persons and one complete 
unity. 
In Exclusion and Embrace the notion of embrace as a metaphor for human 
identity and relations is drawn from Volf’s understanding of God’s triunity as a 
life of embrace in which Father, Son and Spirit are bound through mutual self-
giving love. The concept of embrace in human terms is proposed more in terms 
of a relational practice rather than an identity theory.219 This may mean that my 
proposal of embrace as an alternative type of identity, or more accurately an 
alternative way of perceiving and constructing identity, appears confusing. If 
embrace is a practice, whilst identity is an understanding of the self, how can 
embrace be an alternative proposal to problematic identities? However, Volf’s 
theology suggests that understanding embrace as a relational practice of 
identity construction in itself shapes the content of identity. Just as in the Trinity, 
human beings should be ‘constituted by one another in their relations.’220 
Charles Taylor’s definition of identity as ‘something like a person’s 
understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as 
a human being’ also helps here.221 If human beings understand themselves as 
fundamentally designed to image the triune life of embrace, then embrace will 
be both the mode of pursuing positive identities but will also shape the content 
of those identities.222 In this sense embrace can be understood as a type of 
identity. 
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Volf suggests that whereas most approaches to problems of identity 
(universalist, communitarian or postmodern) focus on reconfiguring social 
arrangements, his approach concentrates on social agents.223 He explores 
‘what kind of selves we need to be’.224 This reflects his approach to theology 
more widely, which is to suggest the character and shape of human action 
rather than a program or theory to be enacted.225 Similarly in this chapter I will 
focus not on the contents of identity as inherently problematic, but on the shape 
and character of identities as problematic. Understood in this light, embrace can 
be characterised as a reshaping of the way identities are formed, and thus as 
reshaping the identities themselves. Embrace as a practice is the means by 
which fluid contents of identity are negotiated and renegotiated. Thus whilst the 
content of identity may change, the means by which it is formed remain the 
same.226 
In section 4 I will examine Volf’s metaphor of embrace in terms of its 
movements more closely. Here it is sufficient to see embrace as formed in 
contrast to identities which exclude or ‘self-enclosed identities’.227 That is, 
identities which are primarily about gaining self-recognition and domination and 
which in doing seek to exclude the other.228 Embrace is about ‘de-centering’ the 
self and making room for the other to participate in the formation of one’s own 
identity.229 It is certainly a profoundly relational understanding of identity. Volf 
writes elsewhere that ‘persons are constituted by God in the medium of their 
social relationships. Sociality is essential for personhood.’230 Yet Volf’s concept 
of embrace is more than the recognition of the fact that the other will in some 
way impact our identity (whether collaboratively, or in conflict). It is the active 
desire for the other, the creation of ‘space in myself for the other to come in 
...[and the] movement out of myself so as to enter the space created by the 
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other.’231 It is an understanding of human beings as designed in the image of 
the triune God. 
It is an understanding which is also reflected in Volf’s concept of the ‘catholicity 
of persons’ which appears in both After Our Likeness and Exclusion and 
Embrace.232 This terminology particularly highlights the need for individuals to 
have a ‘self-understanding as a relational being’.233 Yet this language is derived 
from Catholic and Orthodox theology, it is not primarily Volf’s own, and is used 
primarily within a church context.234 It is coupled with the idea of a catholic 
community.235  
In After Our Likeness, Volf discusses ecclesial identity in terms of ‘catholic 
personality’.236 Whilst Volf takes the notion of catholicity of person from both 
Catholic and Orthodox traditions, he develops it differently in order to address 
his egalitarian and voluntarist concerns. Volf’s notion of the catholicity of the 
church gives way to the idea of the catholicity of person. Rather than 
understanding the catholic person as ‘catholic insofar as the universal church is 
realised in that person’, as Ratzinger or Zizioulas might prefer, Volf argues that 
‘an ecclesial person is not constituted by the Spirit of God through that person’s 
relation to a whole…but rather through that person’s multiple relations to other, 
concrete Christians, especially through the relations to the concrete 
congregation in which the person has come to faith and been baptized.’237 In 
this way Volf relegates the status of the church as one unified entity into which 
individuals are subsumed. This reflects his Trinitarian emphasis which follows 
Moltmann’s in stressing the individual persons of the Trinity.  
Volf makes clearer in this text that the catholic person (or the person practicing 
embrace perhaps) is one who acknowledges themselves to be inherently 
relational and who seeks to live ‘within a community of mutual giving and 
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receiving.’238 It is this self-knowledge which sets them apart from others who are 
also inescapably relational but who reject or are unaware of their relational 
being.239 
In stressing the inherently relational nature of human beings as imaging the 
relational nature of the Trinity, Volf is keen to avoid relationships which are ‘at 
bottom contractual and whose attachment lasts only “until better return is 
available elsewhere.”’240 Volf puts in place a sense of permanence and 
inevitability rather than seeing individuals as having a choice to be formed by 
relationships or not. The choice is in whether one recognises one’s relational 
nature or not. It is unclear whether such recognition is a characteristic of 
Christian conversion only, or whether non-Christians might also recognise their 
human nature. Since the mutual giving and receiving of the triune God is the 
model it seems that without recognition of such a God recognition of human 
nature could only be partial.  
Whilst the sense of identity it advocates is the same as that in Volf’s concept of 
embrace. It is embrace which serves as the primary answer to the problem of 
exclusionary identities. For this reason, it is embrace which is the central point 
of reference in dealing with the issue of problematic identities in Bosnia and 
Croatia in this chapter. 
 
1.2 Volf’s Theology in Context 
1.2a Identity and Relationality 
Volf’s work begins with the understanding that human beings are inherently 
relational. His position is that this relationality is ultimately founded in God. 
Moreover, human beings should understand themselves as relational in order 
that those relations should be lived out in a way which seeks to image Godself 
as far as is right and good for human beings to do.241 Volf draws on Luther to 
assert that ‘The heart of our identity lies not in our hands. We are most properly 
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ourselves because God is in us and we are in God’.242   The very heart of 
human identity is formed in relation with the ultimate other. Despite the 
theological foundations of his position, he is situated, very broadly, within an 
agreement on the relationality of identity with his contemporaries which begins 
with Hegel.243 
Volf notes that ‘in recent decades the issue of identity has risen to the forefront 
of discussions in social philosophy...major concerns of the nineties seem to be 
about identity.’244 In this context (the end of the twentieth century), the basic 
insight which Volf upholds, that identity is inherently relational, is a widely held 
view and can be seen, for example, in Taylor, Habermas and Benhabib. It is 
Hegel who is seen as ultimately responsible for the break with earlier notions of 
identity as self-referential.245 Hegel saw modern conceptions of identity as 
overemphasising identity as sameness and as having an ‘inherently non-
relational view of the self.’246 Instead Hegel began to emphasise the inherently 
relational nature of identity and thus the importance of difference or otherness in 
affirming the self’s sameness. Of particular concern in this chapter is Hegel’s 
understanding of identity as ‘being-for-self which is for itself, only through 
another’.247 This view contrasts considerably with Volf’s since Hegel 
understands identity as self-interested and, what Volf would deem, 
exclusionary.248 Volf instead seeks to propose a sense of identity which desires 
the good of the other as much as the good of the self.249 Nevertheless, at its 
heart Hegel brings in the notion of identity as inescapably formed in relation with 
the other. 
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The importance of identity being seen as inherently relational, as noted in this 
section, is that if we are to associate justice with identity formation, as I propose 
and will argue for below, then justice also becomes inherently relational. The 
type of relationality or the ways in which this relationality is expressed will 
emerge as I explore Volf’s concept of embrace as a means of understanding 
identity. 
I have noted that contemporary discourse on identity widely acknowledges that 
at a basic level identity is formed in relation to others. Benhabib writes that ‘the 
self becomes an individual in that it becomes a “social” being’.250 This, mirrors 
Volf’s own comment (bar the theological underpinnings) that ‘persons are 
constituted by God in the medium of their social relationships. Sociality is 
essential for personhood.’251  Yet understandings of the way in which relations 
shape identity and the way in which this should happen, which is Volf’s concern, 
differ greatly.  
Where moderns stressed sameness and unity of identity, Volf’s contemporaries 
see identity as more concerned with difference. Benhabib highlights the role of 
difference in late twentieth century identity discourse stating that ‘since every 
search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity 
politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference. One is 
a Bosnian Serb to the degree which one is not a Bosnian Moslem or a Croat.’252  
 
Identity discourse can be characterised in terms of sameness and difference. I 
have noted above that Hegel moved away from an overemphasis of sameness 
in terms of identity being formed without reference to the other, and that 
postmoderns and Volf’s contemporaries tended to emphasise difference to a 
great degree in a concern for particularity. Hegel’s awareness of difference 
involves a struggle to the death.253 Taylor notes that ‘with the politics of 
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difference, what we are asked to recognise is the unique identity of this 
individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else.’254 Volf is fully aware 
of the pitfalls of both an overemphasis on sameness and of an overemphasis on 
difference. His proposal seeks to find roots for an overarching sense of 
sameness founded in God, as well as account for the reality of difference. 
 
1.2bSameness and Difference 
Volf’s work on identity is centred initially on the problem of exclusion of the 
other. Volf understands exclusion as practices or constructions of identity which 
place an overemphasis either on the sameness of the other or upon the 
difference of the other. Sameness and difference are key terms within 
discussions of identity and will be central to the debate within this chapter.  
Young summarises the role of these terms: Identity is initially defined as ‘the 
relation expressed in mathematics and logic by the equals sign (=), as absolute 
sameness, individuality, the condition of being a specified person who is the 
same in all situations and circumstances, through time...Yet, if identity is 
sameness it is also specified by being different – paradoxically it can only be 
defined by difference from others. As a concept identity has thus the unusual 
characteristic of necessarily immediately summoning up its opposite, 
difference.’255 Human identity can be understood in terms of a tension between 
sameness and difference. Philosophical accounts of identity can also be read 
as stressing either sameness or difference. Certainly, Volf reads identity largely 
in these terms and seeks to find a midpoint between an emphasis on either 
term.  
Volf draws on a range of philosophical sources in his discussion of sameness 
and difference. However he engages initially with Derrida’s critique of 
totalitarian identities.256 That is, identities which seek to subsume the other into 
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sameness.257 This is perhaps unsurprising in that Derrida is a key example of a 
critique of modern notions of identity linked to sameness and a shift towards 
emphasising difference, diversity and particularity. There is also a contextual 
relevance in that Volf reads Derrida’s critique of totalitarian identities in light of 
Serbian assertion of their own identity.258  Whilst Volf agrees with many of 
Derrida’s critiques, Volf also seeks to redress the widespread shift towards 
identity as difference which Derrida represents. In this sense it may be that Volf 
chooses Derrida as a dialogue partner to accentuate his argument since 
Derrida represents a more extreme position than other writers.259 Certainly 
Volf’s own efforts are present a balance between the modern and postmodern 
emphases on identity as sameness and difference. Whilst Volf pursues a 
theological position, in many areas he agrees with Taylor who also seeks to find 
a ‘mid-point’ between homogeneity and particularity.260 
Volf begins his engagement with these current issues in identity discourse by 
agreeing with Derrida’s critique of identities which overwhelm the other with an 
assertion of sameness. This type of emphasis on unity, sameness and purity of 
identity can destroy the other’s ‘otherness’ and is thus one type of exclusion. 
Yet Volf is also critical of the problems of difference. Volf critiques the 
deconstruction of identity or the focus on particularity which loses sight of the 
‘sameness’ of humanity, which is necessary for a sense of non-exclusionary 
identity to exist. Volf suggests that as well as a deconstruction of oppressive 
sameness or false unity, what is required is a notion of construction of ‘salutary 
harmony’, essentially a lighter notion of sameness which brings order to the 
otherwise endless difference.261 Ultimately Volf turns to God as the root of this 
‘lighter’ sameness, stating that ‘oneness in Christ is a community of people 
with...distinct...identities, not some abstract unity of pure spirits.’262 In this type 
of assertion Volf is trying to avoid the problems of socially constructed or 
enforced sameness which turns to violence or exclusion of difference. 
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Volf’s critiques of those such as Derrida, Deleuze and Foucault move Volf’s 
work away from direct engagement with the lived realities of exclusionary 
identities which he identifies during the 1990s, and which I argue are still a 
pressing problem. These realities are perhaps more in tune with problems of 
modern philosophy. That is the problem of overemphasis of sameness 
(oneness within an identity group). This is seen in the story of the Serb father’s 
crisis of identity at the beginning of this chapter where he kills to remove the 
other from himself, seeking a purer identity. It also relates to Benhabib’s 
comment noted earlier. This suggests that where Serb identity is formed around 
difference from Bosnian Muslims and Croats, there will be an emphasis on 
being ‘the most different’ from the other and thus perhaps an increased 
emphasis on ‘sameness’ within a group in order to emphasise difference from 
those outside the group. This indicates a sense of self-definition which sees no 
need for the other to be a part of the self. This in turn leads to a problem of 
understanding the other as defined by difference.  
The concept of boundaries emerges from this type of discussion. Bosnian and 
Croat identities can be understood as very much formed around boundaries. 
This is characterised by an emphasis on defining who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ 
rather than on the content of the identity (i.e. shared language, history or 
experience). There is a focus on self-definition and a lack of fluidity. Wolfe notes 
that postmodern accounts of identity (such as Derrida’s) are defined by a 
dissolution of boundaries or a presumption that boundaries are ‘little more than 
a distinction rooted in power or a move in a rhetorical game. Differences, in 
other words, never have a fixed status in and of themselves.’263  These appear 
to be rather opposite problems. In this sense it might be possible to characterise 
the majority of Balkan identities discussed as in some sense fitting with modern, 
rather than postmodern, conceptions of identity. Volf seeks to propose an 
understanding of permeable boundaries which have both a sense of stability of 
identity and allow for the communication and sharing of difference. This idea 
has echoes of Benhabib’s understanding of ‘porous borders’, whilst expressed 
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in different contexts and language both share the idea that both stability and 
difference need to be accommodated.264 
Whilst Volf’s work on exclusion is partly based on engagement with 
philosophers and speaks in these terms, I will seek to return Volf’s discussion to 
the context which prompted his initial identification of exclusionary identities as 
problematic.  I will seek to demonstrate that identities focused upon 
exclusionary practices are still very evident in the Balkans in a variety of forms 
and that such identities have a significant and damaging effect on both 
perceptions of and attempts to pursue justice. In the following I will seek to 
demonstrate that unless this underlying problem of identity is acknowledged 
and tackled, the pursuit of justice will continue to founder.  
 
1.3 The Content of Identity 
 
It is important to highlight here the way in which Volf speaks of identity. In this 
chapter the key questions are ones of identity construction rather than the 
content of identity. It is therefore helpful to understand Volf’s perception of the 
way in which these elements of identity are held together. 
Curiously Volf chooses to explore this issue in reference to gender identity in 
Exclusion and Embrace. It seems to take a tangent from the main thrust of the 
text, yet Volf uses it as a ‘test case’.265 Volf notes that Luce Irigaray claims ‘the 
importance of sexual difference is the most important challenge humanity 
faces.’ 266 In this light it appears to be an attempt to engage his argument with 
the interests of a wider audience. Whatever the case what he has to say about 
the fluidity of identity is important. 
In reference to gender identity, Volf suggests that sexed bodies form the “root” 
of gender identity, that is, they are a stable biological fact of difference. Gender 
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identity on the other hand, whilst ‘not arbitrary…is fluid’.267 Volf sees sexed 
bodies and gender identity as closely related, with the first allowing the 
possibility of the second’s continued existence.268 In this view socially 
constructed identities are subjective, but have stability because they are 
orientated around an objective “root”.  
This position appears relatively easy to maintain in terms of the relationship 
between sexed bodies and gender identity, since the root difference is clear.269 
However in reference to ethnic identities (and most other identities) the root 
difference may be less clear. Whilst Croatianess may be defined by parents 
declared ethnicity, birth place, language variant or religion, there are many 
cases in which individuals in the Balkans have a variety of ethnic ties (for 
example parents of different ethnicities, no religious belief or an alternative 
religious belief, a birth place which differs from their language etc.). In these 
cases, Volf’s concept of a fixed “root” as the basis for negotiated identity seems 
less persuasive. Indeed some would claim that there is no “root” of ethnic 
identity, that it is all construction. Indeed in interview Volf agreed that the idea of 
root is less helpful in the case of ethnic identity, since it is largely about self 
identification. 270 
However, Volf’s attempts to maintain both a solidity and a fluidity to the notion of 
identity is helpful. It seems to counter the criticisms of both the soft conceptions 
of identity as ‘constructed, fluid and multiple’ as well as agreeing with standard 
critiques of essentialist understandings of identity as too fixed….271 This is also 
a typical move for Volf, in that he is constantly attempting to marry postmodern 
concerns over plurality particularity with a sense of solidity or universality. In this 
case however, informed particularly by the problems of reading gender identity 
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from the sexed body, Volf tips the balance slightly towards a postmodern, fluid 
conception of identity. This means that the “root” stands only as a stable marker 
of difference, it has little to say about the content of identity or the means of 
negotiating identity. In this way the ‘real’ difference becomes a background 
factor in terms of determining identity. Later, in a discussion of memory, Volf’s 
work perhaps suggests that the stable root of human identity is in fact God: ‘we 
are defined by how God relates to us’.272 Whether Volf would call God the root 
however is unclear. 
In terms of finding alternative language, Stuart Hall writes that ‘it seems to be in 
the attempt to rearticulate the relationship between subjects and discursive 
practices that the question of identity recurs – or rather if one prefers to stress 
the process of subjectification to discursive practices, and the politics of 
exclusion which all such subjectification seems to entail, the question of 
identification.’273 In this reading, attempts to categorise people means a return 
to the question of identity. These practices of categorisation are based upon 
exclusionary practices since they involve subjecting the subject to a category 
rather than a category existing because of the subject. This means the question 
is more about how human beings identify others (“identification”), rather than 
“who they really are” (which is often implied in the term “identity”). Essentially 
Hall moves on from the term “identity” in order to highlight the subjectivity of 
categorisation whether by self or other.  
Hall’s comments indicate an understanding of identity labels themselves as 
exclusionary, which is not a position Volf’s theology suggests.274 However, the 
language of identification may be useful in talking about Volf’s work in that Volf 
is primarily talking not about what might be termed the content of identity (the 
facts of who one is i.e. Catholic, a speaker of Croatian, one born in Croatia 
etc.), but about the way in which individuals identify themselves.275 That is, how 
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the content of identity is negotiated between social beings, how people use 
basic facts about themselves to construct their own image of who they are and 
who the other is. 
Despite its problems in relation to ethnic identity, using Volf’s language of root 
and negotiated identity is helpful here to illuminate the way in which this chapter 
deals with identity.   I will not be concerned with the roots of identity, which in 
the sense of ethnic identity might arguably include: language spoken, country or 
region one lives in, country of birth, age, concrete experiences (for example 
time served as a soldier, time spent in a wartime camp). Instead I will be 
concerned with the more subjective, negotiated element of identity which is 
more about identification, either self-identification or identification by others. 
This subjective element might include one’s ethnic identity, one’s political 
affiliations, one’s understanding of self as victim or perpetrator, one’s 
understanding of one’s role in society, in justice processes or in reconciliation.  
 
Section 2: Problems of Identity 
 
2.1 The Problem of Identity in Bosnia and Croatia  
 
The problems of identity in the Balkans are in one sense well known. Ethnic 
identity has been well documented as the chief dividing line of the war.276 The 
conflict can be broadly categorised as fought between Serbs, Croats and 
Muslims. Whilst ethnic identity continues to have a prominent role in the post-
conflict Balkans, many other wartime identities have also become significant. In 
this section I will draw on ethnographic studies which observe the significance 
of wartime experiences on self-identity, and the ways in which group identities 
form around shared experience whilst excluding those with different 
experiences. I will argue that such studies lend support to the notion that the 
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common thread running through a diverse range of post conflict identities is the 
problem of exclusion. I propose that it is not necessarily the content of these 
identities which is problematic in moving forward with justice or reconciliation, 
but the way in which these identities are constructed. 
In looking first to cultural anthropologists rather than political commentators or 
philosophers, I have sought to find support for my own observations and 
interviews. I also seek to redress the lack of contextual focus in Volf’s work. 
Volf’s consideration of identity moves swiftly from observation of the lived reality 
of exclusionary identities, particularly in the Balkan conflict during the early 
1990s, to engagement with the philosophical debates centred around the ideas 
of sameness and difference of the same period. In making this move Volf 
sidesteps some of the real issues surrounding the content of ethnic identity, and 
fails to return his philosophical discussion to an engagement with the problems 
of exclusionary identities in terms of lived experience. That is, Volf fails to come 
to a clear conclusion with contextual application. Despite this, when I return in 
section 3 to Volf’s understanding of exclusionary identities, I will argue that his 
understanding of the problems of identity construction do fit with the current 
problems of identity observed here. This section seeks to keep the focus on 
lived realities and to bring Volf’s ideas back into dialogue with the context he, in 
some senses, leaves behind.  
For this task, an anthropological view point is invaluable in that it engages with 
the complexity and multiplicity of post-conflict identities. This engagement 
reveals both particularity and a degree of commonality in the way that these 
identities are constructed. Whilst maintaining the importance of particular 
identities, I will move towards a consideration of the common threads identified 
through anthropological research. These suggest that the construction of 
identities is the root problem. In doing so, the anthropological studies lend 
support to my proposal that Volf’s theology, which responds to the problem of 
exclusionary identity, has something to offer in this context. These studies also 
lend support to Volf’s reading of exclusionary identities as the chief problem of 
the conflict (and post-conflict) situation. Re-establishing this connection of Volf’s 
work with the present context is important if I am to support the thesis that Volf’s 
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response to exclusion – the theology of embrace - offers valuable resources in 
tackling the current pressing problem of justice in the post-war Balkans. 
 
2.1a The Problem of Ethnic Identity in the Balkans 
Here I want to demonstrate that ethnic identities in Bosnia and Croatia are 
relatively rigid and have become more so since the war. I also want to show that 
ethnic identities are linked to perspectives on justice. I will suggest that justice 
claims reflect the rigidity of the ethnic identities.  
‘After war and ethnic cleansing, ethno-national categories have become more 
pervasive and rigid, as well as more closely linked with religious markers and 
institutions.’277 As these anthropologists observe, ethnic identity in the Balkans 
is still a key category of identification. It often informs social groups, religious 
affiliation, where one lives, sometimes what job one has and, most importantly, 
it informs one’s perspective - understandings of justice have been shown to 
have strong correlations to ethnic identification.278 This comprehensive 
influence of ethnic identity as well as the “rigidity” or prescriptive nature of ethnic 
identification means that such identities are often exclusionary identities, based 
upon a definition of oneself (or one’s group) as that which is not the other.279  
In Bosnia particularly, ethnic identification is almost inescapable, even if one 
wanted to escape such categories. Political structures have been built around 
providing equally for each ethnic group (as part of the peace settlement), and in 
doing so have written ethnic difference into law and legitimised ethnic 
divisions.280 The separate administrations of the Federation and Republika 
Srpska are the most obvious example of the continued and legitimate ethnic 
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divisions. However, at a lower level, there is also a great deal of segregation in 
housing and schooling. There is also self imposed segregation of cafes, shops 
and public spaces. Even though the divisions are not immediately visible to 
outsiders, every public space and transaction is ethnically marked, including 
bars, cafes, most privately owned enterprises, shops, soccer clubs, market 
stands, churches, schools and even the kindergarten.281 Issues surrounding 
displacement and clear designations of Serb, Croat and Muslim space continue. 
Ethnic representation at a political level also means that political life tends to be 
ethnically segregated as political parties thrive on courting one ethnic group, 
highlighting difference and nationalistic concerns. This political element is 
particularly noteworthy in that it provides a cycle of confirmation and 
reinforcement of ethnic difference and separation. 
In Croatia nationalistic sentiments have calmed, primarily because there are few 
Serbs left and therefore little threat to Croats, Croatia or “Croatianess”. However 
ethnic identifications still play a significant role. Those Serbs that do remain 
tend to face negative discrimination in terms of work permits, interaction with 
police and the judicial system. Tensions do still flare up, in May 2008 in Vukovar 
Croats rallied against the Serb domination of employment in the town.282 In 
December 2008 informal conversations suggested that there is still an 
underlying bias against Serbia (“I would never go East”283) and Serbians. Those 
who commented on Serbs they knew and liked would tend to give the 
impression that these individuals were notable exceptions, not necessarily a 
reflection of Serbs as an ethnic group. 
Given the strength of ethnic identification in this region it is perhaps unsurprising 
that Tania Wettach’s survey of Muslim, Catholic (Croat) and Orthodox (Serb) 
interpretations of truth, justice and co-existence shows agreement between 
those of the same ethno-religious background and disagreement between each 
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group. Partial agreements between groups only come where there is a sense of 
shared wartime experience. For example Catholic and Muslim representatives 
(in discussions on truth) agreed that ‘the Bosnian war can be interpreted as 
Serbian aggression’.284 In discussing justice in Bosnia, the Croat Catholics and 
Orthodox Serbs found more in common. Whilst the Muslims emphasised 
punishment through global courts, Catholic and Serbian Orthodox participants 
stressed ‘the problem of equality or equal opportunities for ethnicities and 
religious communities, especially in questions of restitution of property, religious 
education and employment.’285 Justice claims here reflect the ethnic identities of 
the claimants. Justice claims in this research reflect the interests of the ethnic 
group. They are assertions of the group’s own interests over and against those 
they wish to exclude. So for example the Catholic claim that ‘the Bosnian war 
can be interpreted as Serb aggression can be understood as naming the ‘other’ 
in this case the Serbs as the perpetrators, and conferring victim status on 
oneself, in this case Catholics/Croatians.  
Wettach’s research demonstrates the inextricable links between ethnic identity 
and perspectives on justice in practice. However, where claims were shared 
between ethnic groups, there is the suggestion that the content of identity is at 
least partially informed by wartime experiences. The interplay here of ethnicity, 
religion and wartime experience suggests a complexity both to the way identity 
is formed and its effect on perceptions of justice. In the language of sameness 
and difference highlighted earlier, what appears to be happening is that identity 
is formed around sameness, (shared ethnic history, language etc.), and then 
from that place of safety, as standing within an identified group, justice claims 
are projected which serve to reinforce one’s own group’s rightness (and 
sameness and purity) and highlight the others’ difference, inferiority and guilt. 
What remains is that the sense of the self, however it is informed, is a key factor 
in determining what one perceives justice to be.  
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2.1b ‘Beyond Ethnicity’286 
In the previous section I noted the importance of ethnic identity on justice 
claims. Here I want to stress that problems of identity are not about the content 
of the identity being expressed i.e. ethnicity and the shared language, history 
and sense of self that implies. Instead I want to show that the problems of 
identity (and its effect on perceptions of and claims for justice) are founded in 
the way that identity is understood, the way it is constructed in relation to the 
other and the way it is consequently expressed. Therefore I want to suggest 
here that there are problems of exclusionary identities and conflicting justice 
claims, not only between ethnic groups, but between differently defined groups, 
for example, refugees and non-refugees. 
Whilst it is clearly understood that problems of ethnic identity or identification 
were central to the Balkan conflict, they continue to be of great importance in 
understanding and addressing post-conflict issues.287 However, it is too 
simplistic to understand divisions within Bosnia and Croatia as merely along 
ethnic lines. Whilst these are the most identifiable divisions, and maintain a 
strong hold, other wartime categories are also still in play, as are new 
identifications and divisions.  
It is important therefore to move beyond a focus on ethnicity as problematic and 
instead consider ethnicity within a larger context of multi-layered post-conflict 
identities all of which, I would argue, display a common problematic 
characteristic. That is both ethnic and other post-war identities display a focus 
on excluding the other.  
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Bougarel, Helms and Duijzings note that: 
‘The acceleration of the restitution and return process in the early 
2000’s pitted displaced persons and (minority) returnees against 
each other: the former emphasised their material needs and their 
right to settle while the latter demanded their pre-war property rights 
and redress for wartime injustices. At the same time veterans 
lamented the loss of their wartime status and the ingratitude of 
society while civilian victims longed for recognition of their own 
suffering.’288 
 
This type of anthropological research demonstrates that the conflict has created 
many more identifiable groups, all of whom have claims, many of which conflict. 
Interestingly this extract notes the need for recognition of grievances. In doing 
so they may be pointing to the cause of problematic identity constructions. 
Taylor’s work on recognition, which Volf draws on, suggests that ‘non-
recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, 
imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.’289 It 
may be that feelings of non-recognition in these instances mean individuals and 
groups assert their identities, their difference from the other and sameness 
within their group, more forcefully and in doing so distort the reality of that 
identity. This is a question I will return to in the discussion of problematic victim 
identities in section 3.  
There are a number of further divisions in Bosnia which continue to cause post-
conflict divisions. Anthropologists identify the long-standing urban-country 
divisions within Bosnia as still having some role in dividing and categorising 
groups of people.290 These categories are strongly linked to ideas of the 
cultured and uncultured. Similarly wartime stayees and returnees can find 
hostility between them.291 Moreover different types of victims are in some cases 
legally categorised as to the extent of their injuries – not all war victims are 
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classified as such by the Bosnian government – and this can lead to tensions 
and further problems of non-recognition.292 Bosnia in particular is a country with 
strong regional/municipal identities and these also come into play in terms of 
identification and perceptions of justice. This comes to the fore in cases where a 
particular region has suffered a particular injustice. Essentially there are multiple 
layers to any identity, and in terms of the elements pertinent to understanding 
the relationship of identity and justice in Bosnia and Croatia this is also true.  
It is important to recognise the multiple divisions noted here since they impact 
the progress of justice. In a witness transcript from the ICTY, one witness 
questions why he, a (cultured, educated) doctor, should be submitted to such 
treatment at the hands of the Serbs. Similarly other witnesses question why 
they suffered, bringing to the fore their status or identity. The implication of such 
statements is that if they had not been one of the cultured, or had not had the 
identity or status they claimed perhaps they would have deserved their 
treatment or accepted it as their due in some way. This demonstrates the 
complex interaction of multiple layers of identity and its effect on justice claims 
which reflect one’s beliefs about oneself and one’s group. 
These multiple layers of identification mean that whilst there is much to say 
about identity at the broad category level of ethnicity, many other divisions and 
differentiations must also be considered in any discussion of identity in the 
Balkans. It is the emphasis on complete difference, the setting up of firm 
boundaries which do not allow for mixed identities, which is damaging to the 
progress of justice.  
The collection of studies brought together by Bougarel, Helms and Duijzings 
brings together research into very particular identity groups, but manages to 
suggest commonalities between them. The studies suggest that in both ethnic 
and other wartime identities there is a need to maintain strong identities as a 
form of protection against the other. The studies suggest that identity groups 
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are focused on a particular aspect of sameness which is primarily reinforced by 
an exclusion of those who are different.  
 
2.2 Identity and Justice  
 
Beginning with Tania Wettach’s sociological research on ethnically identified 
groups and their perspectives on justice, it is clear that ethnic identity has a 
strong impact on understandings of justice and the claims to justice individuals 
and groups within Bosnia-Hercegovina put forward. Wettach’s research blurs 
the line between ethnic and religious identities however. This is common place 
in that religious labels were consciously brought to the fore during the conflict as 
one of the clearest markers of ethnic distinctiveness. Wettach’s research 
focused on questioning religious leaders from Muslim, Catholic, Serbian 
Orthodox and Jewish communities. The inextricable links between ethnicity and 
religious groups in this region mean that these leaders would consequently also 
be representatives of the Bosnian Muslim (Muslim), Croatian (Catholic) and 
Serbian (Serbian Orthodox) communities. In this sense then Wettach’s research 
shows that both ethnic and religious identitifications inform justice perspectives. 
Further anthropological work published by Bougarel, Helms and Duijzings 
suggests that there are multiple divisions amongst those of the same ethnic or 
religious groups in terms of wartime experiences. Such research suggests that 
in the Balkans there are issues surrounding identity which are not necessarily 
related to certain ethnic identities in particular but to many identity groups. 
That there are problems of conflict between multiple identity groups (those 
formed around ethnic, geographical, experiential identifications etc.) suggests 
that the problems of identity are more broadly situated in the way that identities 
are formed and maintained rather than necessarily in the specific content of 
those identities. 
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Tania Wettach’s research clearly demonstrates a link between ethnic identity 
and justice in the Balkans.293 However, in this chapter I want to look more 
broadly at what such links say, not about the content of particular ethnic 
identities, but about how particular types of understandings of self and identity 
effect one’s perceptions of justice. For example the links noted earlier 
demonstrate that there is a large degree of self-interest in the justice claims, 
and that they are often oppositional or antagonistic. I want to suggest that such 
oppositional perspectives on justice may be largely related to a perception of 
self built upon difference from the other. Thus a change in the way identity is 
constructed might be influential in changing one’s perspective on justice. 
It is of course important to first establish a broad link between identity and 
justice in order to demonstrate the necessity of dealing with identity in order to 
progress with justice. It is also significant to note that multiple aspects of identity 
inform conceptions of justice. In the Balkans a combination of ethnicity, religion, 
geography and war time experience are the most obvious factors in determining 
one’s perception of justice. Of course gender, economic status, intellect, 
profession etc. also play a role. It is therefore not the content of these identities 
which is problematic necessarily, but the way in which people perceive the role 
of their identity in terms of relating to the other.  In the following section of this 
chapter I will be arguing that it is certain ‘types’ of identity, or more precisely 
certain ways of forming or perceiving of identity, which inform perceptions of 
and approaches to justice.  
 
2.3 What does Volf say about the Problem of Identity? 
2.3a Volf and the Relationship of Identity and Justice 
For Volf the problem of identity precedes the any problems of justice. 
“Various kinds of cultural cleansings demand of us to place identity 
and otherness at the center of theological reflection on social 
realities.’294 
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After spending 6 weeks in warring Croatia in 1992 Volf wrote that ‘it became 
clear to me what, in a sense, I knew all along: the problem of ethnic and cultural 
conflicts is part of a larger problem of identity and otherness.’295 For Volf the 
Balkan conflict did not initially prompt him to question which claims were just, or 
what a just outcome might look like or what just action could be taken. Instead 
Volf’s realisation indicates a broad concern which was not primarily about the 
cultural or ethnic content of identity he witnessed, but with the way identities are 
formed in relation to the other. Together with other resurgence of cultural 
conflicts (the L.A riots and Berlin neo-Nazi rallies) in the early 1990s this 
understanding of identity and otherness as central to cultural conflicts, which 
also draws on Volf’s reading of Derrida,  prompted the beginnings of Volf’s 
theology of embrace.296  
Indeed, Volf’s theology is much more concerned with addressing identity than it 
is in addressing justice. This is perhaps partly from observation: Volf sees 
identity as a much more fundamental issue in terms of its effect on human 
interaction both in relation to conflict and peace. It is also because Volf’s 
theological starting point is always the Trinity. Beginning with the Trinity 
(something to be discussed in more depth in the following chapter) is both due 
to the fact that Volf sees God’s revelation of himself as fundamentally Trinitarian 
and because the Trinity offers a rich resource for a renewed understanding of 
human identity and relations. For Volf this means understanding how human 
beings can seek to be as God is, that is to live a life which images God.297 
Therefore if identity can be understood correctly, then it may serve as the basis 
for understanding how human beings should interact in a multitude of situations. 
That is, identity, considering who we are and how we interact, is the starting 
point for any social action. Understanding identity therefore precedes any 
attempt to understand or construct justice, truth, good and evil.298  
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The necessity of dealing with identity before concepts of justice reflects Volf’s 
focus on social agents rather than social arrangements.299 Volf believes that 
social agents should shape the character of social arrangements rather than be 
moulded to them.300 He writes elsewhere that ‘the identity of human beings and 
the goal of their lives are bound up in the fact that God created them to image 
God.301 This illustrates not a separation between action and being or who we 
are and what we do, but that both are dependent on God. However, 
understanding that dependence and our interdependence as God’s creation 
means that understanding who we are is necessary in order to understand the 
direction in which we should be orientated or, in this case how we might pursue 
justice.  
By prioritising identity as the core issue, Volf is also centring responsibility for 
the pursuit of justice with social agents. He interacts with Bauman who notes 
that modernity and postmodernity have, in different ways shifted moral 
responsibility away from the self.302 This may be a particular issue in the pursuit 
of justice in Bosnia and Croatia where post-socialist mindsets may be an issue 
in that justice is not seen as a personal responsibility. In linking identity and 
justice in the way Volf does, the pursuit of justice is seen as the concern of and 
affected by the individual’s construction of identity. 
Volf is not alone in understanding the close link between justice and identity. 
Taylor also notes the importance of understanding ‘what it is good to be’ rather 
than moving straight to ‘what it is right to do’.303  Taylor also makes the link in 
the opposite direction, highlighting the impossibility of discussing identity without 
also referring to morality or “the good”.304 Justice emerges from a proper 
understanding of who we are, and perhaps preceding both is an understanding 
of what it is good to be. For Volf both the goal of identity and the goal of justice 
are the good that is the life of the Trinity,  and the Trinity serves therefore firstly 
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as the source of identity and also then as the source of justice. All three aspects 
of this thesis then are closely interwoven.  
Volf and Taylor both raise the prospect that who we are, or who we believe 
ourselves to be, affects how we act. Before action however comes perception. 
As has been illustrated ethnic identity in particular has a strong relationship with 
individual and group perceptions of what the term justice means and following 
that, what action justice entails. If the problem of conflicting claims to justice is 
to be addressed then identity, which informs both one’s own perception of 
justice as well as one’s perception of the other’s justice, must be included in the 
discussion. It is perceptions of the other which are the chief concern of Volf’s 
work, the perception of the other as wholly different, precedes the action to 
exclude. Similarly in offering a solution the very notion of who we are and how 
we relate must be altered in order that self understanding provokes altered 
relations. 
For Volf then identity and justice are inextricably linked and both find their roots 
in God. In order to understand justice, one must understand who one is in the 
most basic sense. That is a person created by God and in relation with God and 
each other.  
 
2.3b Volf, Identity and Experience 
Whilst Volf’s work on identity engages primarily with philosophical debates, his 
initial thoughts on the subject do come in response to the realities of the Balkan 
conflict. After the declaration of Croatian independence Volf at first felt relief in 
being in Croatian space but quickly found that he was expected to be 
exclusively Croat to the exclusion of Serbian friends and culture. ‘The new 
Croatia, like some jealous goddess, wanted all my love and loyalty. I must be 
Croat through and through, or I was not a good Croat.’305 Essentially Volf’s 
experiences suggested that Croatian identity was primarily about exclusion of 
anything identifiable with Serbia. Croatian identity was about that which was not 
Serbian identity - it was an identity of difference or opposition. 
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Volf understood that ‘after a forced assimilation under communist rule, the 
sense of ethnic belonging and cultural distinctness was bound to reassert 
itself’306  - that the previously enforced identity as “the same” would be 
countered with a radical swing towards identity as difference – and that ‘the 
need to stand firm against a powerful and destructive enemy…left little room for 
divided loyalties.’307 However he argues that such an identity in fact mirrored 
much of that of which the Serbians were accused. This suggests that two 
identities formed in opposition are in fact not really opposite at all, but are 
merely reflections of the worst in the other. In this sense there is a commonality 
between the identities of Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs in that each 
group’s identity is formed in opposition to the other and in order to exclude the 
other. 
Volf’s response to such exclusive demands was a decision that ‘being a part, 
belonging as “fully a part” should be incompatible with belonging “in every 
part”.’308 Essentially in his work he wanted to conceive of an identity which 
would allow him to be Croatian, but to maintain a relationship with the Serbs as 
well as to maintain parts of his own identity which were not subsumed into or 
defined by his Croatian identity (his Protestant faith, his mixed ethnic heritage, 
his Germanic and American associations etc.). He wanted to find room for a 
multifaceted identity rather than an exclusive identity. In this aim his work 
connects with the reality and complexity of identity in Bosnia and Croatia which 
current rigid identities make impossible. This understanding of identity in more 
fluid terms reflects postmodern concerns and will be discussed in section 3. 
Whilst Volf’s focus is on conflict and immediate post-conflict identity in relation 
to the enemy, this chapter will seek to demonstrate that the threat of the other 
itself is not the only reason for such an exclusive identity, and that exclusionary 
identities are a huge problem in term of preventing the pursuit of (any type) of 
justice, most particularly in terms of preventing empathy, shared history, the 
pursuit of truth and the will to work collaboratively towards conceiving of a 
mutually just outcome.  
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It is from experience that Volf makes the initial link between identity and justice. 
Volf argues that ‘If you insist that others do not belong to you and you to them, 
that their perspective should not muddle yours, you will have their justice and 
they will have theirs: your justices will clash and there will be no justice between 
you. The knowledge of justice depends on the will to embrace.’309 For Volf then, 
understanding identity as formed in collaboration with the other is essential to 
understanding and pursuing justice. The maintenance of exclusionary identities 
sees no end to conflicting justice claims and seeks justice for the self which this 
thesis suggests is impossible: justice can only exist between persons, between 
self and other. 
 
2.3c Exclusionary Identity 
That Volf chose to call his book Exclusion and Embrace emphasises the 
opposition of these two positions. The practice of embrace is of course that 
which Volf wants to recommend. It is a practice grounded in the triune life and 
symbolises the ultimate goal of all creation as reconciliation with each other and 
with God.310 In comparison, exclusion becomes almost equivalent to sin. 
Exclusion is that which is not of God. Since human beings live in a world of sin 
and are themselves sinners human beings also live exclusionary lives. Indeed 
Volf claims that human identity is often built upon exclusion. Certainly the idea 
of exclusion is central to the type of victim identity tackled here. Indeed one of 
the key aims of such an identity is to elevate the self and exclude the other. 
Volf is careful to follow Moltmann in rejecting attempts within the Christian 
tradition to find ‘one basic form of sin’.311 Instead, for Volf, ‘Exclusion names 
what permeates a good many of sins we commit against our neighbors, not 
what lies at the bottom of all sins’312. Volf draws on Christ’s practice of moving 
beyond social boundaries which excluded the other, the undesirable and the 
different in the name of righteousness in order to name such boundaries as 
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‘evil, sinful and outside God’s will.’313 Exclusionary identities can be seen as 
sinful in the sense that they are a refusal to acknowledge one’s place in relation 
to God and each other. Thus the refusal to form positive relational identities is 
not only a rejection of the other, but also a rejection of God. Similarly if we 
follow Volf’s point above, that recognition of human identity as created by God 
influences our understanding of life goods and actions, then the consequences 
of exclusion are myriad. So, for Volf, identities which are formed around, and 
based upon, exclusion of the other, are sinful and run contrary to a Christian 
vision of both the basis of human identity, and consequently a Christian vision 
of how human identity should be formed and have consequences for human 
action. 
In one sense then it is possible to frame the types of identities discussed so far 
as ‘sinful’ identities. This is not necessarily because of the content of those 
identities, in no way would Volf want to say to be Serbian or to be a refugee is 
sinful, but because of the way those identities are formed around exclusion of 
the other. 
Essentially exclusionary identities for Volf are those which create barriers 
between the self and the other. This might be done in two ways, most 
commonly through excluding the other because of their difference. For example 
Volf references exclusion of others who are perceived as unclean. In extreme 
form this becomes exclusion as elimination as seen in the Balkans.314 Exclusion 
may also occur as exclusion through assimilation or assertion of sameness. 
That is where one party accepts the other only on condition that they no longer 
maintain their otherness but become the same as, or are subsumed into, the 
self. Volf turns to Levi-Strauss for elaboration of this idea that ‘we will refrain 
from vomiting you out..if you let us swallow you up’.315 This type of exclusion 
was perhaps more evident in the pre-war Yugoslavia where national, ethnic and 
religious identities were most often suppressed in favour of a Yugoslavian 
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identity built upon a false notion of sameness or absolute identity between 
citizens. 
The concept of exclusionary identities is not particular to Volf, nor is it only 
notable in terms of Balkan identities. The idea draws significantly on wider 
philosophical discussions of sameness and difference referenced earlier. Volf 
uses the term exclusion to cover both identities which exclude the other based 
on difference, and identities which exclude the other by subsuming them into 
sameness. That is, essentially denying the difference of the other and thus 
excluding them through suppression.  
It seems that there are currently two options open to Bosnians, Croats and 
Serbs - either to continue to define oneself against another, to segregate, to 
reinforce ethnic oppositions in the political systems, or, as many young people 
in particular are doing, to ignore the past and suggest that all ethnic groups are 
essentially the same, an idea which has been tried once before under the 
Yugoslavian regime. For Volf both these options are problematic in that whilst 
they are apparent opposites, in fact they are both identical in that they are 
identities built upon exclusion of the other. 
 
Conclusion 
Tania Wettach writes that ‘fourteen years after the Dayton Accords were signed 
a “negative peace” hangs over BiH [Bosna i Hercegovina] and the entire ex-
Yugoslavian Balkan region.’316 Her comments suggest that peace in Bosnia is 
currently built upon the maintenance of exclusionary identities, spaces and 
politics. It is evident that the Balkan conflict has both entrenched existing 
divisions and forged new ones. Currently one’s identity dictates multiple aspects 
of one’s life and informs perspectives on post-conflict issues including justice. 
Identity is about separating oneself from the other be that based on ethnicity or 
wartime experience. A great deal of effort may be put into excluding the other. 
All of this has a negative effect on post-conflict progress.  
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There is an evident relationship between justice and identity. Perspectives on 
justice are informed by one’s allegiance to a group, one’s self-identification. 
Similarly the exclusionary form that identities take allow little in the way of 
relationships with the other and therefore encourage the understandings of 
justice which pay no attention to the interests of the other. This means that the 
role of identity in the Balkans is directly linked to an inability to find a common 
justice or to pursue justice collaboratively. 
Volf’s own experience of post-war Croatia informs his understanding of the 
importance of dealing with the issues of identity and otherness in order to avoid 
the exclusionary identities and the consequent violence and segregation he 
witnessed. Volf is also convinced that such exclusionary identities prevent the 
understanding of and pursuit of justice. 
It is evident that there are multiple uses of the term “identity”. Volf’s work 
focuses on subjective elements of identity - how identity is negotiated. Similarly 
the problematic elements of identity in the Balkans are also related not to the 
facts of ethnicity, religion or wartime experience, but to the way in which 
individuals and group perceive themselves and others in regards to these 
categories. Therefore the focus of this chapter is largely on subjective identity 
rather than the “root”. That is the identification element of identity is of chief 
concern. 
This chapter’s focus on identity is inspired both by the complex role of identity in 
Croatia and Bosnia and its inextricable link to perceptions of justice, as well as 
Volf’s understanding of a renewed theology of identity as of central concern in 
overcoming practices of exclusion and thus in pursuing embrace. In this way 
identity both raises key contextual problems which any proposed conception of 
justice needs to address, as well as being a potential solution to problem of 
stalemate between conflicting justice claims. 
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Section 3: Embrace as an Alternative to Exclusion 
3.1 Identity and Boundaries 
 
Is the inner logic of exclusionary polarities irresistible? There may 
indeed be situations in which “there is no choice”, though we should 
not forget that to destroy the other rather than to be destroyed 
oneself is itself a choice....the choice is not constrained by an 
inescapable “either us or them”. If there is will, courage, and 
imagination the stark polarity can be overcome. Those caught in the 
vortex of mutual exclusion can resist its pull, rediscover their 
common belonging, even fall into each other’s arms.’317 
  
Volf is clear here that there is an alternative to identities built upon exclusion. 
He is also clear the chief issue is that of identities which are built upon either 
difference from the other, the proliferation of difference which Volf identified in 
the extreme with Derrida, or the assertion of sameness which seeks to 
subsume the other by identifying the other as identical with the self, the 
‘totalitarian self’.  
That there is an alternative, or a ‘choice’, is perhaps not so evident to the 
present participants in post-conflict justice in the Balkans however. Where there 
are conflicting claims to justice any concession to the other will appear to 
undermine one’s own conception of justice. Volf’s emphasis on choice is 
significant as essentially his alternative vision of how identities might be 
constructed or negotiated depends simply on a choice or a ‘will’ to embrace 
rather than exclude. I will attempt to keep this, the chief problem in terms of 
viewing Volf’s theology of embrace as a solution, in mind in this final part of the 
chapter as I  propose Volf’s theology of embrace as an alternative to the 
problem of identities built upon exclusion. I also return to the subject of the will 
to embrace in chapter 3 (section 4.1ai) where I deal with the role of the Spirit in 
embrace and justice.  
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3.2 Identity as Embrace 
 
In turning to Volf’s theology for resources to tackle the problem of exclusionary 
identities, which I have argued lies at the heart of the problem of justice in the 
Balkans, we come to the heart of Volf’s theology of embrace. The theology of 
embrace is essentially a theological notion of how human beings are created in 
relation to one another. It comprises of both an understanding of the Trinitarian 
life of embrace – embrace as the way in which God can be three persons in one 
revealed in Christ’s life and death – and of human beings as created to 
participate in that embrace. 
The notion of embrace, for Volf, is explicitly the antithesis of exclusion. Where 
exclusion becomes almost synonymous with sin, the act of embrace represents 
human participation in the life of God.318 Whilst exclusion’s natural opposite may 
appear to be inclusion, for Volf the term inclusion is problematic. Looking to 
Christ to understand the practice of rejecting exclusion, Volf sees simply 
acceptance and tolerance. Instead Volf argues that the opposite of exclusion as 
lived by Christ, was the offer of embrace extended to the excluded which sought 
not to merely tolerate but to re-name and to re-make. For Volf re-naming 
involves rejecting the false labels which exclude (for example the labelling of the 
other as ‘unclean’) and re-making involved ‘tearing down the barriers created by 
wrongdoing in the name of God...whose love knows no boundaries’.319 In this 
sense then embrace is a transformative practice which is about an alteration of 
identity. It is a practice which is based upon changing perceptions of who the 
other is, and thus who the self is, and in doing so seeks to break down the 
barriers which have been built between the self and the other. There are two 
elements, firstly the exclusionary barriers of perception (which is the key focus 
of this chapter) and secondly the actual barriers of wrongs which have occurred 
and which need to be recognised and overcome.  
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In this section I will focus on Volf’s sketch of the movements of embrace which 
he calls both the ‘drama of embrace’ and the ‘phenomenology of embrace’.320 
The first term is perhaps more accurate in that Volf’s concept of human 
embrace is focused on what human interaction and relationships should look 
like, rather than an account of what they are like. This is because the practice of 
embrace is drawn primarily from an understanding of Trinitarian life of embrace 
and its implications for human behaviour.  In describing the movements of the 
drama of embrace Volf is therefore attempting to use the metaphor of embrace 
as a means of explaining a concrete practice which could or should occur in 
human life, and in the establishment of one’s identity and relationships with 
others. It is understandable that Volf should call his attempt to ground the 
theology of embrace in a concrete practice ‘phenomenology’, since for him it is 
a real attempt to ground his theology of God in a concrete practice. 
Nevertheless given the world as it is (the starting point of phenomenology) there 
is little possibility of fully enacting the practice of embrace. Thus Volf’s attempt 
to make embrace practicable and understandable in human relationships 
remains partially in the realm of eschatological vision rather than present reality. 
Volf’s notion of embrace involves firstly, a desire for the other. ‘I do not want to 
be myself only; I want the other to be part of who I am and I want to be part of 
the other.’321 The desire is part of an acknowledgement of ‘the pain of absence 
and the joy of anticipated presence [which] underscore the fact that even before 
the self opens its arms the other is in a sense already part of it.’322 This idea of 
the other as unavoidably a part of the self is the foundation of Volf’s alternative 
conception of identity. That the self and the other are connected in one sense or 
another is not unique to Volf of course. Volf references Hegel as an example of 
one who accepts the interdependent nature of self and other but in a more 
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negative sense, in that the self on recognising the connection wishes to exclude 
the other.323  
Hegel’s observations in the Phenomenology of Spirit resonate with the type of 
exclusionary identities found in the Balkans. Whilst Volf is clear that he finds 
Hegel’s notion of the master-slave relationship ‘disagreeable’, his four elements 
of embrace are broadly in sync with the development of Hegel’s 
phenomenon.324 Both begin with the notion of self and other as in relationship. 
For Hegel, there is an understanding that desire to exclude is precisely based 
upon a tacit acknowledgement of the fact that self and other are linked in some 
way.  
Kain’s study of Hegel summarises the idea of exclusion found in Hegel’s 
master-slave dialectic. ‘The object is nothing but an object-of-my-desire, an 
object-of-my-self-consciousness (PhS,105/GW, IX, 103-4). Moreover, in 
satisfying desire, we often negate the object we desire. If we desire food, we 
want to consume it. We want to assimilate it. We transform otherness into 
oneness, difference into identity. Only in negating the object – its independent 
otherness or difference – do we affirm ourselves. In negating the object we feel 
assured of our selves, our identity.’325 It seems then that Volf and Hegel are 
both clear on the point that self and other are inextricably connected. Indeed 
Hegel’s account of how human beings behave when confronted with this 
recognition of the other before the self actually largely corroborates Volf’s own 
understanding of human beings as constantly seeking to exclude. There is of 
course a difference between Hegel’s phenomenology, which seeks to observe 
human beings as they are, and Volf’s drama which seeks to point towards 
human beings as they should be. However the key difference seems to be over 
Hegel and Volf’s differing role of desire. Hegel talks of desire as desire for the 
other whose ultimate focus is only on the satisfaction of the self. Volf also relies 
on a sense of desire, however for Volf embrace must be built upon desire for 
the other and for the good of the other, over desire for the good of the self. 
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Volf’s sense of desire for the other is also prompted by a sense of the self as 
incomplete without the other. What Volf is suggesting here, which is different, is 
that the recognition of the other as a part of the self should be coupled with a 
desire for the other to be part of the self, whilst retaining their difference. That 
one must come to think of oneself as incomplete without the presence of the 
other in their difference. This is the important shift in focus which needs to 
occur:  A desire for the presence and flourishing of the other in their difference. 
As the Croatian Kruno Kardov’s sociological –anthropological research 
suggests, much of the desire for exclusion encountered in post-war Croatia is 
based upon the perceived need to find order in chaos, the chaos being the 
‘messiness’ of post war communities where victims and perpetrators may be 
impossible to separate and identify.326  Essentially Kardov’s work demonstrates 
that the exclusionary behaviour evident in these situations emerges from 
recognition of the links which already exist between the self and other.   
Volf’s theology suggests that an identity based on excluding the other cannot be 
achieved without violence both to oneself and the other. Croats cannot 
understand their Croatianess or restore Croatia without reference to Serbs and 
Serbia. Similarly such an understanding of identity suggests one cannot pursue 
justice for oneself or merely with reference to one’s own perspective without 
also pursuing justice for the other and taking account of the others perspective.  
Volf’s difference hinges on the idea of desire for the other or the ‘will to 
embrace’. This desire or will is the turning point which is absolutely required for 
the rest of Volf’s theology of embrace to have any impact. This shift in 
perspective is also fundamental to any progress in terms of justice in the 
Balkans. 
In practice the desire to embrace crucially requires nothing from the other in the 
first instance. The will to embrace the other exists before the other issues any 
response, either positive or negative. In this sense it breaks the cycle identified 
earlier in which all identify as victims and require apology, concession or 
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reparation from the guilty other above all else. Volf’s notion of identity built upon 
embrace begins with a movement from the self to the other.  
In terms of practice this is both an advantage and disadvantage. That all that is 
required to begin a radical change from exclusionary identities to identities built 
upon the theology of embrace is a change of desire, perspective or will allows 
for Volf’s theology to be effective amongst those without power to implement 
significant change. Indeed the desire to embrace the other does not necessarily 
require the response of the other.327 However, beginning with something so 
intangible makes moving towards a more constructive account of how the 
theology of embrace might be put into practice very difficult.  
Theologically it would seem that the desire for embrace with the other is begun 
with conversion or the work of the Spirit.328 However, in terms of addressing this 
theology more broadly as an alternative to the present exclusionary identities 
which exist in the Balkans, a more pragmatic approach might be needed in 
which the evidence of the destructive nature of current exclusionary identity 
constructions and practices is contrasted with the potentially positive 
consequences of rethinking the relationship between self and other. 
Whilst the first element of Volf’s embrace, desire, is characterised as ‘opening 
the arms’ to embrace the other, the second stage is understood as the moment 
of waiting, arms outstretched.329 This second ‘act’ of the embrace can be 
understood as Volf’s understanding that the desire for the other must not verge 
towards an act of violence towards the other or “an invasion”.330  ‘After creating 
space in itself and coming out of itself, the self has “postponed” desire and 
halted at the boundary of the other. Before it can proceed, it must wait for desire 
to arise in the other and for the arms of the other to open.’331 Volf is careful here 
that his drama of embrace, understood as an alternative to exclusionary 
constructions of identity, must not become an identity of difference nor an 
identity of sameness. If the embrace were to be characterised by an unchecked 
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move towards including the other in the self then the embrace would become 
about sameness, subsuming the other into the self.  
This waiting for response from the other is perhaps the point at which the actual 
practice of embrace is likely to stall. However, it seems that there is no real 
alternative which does not in some way coerce the other and thus fall into the 
category of exclusion, since any unwanted, unchecked movement towards the 
other refuses to allow them to remain other and does not acknowledge their will 
but only the will of the self. Essentially refusal to wait on the other does not 
follow on from a genuine desire to allow the other to be other. This waiting is 
likely to be frustrating and on a larger political scale it is difficult to see how 
justice might progress if there is an indefinite pause in order for the other to 
respond. It might be that practical considerations mean that where there is a 
refusal to participate in justice processes may have to continue. However the 
spirit of waiting on the other does not necessarily have to be abandoned in that 
the other might be able to enter into the ongoing pursuit of justice at anytime. 
The third act in Volf’s drama of embrace is the closing of the arms around the 
other, ‘the goal of embrace’.332 It is at this point that the other’s response is 
required. There must be an equality within the embrace so that ‘each must enter 
the space of the other, feel the presence of the other in the self, and make its 
own presence felt.’333 Again the embrace requires careful balance between 
differentiation and sameness. What Volf is seeking is the transformation of the 
self in light of an experience of the other but not the alteration of the self to be 
the other. The outcome is an altered self rather than a negation of the self or the 
other.334 
Volf also adds a further caveat, in order to avoid the traps of 
sameness/difference. He argues that in the closed arms of embrace there 
should be an awareness of the non-understanding of the other, the inability of 
the self to fully comprehend who the other is.335 This awareness of strangeness 
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draws on the Israeli sociologist Z D Gurevitch’s idea of ‘non-understanding’ and 
reflects something of Volf’s whole approach. 
Gurevitch suggests in his paper ‘The Power of Not Understanding’ that 
‘attempts to establish dialogue between conflicting identities usually focus on 
mutual understanding and the common, while downplaying the elements of the 
conflict and ignoring the element of otherness.’336 Gurevitch argues that instead 
of this emphasis on sameness when the self encounters the other, the ‘ability to 
not understand, rather than the ability to understand the other’ should be 
emphasised in order to allow space for the difference of the other. Gurevitch’s 
work is similar to Volf’s in that he is seeking to find space for acknowledgment 
of difference within a close encounter which occurs because of recognition of 
sameness.   
Gurevitch continued this line of thought in a paper entitled ‘The Embrace – On 
the element of non-distance in human relations’ written in 1990 but not read by 
Volf until after the publication of his own theology of embrace.337 In this paper 
he writes that ‘the seed of distance always remains within the moment of non-
distance, yet the growth of the self (the separate, the different) requires the 
element of non-distance attained in the unity of the embrace.’338 Here we see 
that for Gurevitch encounters between the self and other must be characterised 
by fine balances of sameness and difference, knowledge and non-knowledge, 
distance and non-distance. These balances are very similar to those Volf is also 
attempting to create between acknowledging one’s commonality with the other 
without subsuming the other into the self or being subsumed into the other.   
The idea of non-understanding in particular is important in that it appears to be 
more readily understood in terms of concrete relationships. For example, it 
appears to answer the question ‘how might we recognise the other’s 
difference?’. To acknowledge one’s inability to fully know and understand the 
other would seem a good first step in such a recognition. 
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Certainly, the idea of non-understanding is constantly reflected in Volf’s 
theological method. In Volf’s rejection of the possibility of a theory of justice in 
the previous chapter, for example, there was a clear sense of awareness of the 
limits of understanding. Here we see that limiting claims to knowledge allows 
space for the other. Most particularly in Volf’s work this is evident in Volf’s 
constant limitation of claims in reference to knowledge of and understanding of 
God, the ultimate ‘other’. 
In terms of the Balkan context the possibility of this third step being enacted 
seems remote. Indeed such a balance between self and other seems to be only 
an eschatological possibility. However understanding the balance Volf wants to 
achieve as an ideal to aim for can be informative. The idea that the self should 
seek to be transformed by the other, not to be the other but to take account of 
who the other is might be used to inform accounts of justice and dialogues over 
justice claims for example. Similarly the limiting of claims to know who the other 
is could be crucial in moving inter-ethnic relations forward. It prevents the 
possibility of exclusionary labels and the logic which states that one knows who 
the other is because he is everything that the self is not. This is the logic which 
underpins the type of victim identity discussed earlier. Volf’s emphasis on 
limiting claims to know the other goes some way to prevent this type of 
oppositional identity. 
The fourth step in the embrace is the opening of the arms. ‘The opening of the 
arms underlines that, though the other may be inscribed into the self, the alterity 
of the other may not be neutralized by merging both in to an undifferentiated 
“we”...the other must be let go so that her alterity – her genuine dynamic identity 
– may be preserved.’339 Again this reflects Volf’s concern that identities not be 
merged into one unified identity, but that difference might be allowed to flourish 
within the embrace which recognises the interdependence of the self and other. 
Volf sees this letting go as necessary for the maintenance of individual identity, 
but it is also in order to allow the embrace to begin again. The release allows 
space for a re-recognition of the need for the other.  
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Perhaps in terms of practice this emphasis on the need for space also allows for 
a break from the inability of opposing parties to come to the point of embrace, 
and might similarly in this situation allow room for a renewed sense of the 
interdependence of the self and other, and a desire for such an 
interdependence or collaboration to begin again. Volf’s fourth act of embrace 
suggests the cyclical and continuing nature of identity negotiation. The desire 
for the other, even the embrace of the other, is not a one time event which 
might be enacted and is then completed. Instead negotiation of identity between 
self and other is ongoing. This also suggests what Volf calls a ‘fluidity of 
identity’.340 That one’s identity is constantly being transformed through new 
interactions with the other. It is not static. This idea links with that of 
acknowledging one’s not knowing the other. If this fluidity and ongoing need for 
the other is recognised there is a sense in which the static labels of 
victim/perpetrator and the firm boundaries which accompany such labels are 
impossible to maintain.  
Instead of the firm boundaries of difference exclusion or the forcible removal of 
boundaries that occurs in sameness exclusion, Volf’s theology suggests that 
identity can be best understood as based upon ‘permeable boundaries’. As 
suggested by the drama of embrace, these boundaries allow for the other to 
enter in but do not allow for the self to be subsumed into the other. The open 
arms which mark the end (and beginning) of the cycle of embrace allow for 
these ‘permeable’ boundaries to remain. 
This idea of the need to reformulate boundaries has particular resonance in 
terms of application to ethnic identities. Frederick Barth, the Norwegian 
anthropologist, saw ethnic identities as primarily defined around boundaries, 
and attempts to delineate one ethnic group from another, coining the term 
‘ethnic boundaries’.341 Therefore in focusing on a shift towards a different type 
of boundary Volf is tackling the problem of ethnic identity quite directly. His 
theology offers a new way of envisioning boundaries which already exist and 
which are already at the heart of ethnic self identities. 
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It is clear that Volf is constantly aware of the problems of exclusionary identities 
based both on definition through difference, and through attempts to subsume 
the other into the self. Embrace is perhaps more likely to fall towards the 
problem of sameness, as the self and other are seen as interdependent. 
However Volf seeks to avoid this by maintaining a space for the self to draw 
back and reassert its self. The cyclical nature of embrace and identity 
negotiation allows for this space. It seems that in many ways Volf tackles the 
problems of exclusionary identities and offers an alternative way in which 
identity might be constructed.  
 
3.3 Moving forward from Embrace 
 
Volf’s theology of embrace seems to offer an account of identity which seeks to 
balance sameness and difference. In this sense it is seeking to avoid the ways 
in which identities might be built upon excluding the other. Theoretically it 
seems the notion of identity found in the theology of embrace is largely 
successful in combating these extremes. The deeper theological roots of the 
embrace will be examined in the following chapter. The final question is; what 
might embrace offer in terms of a practicable response to the problems set out 
earlier in the chapter? Is it possible that the theology of embrace might inform 
an altered perspective on the self and the other in the Balkans and feed into a 
different approach to and understanding of justice? 
The key in terms of present practice is the desire to be shaped by the other or 
the will to embrace and the knowledge that the self cannot be understood apart 
from the other. This first step is perhaps the most crucial in that such a shift in 
will and understanding consequently precludes many of the destructive 
perspectives and practices outlined previously. For example a genuine desire to 
be with the other and shaped by the other, and an acknowledgement of the 
impossibility of existing apart from the other cannot coexist with a sense of the 
self as blameless victim and the other as guilty perpetrator. Instead, desiring the 
other, in the way that Volf outlines, must involve an acknowledgement of the 
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blurred lines which exist between the self and the other. In fact, it is possible 
that desire for the other might be dependent upon recognition of non-knowledge 
of the other. Exposing the fallacy of the victim/perpetrator labels might be the 
first step in igniting the will to embrace. 
This sort of exposure (to the reality of one’s non-knowledge of the other) 
already occurs in inter-faith and inter-ethnic dialogues organised by peace 
workers and NGOs in the Balkans. However participation in such dialogues 
presumably requires a will to engage with the other to begin with. Thus non-
knowledge and will to embrace are closely linked as the first factors required to 
instigate the type of engagement with the other necessary to break the 
deadlock of exclusionary identities and conflicting justice claims. 
The theology of embrace importantly shifts the focus from beginning with 
demands for the other to act and satisfy the demands of the self, and instead 
begins with an opening up of the self to the other.342 This places the emphasis 
on gift and self-giving. Justice understood in this light moves from claims 
against the other and demands for punishment or reparation to a focus on how 
one might change and move towards the other.  
Volf’s theology of embrace suggests that the self and other are inextricably 
linked. That human beings are fundamentally relational. Yet what distinguishes 
Volf is his notion of will for the other or desire for the other which does not seek 
the death of the other as Hegel’s phenomenology does, nor does it allow 
difference to remain a barrier to unity. Instead Volf’s understanding of embrace 
offers an understanding of identity which seeks out the other for one and the 
other’s mutual benefit, for the sharing of identity, without losing one’s own 
sameness and whilst maintaining one’s difference from the other. It is a model 
which relies fundamentally on the oneness and difference held together in 
mutual giving that is the triune God, the source and creator of human identity, a 
subject I will turn to in the following chapter. Justice understood within this 
context of balancing sameness and difference must also be understood as 
fundamentally relational. A conception of justice based on Volf’s understanding 
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of identity cannot be a justice conceived by the self alone; justice can only exist 
if it is justice both for me and the other since the two shape each other and 
cannot, or should not, be separated. Similarly however justice cannot be 
abstractly applied to all in the same way for the other is not identical to the self. 
Justice can be neither partial to the point of exclusion nor impartial to the point 
of exclusion. Justice must also be conceived of in a way which balances both 
difference and sameness. This indicates a move from adversarial to 
collaborative justice.  
 
Section 4: Victim Identity 
 
In the previous section I have examined Volf’s notion of embrace as an answer 
to the problems of identity in post-conflict Bosnia and Croatia which, following 
Volf, I have identified as exclusionary identities. In the previous chapter on 
justice, I highlighted victim identity and the sense of separation between victim 
and perpetrator as one of the issues in post-conflict justice. In the following 
section I will highlight victim identity as a particularly problematic and pervasive 
form of exclusionary identity post-conflict. It is a problematic identity with 
particular relevance to justice since it suggests a firm boundary of difference 
between victims and perpetrators and thus underpins relationships of difference 
and separation. Exclusionary victim identities are clearly linked to and result in 
adversarial approaches to justice claims and negative interactions with justice 
processes. It does not see the other (perpetrator) as one to build relationships 
with but one to be excluded. Taking a critical approach to victim identity is 
difficult in that it appears to blame those who have already suffered so much for 
the failures of justice. I hope in the following to demonstrate that this is 
nevertheless necessary in order to pursue the ‘enlarged’ justice I want to 
propose in this thesis. 
Firstly in this section I will highlight the role of victim identity in post-conflict 
Bosnia and Croatia. Secondly, I will turn to Volf and his particular attendance to 
the role of the victim and the need for victims to form their identity in way which 
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do not exclude the other. Finally I will use this particular study to suggest ways 
in which identity must be altered to prepare the way for the enlarged justice I 
want to propose in this thesis. 
 
4.1 Victim Identity in Context 
 
 A key problem with identification as a victim in Bosnia and Croatia is that it is 
an identity which goes beyond the facts of injustice suffered and takes on a 
political edge. It is used to maintain exclusive boundaries between oneself and 
one’s identity group and the other by underlining one’s absolute difference.  
Helms comments that ‘the politicized ethno-national identities which have driven 
social and political processes in Bosnia for the past decade have been heavily 
based on claims to victimhood.’343 Identifying oneself or one’s group (ethnic, 
religious or other) as a victim can be the grounds for all kinds of political and 
social claims, most particularly claims to justice. It seems that ‘victim identity [i]s 
perhaps the only morally acceptable persona in post-war Bosnia.’344 Identifying 
oneself as the victim is used both as self-justification, as a means to promote 
one’s own demands for justice over the claims of the other, and as a means of 
implying the guilt of those whom one wishes to exclude – the ‘non-victims’ or 
perpetrators.  
Similarly sociological studies in Vukovar show the continued importance of 
victim identity in Croatia after the conflict. Kruno Kardov stresses the role of new 
identities such as these in terms of creating order out of chaos.345 The 
messiness of the Croat and Bosnian conflicts has already been highlighted in 
this thesis and it is this messiness which lends itself to the formation of new 
identities in which individuals and groups seek to identify those who behaved 
“correctly” during the war, and to exclude those who did not. Identity and 
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judgement are bound closely together in this sense. In this way many sides or 
groups can claim victim status whilst excluding others who also call themselves 
victims. Conceptions of who is victim are based upon who one wants to identify 
with in terms of agreement on moral claims and perceptions of justice.  
This type of victim identity, whilst often drawing on sources of real injustice, is 
about a heightened perception of self or one’s group as the sufferer of injustice, 
the apportioning of blame for one’s predicament firmly on the shoulders of the 
other, and a consequent regard for the self as morally superior and, perhaps, 
pure or blameless.  This type of victim identity is not peculiar to the Balkans but 
it is, understandably, especially prevalent in this post-conflict area and can be a 
primary mode of identification overtaking other aspects of identity such as work, 
family, or even ethnicity and religious belief. Brown notes that, ‘Politicized 
identity...makes claims for itself, only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and 
inscribing its pain...it can hold no future for itself or others.’346 This suggests that 
the type of narrative identity involved here means individuals become defined 
by their experience, and in reiterating their identity the experience becomes who 
they are and leaves them unable to move beyond it. Relations with the other are 
impossible because one is caught up in restating one’s own identity as victim. 
Das and Kleinman suggest that ‘our age is one in which victimization has 
become of special ontological salience. The assumption is that it helps victims 
to emphasize victimhood as a cultural representation and collective experience. 
If that is true, does the appropriation of victimization as the core moral stance 
create a paradox in that it becomes a means to revivify the fragments of 
communities, one that works against reconciliation and rebuilding?’347 This 
section will reply that emphasising victimhood as a primary mode of 
identification is hugely damaging to reconciliation with the other and 
consequently to the pursuit of justice. 
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The anthropologist Elissa Helms comments in her study of victimhood in post-
war Bosnia that ‘moral purity is based on war-associated victim identities.’348 
Kruno Kardov’s sociological research in Vukovar appears to support this notion. 
It seems that both ethnic divisions and many of the intra-ethnic divisions are 
largely based around ides of purity and pollution. ‘Refugees from Vukovar are 
regarded as possessing categorical purity.’349 Those Croats who chose to flee 
Vukovar escaped any association with the Serbian Krajina state. Those who 
stayed, Kardov suggests, are seen as polluted by contact, not only with 
individuals responsible for war crimes, but with the state itself. Intra-ethnic 
divisions, as well as ethnic divisions, can be seen as a means of protecting the 
purity and moral status of the self. It is not hard to see how a focus on the 
maintenance of such a blameless identity is part of a notion of the self as victim. 
Volf notes the similar ‘will to purity’ from the New Testament period through to 
Nazi Germany.350 
This context raises interesting points, firstly, that chaos (as mentioned by 
Kardov) leads to the assertion of firm identity boundaries. In referring back to 
Taylor’s ‘Politics of Recognition’, we might read this as signalling that a lack of 
proper recognition for victims by perpetrators distorts identities and in this 
instance leads to the assertion of hard or exclusionary identities on the part of 
the victims.351 Hard identities are a result of the desire for recognition of the 
wrongs done to one to be recognised when they are not. Non-recognition of the 
truth of the victim’s suffering or victimhood might be seen as the cause of this 
hard identity. In this sense then, an openness to and pursuit of truth might be 
seen as a necessary element of reconfiguring identities.  
Secondly, the result of this hard or exclusionary victim identity is that the truth is 
further obscured by the inflexibility of the boundaries of this identity. Individuals 
can either be victims or perpetrators, they cannot be perceived as both at once, 
despite this often being closer to the truth.  
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Thirdly, the future prospects for this type of identity are dim, since they are 
forged around an elevation of the wrongdoing and suffering endured over the 
desire or need for future reconciliation with the other. It might be the case that 
the maintenance of hard victim identities reflects a desire to remove 
responsibility for action. Volf notes Bauman’s suggestion that there is “a 
tendency to shift moral responsibilities away from the moral self either towards 
socially constructed and managed supraindividual agencies, or through floating 
responsibility inside a beauracratic “rule of nobody.”’352  Whilst victims may 
make claims to justice heard, and there are certainly claims made to the ICTY 
amongst others, it is rarely seen as the victims role to act first in the pursuit of 
justice or reconciliation. Victims expect that the first move will be the 
prosecution of or confession of the perpetrator. Volf’s understanding of the role 
of victims runs counter to this. His model of identity as embrace requires a 
movement outside of the self towards the other. 
 
4.1a Victim Status and Beyond 
Before continuing to Volf’s contribution to understanding victim identity, it is 
important to note that victim identity is not the only type of moral identity in this 
post-conflict context. Other claims include that of bystander as well as 
occasional acknowledgement of oneself as perpetrator. 
Identity as a bystander seems more likely to occur on an individual level. Whilst 
it may be seen as an acknowledgment of the grey area between victim and 
perpetrator and as a potential root towards opening up of hard identities to 
acknowledging the reality of diversity and difference, more often, it is again an 
identity based upon exclusion through the elevation of the self above or outside 
of the circumstances (and people) surrounding one.  
Kardov identifies the problem of bystanders in the pursuit of justice. Bystanders 
absolve themselves of involvement or responsibility and in this are affirmed by 
the judicial process. ‘While judicial trials, with their attempts to isolate guilty 
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individuals and create rational accounts of events, create a gap between 
perpetrators, collaborators and victims, the real circumstances in which mass 
violence takes place connect them and make the differences between them 
unstable, That is particularly evident in the case of the bystanders who are 
morally but not legally complicit (unlike collaborators who are subject to the 
law). This leads to the absence of bystanders, and in most cases to that of 
collaborators, in the legal processes of criminal trials. Because of bystanders’ 
perceived moral complicity with crimes, the legal principle by which bystanders 
are considered innocent makes their presence in post-war settings particularly 
provocative from the perspective of victims.’353 This type of identity is also 
therefore problematic in the pursuit of justice since it is one which refuses to 
engage in the need for justice between individuals. (A proposal I will elaborate 
on below). 
This focus on victims and victim identity may appear to leave little room for 
perpetrators or have little to say to those who acknowledge themselves as such. 
I would argue that this is not the case. The focus on victim identity is about 
individuals’ and groups’ perceptions of themselves.  
In the post-conflict Balkans it seems rare to find any who will label themselves 
as perpetrators. This is not to say that there is always an outright denial of 
violence or what we might call war crimes. Instead violence and wrong doing is 
put into context of what the other had done or did do to oneself or one’s group. 
Essentially violence is justified by one’s own victimisation at the hands of the 
other. This is perhaps most evident amongst those who are seen as the primary 
aggressors, and who therefore need to fight harder to be seen as sympathetic 
victims by others.  
Despite this, there are a few who name themselves as perpetrators. These 
people can be those who find such an admission advantageous in terms of 
criminal or justice proceedings against them. In this case the admissions are 
perhaps more about pragmatic considerations than a genuine reflection of how 
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the individual sees themselves or their role in the conflict. Secondly of course 
there are those who genuinely see their role, or perhaps more often their 
nation’s role, in the conflict as unjust.  
Essentially it becomes evident that to attempt to talk to perpetrators, at least in 
this context, is really to talk to nobody or at best to a small minority who have 
already found their way towards acknowledging their guilt and thus their 
relationship to the other, their victim. It seems that to address people where 
they stand, that is to work from their self-identifications rather than imposing 
categories of victim-perpetrator from our own perspective, may be a more 
productive way of addressing ways in which justice may be best pursued. 
As noted in the previous chapter, theories of justice, and justice discourse, 
written from Western academic perspectives, tend to attempt to address either 
perpetrators or the powerful. In the Balkans few would self-identify in these 
groups and thus such theories have little to say to them.  The orientation of 
Nicholas Wolterstorff’s work, for example, is explicitly as Westerner writing in 
response to victims of apartheid.354 Moltmann’s work is also focused on 
solidarity with the victim. His focus as a former, reluctant, conscript and a citizen 
of guilt ridden post war Germany is often on the victims of the Nazi violence and 
‘theology after Auschwitz’.355 Volf’s approach which begins in asking the victim 
to act first, to change themselves and to reach outside their own enclosed 
identity towards the other is in this light both necessary, given the context 
discussed here, and radical.  
 
4.2 Volf and the Victim 
 
In Exclusion and Embrace and in The End of Memory, Volf specifically sets out 
to address victims of injustice. He sees himself as extending the later work of 
Moltmann in The Spirit of Life. Volf believes that whilst Moltmann supplements 
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the theme of solidarity with the victim with the ‘theme of solidarity with the 
perpetrator’356, he does not go on to spell out the social implications of this, 
focusing primarily still on the solidarity of God with victims. Volf wants to extend 
the understanding of God giving himself for perpetrators presented by 
Moltmann in terms of its social significance. The consequence of Volf’s 
expansion of this idea is the suggestion that victims should themselves offer the 
arms of embrace to their enemies.357 
Moltmann’s view is that violence destroys both victim and perpetrator, both are 
oppressed by the weight of what they have suffered or what they have inflicted. 
God’s relationship with the perpetrator is described in this way: 
‘God reconciles the world in contradiction by enduring the 
contradiction, not by contradicting the contradiction – not that is to 
say through judgement. He moulds and alchemizes the pain of his 
love into atonement for the sinner. In this way God becomes the 
God of sinners. He does not desire their death, and so that they 
can turn back he turns to them; so that they may live he endures 
their death.’358 
 
Moltmann’s understanding of God’s solidarity with the victim is turned here 
towards God’s solidarity with the perpetrator which is essentially the same 
solidarity. In suffering at the hand of the perpetrator, as God suffers with the 
victim, God’s pain which is caused by love turns back to the love which it always 
was and seeks to reconcile the perpetrator to himself in taking on the burden of 
Godforsakeness which the perpetrator brought on himself.359 In Moltmann’s 
work here we see the unity of God’s love for humanity and God as victim 
reaching out to the perpetrator.  
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In Volf’s language this idea is extended to make greater sense in terms of the 
language of identity: 
 ‘The cross says that despite its manifest enmity towards God 
humanity belongs to God; God will not be God without 
humanity...The cross is the giving up of God’s self in order not to 
give up on humanity.; it is the consequence of God’s desire to 
break the power of human enmity without violence and to receive 
human beings into divine communion....The arms of the crucified 
are open – a sign of a space in God’s self and an invitation for the 
enemy to come in.’360  
 
In Volf’s terminology we see a greater sense of the action of God in giving up 
himself for the other. The desire for the sinful other involves making space in 
the self and inviting the perpetrator in.  In one sense, couched in theological 
language, this might not appear a radical view. The idea of God’s death for 
sinners and the call to forgive wrongdoers is familiar.361 But this is much greater 
than a call to what we might understand as forgiveness to refuse to punish and 
to pass on.362 If we are to follow Volf in grounding human identity in God and 
human action in God’s way of life, it is a call to allow the other to become a part 
of one self. 363 When coupled with engagement with the lived realities of victims 
and perpetrators encountered in Volf’s work, and in this chapter, this is a 
challenging proposition. It asks the victim to make the first move in laying down 
their identity as victim which excludes the other, opening their arms to the other 
and allowing the other to come into the self. In doing so the victim’s identity is 
reconfigured, not as an identity which excludes the reality of their suffering, but 
one in which the perpetrator participates.  
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4.3 Volf, Memory and Truth 
 
In section 4.1 I noted that victim identity in Bosnia and Croatia involved the 
exclusion of the perpetrator and the passing on of responsibility for 
reconciliation or restored relationships. In 4.2 I showed that Volf’s 
understanding of the victim asks the victim to make a movement of embrace 
towards the other. To make this move the victim also needs to begin to 
reconfigure their identity from one of exclusion to one of openness or embrace.  
Two aspects of the exclusionary identity which emerged in 4.1 were firstly, the 
elevation of memory of wrongdoing to become the defining feature of one’s 
identity. Secondly I mentioned the way in which memories of wrong doing 
distorted so that the truth of the memory was marred, but also that in the 
practice of exclusion the truth could not be anything but marred since it 
excluded the perspective and truth of the other. Here I will explore the ways in 
which memory and truth need to be reconfigured in order for identities to be 
reformed.  
In the End Of Memory Volf’s experience as a victim of Captain G takes centre 
stage, and allows him to make controversial claims about memory which go 
against the widely held, post-Holocaust, view that ‘that letting go of wrongs 
suffered...would betray victims and endanger the wider community.‘364 Instead 
Volf advocates a sense of remembering ‘rightly’. In part this involves locating 
memories in their proper place. Memory of past wrong can become the defining 
feature of one’s identity. Volf argues that to allow memory to work in this way is 
unhelpful since it keeps one trapped in the past in ‘a deep and dark ravine 
which separates’ adversaries.365 Moreover the perpetuation of memory in this 
way ‘may wound...breed indifference...reinforce false self-
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perceptions...reinjure.’366 Whilst Volf is at pains to point out here that this is the 
risk in centring one’s identity on memory, rather than a foregone conclusion, it 
certainly supports the types of problems of identity seen in Bosnia and Croatia. 
The use of memory to justify further injustice is of particular concern. 
Volf’s key criticism of memory as a defining feature of the self however is that it 
refuses to understand God as the primary definition of human identity. We know 
who we are ‘as unique individuals standing in relation to our neighbours and 
broader culture, because God loves us.’’367 Where memories of suffering and 
victimhood take over identities, relations to God and each other are pushed 
aside. The misplacement of memory in this way means that an identity centred 
on victimhood is a misconstructed identity.  Volf also sees an over attachment 
to the past as refusing to prioritise the Christian eschatological horizon, which 
includes reconciliation and eventual full communion with God and the other. 
Again, in this light, we can read the type of victim identity outlined above as 
inherently exclusionary in that it prioritises remembrance of past wrong over 
future reconciliation.  
The second key problem of memories of suffering being the centre point of 
one’s identity is that of memory as distorting truth. Here the intersection of 
identity and justice comes to the fore again. Volf writes that when ‘victims 
“remember” untruthfully, their stories are often attacks on perpetrators in 
response to injuries suffered...To “remember” untruthfully is not only to continue  
but also to deepen in memory the conflict created by the initial injury.’368 The 
type of victim identity considered above does precisely this, refusing to engage 
with the other, and thereby distorting truth, and consequently treating them 
unjustly and so the cycle of injustice continues. Injustice then can be 
perpetuated through exclusionary identities.  
 
                                            
366
 Volf, The End of Memory, 33 
367
 Volf, The End of Memory, 79. 
368
 Volf, The End of Memory, 56. 
147 
 
 
4.4 Identity and the Pursuit of Justice 
 
In this chapter I have suggested that post-conflict identities fit with Volf’s 
designation of exclusionary identities. There is a tendency towards identities 
which maintain firm boundaries between the self and the difference of the other. 
Difference is accentuated to the extent that identities are formed around that 
which is not the other. The most pervasive form of this type of identity is victim 
identity which paints a stark contrast between victims who are blameless and 
the other who is guilty. Identities are constructed around claims to justice and 
reinforce justice claims. Group identities encourage a sense of sameness. This 
means that grey areas, in particular shared guilt and responsibility for the 
conflict and more importantly shared responsibility to pursue justice are pushed 
out. It is the constant claims to victimhood which involve the creation of 
immovable barriers between self and other which are preventing the possibility 
of further dialogue over justice claims, which set up and reinforce conceptions 
and practices of justice that are fundamentally adversarial and which offer no 
prospect of a genuinely just solution for all.  
I have suggested that Volf’s concept of embrace offers a way of thinking about 
identity which encourages the opposite of the current constructions of identity. It 
advocates an understanding of human identity as rightly formed in relations with 
others which seek to image the relations of the Trinity which as human beings 
we also participate in, our first relationship is with God. In this sense the 
metaphor of embrace involves belief. To get one’s relationship with God ‘right’ 
one needs to recognise God as who he is and in doing so recognise one’s own 
identity as created in his image. Whilst this is true, the idea of constructing 
identities along the lines of embrace can be seen as offering practical insight 
into the post-conflict Bosnian and Croatian situation where hard, exclusionary 
identities tend to prevail. 
 
148 
 
Certainly the basic insight of relationality can be offered as a way of seeing 
oneself and the other as inherently linked and the impact for justice highlighted. 
Whilst this may produce grudging cooperation, beyond this Volf’s understanding 
of ‘enlarged thinking’ or ‘double vision’ may help (mentioned briefly in the 
previous chapter).369 Whilst this does not involve the whole movement of 
embrace, which in any case is only completed eschatologically, it is the first 
step. It is the attitude or character of embrace which seeks to hear from the 
other, which puts aside preconceptions. It moves towards the openness to the 
other which Volf wants and allows for the other to begin to shape and form the 
self. It draws on Arendt’s and Benhabib’s work, although Volf is critical of 
Benhabib’s point that such thinking can then ‘justify moral beliefs and give them 
validity.’  
Benhabib’s work is interesting however in the contrasts she draws between an 
attitude of ‘enlarged thinking’ and its consequences for justice. She suggests 
that “legalistic universalism” as found in Rawls for example, only allows for a 
“generalized other”, a moral person endowed with rights, reason and a sense of 
justice, but no particularity.370 In contrast the approach of enlarged thinking 
deals with difference and particularity and allows difference into the heart of the 
pursuit of justice. This links strongly to Volf’s rejection of Rawls’ veil of 
ignorance and the possibility of objectivity noted in chapter one. His rejection of 
equalizing and abstracting justice, is the rejection of justice which asserts 
sameness and fails to respond to difference. Enlarged thinking then is a way of 
approaching justice which places difference and particularity at the heart of 
justice. 
Nevertheless Volf’s disagreement with Benhabib on the result of enlarged 
justice demonstrates that for Volf difference should not be allowed to rule alone. 
Benhabib’s view might be read as allowing difference to define justice in itself, 
in that enlarged thinking, the bringing together of difference, results in morally 
valid claims.371 Volf does not see the process of enlarged thinking, or 
communicating difference, as in itself leading to morally valid claims, enlarged 
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thinking is only the first step. He writes that ‘Though “enlarged thinking” cannot 
serve to justify our notion of justice, it is essential for enrichment and correction 
both of our notion of justice and our perception of what is just and unjust.’372 In 
this chapter I have suggested that the difference of identity is held together by 
the sameness of human beings seen as created by God and designed to image 
God. In the same way  enlarged thinking which seeks to communicate 
difference in the pursuit of justice, is not the last word in defining what is just, 
but is about communicating particular and plural justice claims which can only 
ultimately be known as just in reference to the universal justice of God. 
In part this idea of enlarged thinking is simply about moving beyond the 
“generalized other” with which many justice theories are concerned and 
endeavouring to recognise the other correctly and truthfully. In this way we can 
see enlarged thinking as a way of stepping over the hard boundaries of victim 
identity discussed earlier, and seeking out the other. In seeking to see the other 
truthfully as they are, in both their real difference, and their shared humanity, 
justice is pursued. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have tried to suggest that exclusionary or hard identities are a 
problem for the pursuit of justice. I have proposed embrace as an alternative 
way of constructing identity which seeks the mutual sharing of self and other. 
Embrace points towards a divine and eschatological reality which will not be 
enacted in the present. Moreover it may rely too heavily on recognition of the 
self before God to be of use in the post-conflict context of Bosnia and Croatia. 
Nevertheless to allow this notion of identity to shape attitudes towards the other, 
even in the most basic sense of an acknowledgement of inherent relations will 
work to further the pursuit of justice which can only exist between persons. 
Volf’s notion of enlarged thinking with its important modifications offers perhaps 
the first step towards embrace which can offer a meaningful practice of 
                                            
372
 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 213. 
150 
 
communication of self and other to a non-Christian context. In pursuing right 
recognition of the other, the tendency to distort one’s own and the other’s 
identity which hinders justice might be minimised. 
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Chapter 3 - Trinity 
Introduction 
 
So far this thesis has identified problems of justice in the post-conflict Balkans 
and has suggested that seeking to improve justice processes alone will not 
provide a solution to post-conflict needs, nor to demands for a just outcome and 
peaceful future. I have suggested that a focus on justice processes, primarily 
through national and international courts, has a limited role in effecting justice. 
This is because these processes tend to emphasise justice as an antagonistic 
process (one against the other) and a sense of justice based upon discrete 
actions. I have argued that a new understanding of the purposes and end of 
justice is required in order to address the complexity of the post-conflict 
problems and to offer a more lasting solution. I have suggested justice needs to 
be understood in an enlarged sense which emphasises restoration between 
people and justice as a continuous process. 
In the previous chapter on identity, drawing on Volf’s theology, I suggested that 
the problems of justice are closely bound to problematic constructions of 
identity. Consequently to tackle the problems of justice we need to take account 
of these problems of identity. In the Balkans the disastrous (and failed) attempts 
to maintain and assert ethnic identities independent of each other demonstrates 
the need for a notion of identity which addresses both the need for self-identity 
and the reality of interdependence. In this thesis I have turned to Volf’s 
understanding of human identity characterised by his metaphor of embrace. 
The sense of identity he proposes is inescapably relational (insisting on a 
mutual interdependence) yet allows for space for the individual, refusing to 
allow interdependence to fall into the subsumption of one person’s identity into 
another’s.  
As has been noted, Volf’s understanding of human identity comes from his prior 
understanding of the life of the triune God and his belief that human life should 
152 
 
(and must) reflect the life of the triune God within certain parameters.373 It is 
therefore important that having moved from justice to identity, we now turn to 
consider the source of human identity, the Trinity. In this chapter I will attempt to 
bind the ideas of justice and Trinity together. In particular, I will suggest that, if 
we follow Volf in seeing human identity as bound up with the life of the triune 
God and we propose that justice is relational and thus intrinsically linked to 
human identity, then it must follow that in the life of the triune God we will also 
find the roots of justice. 
With this in mind, this chapter will address Volf’s trinitarian theology in a fairly 
narrow sense. That is, I wish to engage Volf’s trinitarian theology only in so far 
as it will contribute to my own attempt to construct an enlarged understanding of 
justice. The wider theoretical issues in the field of trinitarian theology will be left 
largely untouched. For example the problems of overemphasis on either 
immanence or economy which underpin many of the tensions in recent theology 
of the Trinity are not a concern in themselves.374 Similarly the problem of 
modalistic versus tritheistic tendencies is not a focus. The importance of these 
issues to recent debate is that they highlight the differences between the key 
figures in 20th Century theology. Firstly, Barth who is seen as stressing 
immanence and unity (some suggest modes) of the Trinity.  Secondly, 
Moltmann who stresses God in the world (and the world in God  - panentheism) 
and the difference of the three persons of the Trinity. As a theologian after 
Moltmann, these issues are in some ways pertinent to Volf.375 However, my 
limited scope, in not dealing fully with these wider areas of discussion, reflects 
both my own focus in this thesis which is about reengaging Volf’s theology with 
a particular post-conflict context as well as reflecting Volf’s own focus on doing 
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theology ‘that will facilitate culturally appropriate...social embodiments of the 
Gospel.’376  
To this end I will begin by setting out Volf’s theology of the Trinity in context. I 
will then move to address two key issues: knowledge of the Trinity, and the 
Trinity and analogy. These are central debates within Volf’s own theology of the 
Trinity and are subject matters which must be addressed in order to be able to 
proceed with the project of grounding justice within the Trinity. These first two 
sections will do the groundwork in order that the third and fourth sections of the 
chapter can focus on the important task of returning the theology of the Trinity 
to the contextual question in hand, that is, addressing how Volf’s theology of the 
Trinity relates to and might further illuminate the subject of justice. In these 
subsequent sections of the chapter I attempt to push Volf’s theology of the 
Trinity further than Volf takes it in order to outline a theological (triune) 
foundation for an enlarged sense of justice.  
 
Section 1: Volf and the Trinity in Context 
 
I will begin by sketching the characteristics of Volf’s theology of the Trinity 
before looking to set his work in the context of developments in Trinitarian 
theology. This contextualisation will start by looking at Volf’s relationship with 
Barth’s and Moltmann’s theologies of the Trinity. Barth’s significance is as the 
most influential theologian of the twentieth century who, in placing the Trinity at 
the centre of theology, began a new period of theology of the Trinity. In this role 
he had both a direct effect on Moltmann, largely as someone he reacted 
against, and an indirect influence on Volf through Moltmann. Moltmann’s 
significance is as Volf’s mentor and most important theological influence. 
Following this I will then locate Volf as loosely associated with a trend in 
Trinitarian theology at the turn of the century (1980s onwards) which sees itself 
as drawing on Eastern Trinitarian models. Finally I will look in more detail at the 
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key issues of Trinitarian theology in Volf’s work, how and what we can know of 
and say of the Trinity and, most importantly for this project, what analogies we 
can draw between Triune and human life. 
 
1.1 Volf’s theology of the Trinity  
 
It is not an overemphasis to say that the Trinity underpins Volf’s theology in 
every sense. His work suggests there is no theological question which should 
not ultimately end with or be centred on the Trinity.377 This central role of the 
doctrine of the Trinity and the specific nature of his Trinitarian theology are 
profoundly influenced by wider theological movements in the decades before 
his key period of writing in the 1990s. He stands within a trend of that period 
(and since) to speak of the Trinity in a primarily social sense both in terms of the 
life of the Trinity and of the doctrine’s implications for human sociality. 378  
That said, Volf’s theology of the Trinity is strikingly lacking in detail (in Exclusion 
and Embrace in particular), and without a systematic approach. He does not 
aim for a ‘technical’ theology of the Trinity, by which I mean that - Volf does not 
begin with or spend a great deal of time dealing with problems of persons and 
substance, unity and difference, modalism and tritheism, immanence and 
economy. He does not spend time constructing his own theology of the Trinity 
from the ground up, that is, he does not begin by questioning the construction of 
the Trinity, the relationship of the three persons and the means of Trinitarian 
revelation. Instead he largely presumes an understanding of the Trinity similar 
to Moltmann’s, only noting particular pitfalls he wishes to avoid and areas he 
wants to emphasise and extend in order that he might move towards the 
application of the doctrine.  This is demonstrated in After Our Likeness. Here 
Volf’s theology takes a perichoretic understanding of the Trinity starting with 
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revelation.379 Yet Volf does not appear to distinguish between different 
perichoretic models himself, instead drawing on others’ work, in this case G.L 
Prestige’s God in Patristic Thought and on the work of Moltmann. His approach 
leaves much of the more detailed discussion of the Trinity behind, engaging 
with this type of Trinitarian discourse only so far as it is necessary in order to 
find firm theological roots for a response to an issue of praxis.  
Volf’s approach reflects a wider trend away from a ‘technical’ type of dialogue 
associated with Augustinian tradition and the concerns of the Church Fathers 
towards an emphasis on understanding the Trinity within social contexts.380 
However, it is also particular to Volf’s work because of his great reliance on 
Moltmann’s more complete work on the Trinity.381 It is a matter of debate 
whether Moltmann himself is a systematic theologian. His creative approach to 
theology marks him out from the more precise approach which systematicians 
tend towards.382 Moltmann himself is wary of seeing his theology as a ‘system’ 
in the sense that he makes no claims to completeness or to the complete 
harmony of his work, although he does seek to take a ‘systematic approach in 
some of his work’.383  His theology is also orientated towards praxis, 
nevertheless he does develop the doctrine of the Trinity in its own right rather 
than solely in response to a specific contextual issue as Volf does.384 Volf 
simply does not need to do as much ground work since he is working as a 
theologian ‘“after Moltmann”... continuing to press further in the same direction 
he was moving’.385 Even in this approach Volf is ‘following Moltmann’ since 
Moltmann himself sees his work as part of an ongoing future dialogue.386 In 
particular, for Volf the revelation of the Trinity in Christ’s death and thus the 
Trinity as framing the parameters of theological thought is assumed. The 
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eschatological focus of Volf’s work is also derived from Moltmann and is 
essentially an extension of the focus on the Trinity, since eschatological life is 
the human participation in the triune life.387 Volf’s theology is often a self-
acknowledged extension of Moltmann’s, with little explicit rejection or 
amendment — the latter serving as a foundation for Volf’s own work.388  
Volf’s most detailed writing on the Trinity, After Our Likeness, is about the 
Trinity as a source of ecclesiology, not a treatment of the Trinity for its own 
sake. In this text Volf works towards a Free Church ecclesiology through 
engagement with Catholic and Orthodox Trinitarian theology represented 
respectively by Josef Ratzinger and John Zizioulas. He argues that it is 
incorrect to project an understanding of hierarchy in order to legitimise a 
hierarchical church structure. (Volf, however, is also susceptible to the same 
criticism of projection, an issue to which we will return.) Instead Volf argues for 
the Trinity understood as an equal perichoretic relationship and proposes the 
idea of ‘catholicity of persons’, that is the openness of an individual to other 
individuals, seeing the other as in some way a part of the self, as the best way 
to image the Triune relationship in an ecclesial setting.389 It is the same 
understanding of identity as that found in the metaphor of embrace but is 
expressed in different language for a different context. Despite the strong 
Trinitarian themes, Volf is always clearly focused towards his end goal of a 
corrective ecclesiology, that is, an ecclesiology which counters Protestant 
‘tendencies towards individualism’ without capitulating to Catholic and Orthodox 
understandings of community and authoritarianism. To do this Volf stresses 
both the need for ‘a dual emphasis...on community and on persons, on 
belonging and on choice.’390 The importance of equality both within the Trinity 
and, in consequence, also in human life comes through strongly.  
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This sense of personhood existing within community is a slightly different 
emphasis on the sense of identity built upon the triune God found in Exclusion 
and Embrace. In this later text, whilst the theology is the same, the idea of 
embrace appears to begin with the individual and move towards community, 
rather than beginning with community and moving towards the individual as in 
After Our Likeness. This is most likely due to the subject at hand. Exclusion and 
Embrace begins with the context of fractured relationships (and therefore the 
individual alone) and seeks to demonstrate that individuals must and can exist 
within community. After Our Likeness begins with the Church community and 
seeks to emphasise that that community is made up of multiple individuals, and 
their relationships. 
In Exclusion and Embrace Volf grounds his work in the Trinity in order to 
propose the practice of embrace as a response to conflict and exclusion. Yet to 
an even greater extent in this text, whilst the Trinity is the cornerstone of his 
approach, it is not dealt with in great detail.391 Oddly, much of what he does 
devote to the Trinity is caught up with issues of gender identity and the role of 
the Trinity in that discussion. This slight diversion in the text demonstrates Volf’s 
emphasis on equality within the Trinity. He accuses those who do not have such 
concerns of projection of hierarchy onto the Trinity, but it is equally an 
accusation which could be levelled at Volf in terms of his own concerns for 
equality.392 His concern for social equality appears influential in his 
understanding of the Trinity. 
 
1.2 Volf, Moltmann and Barth 
 
Volf’s Trinity-centred approach is part of a wider movement towards a focus on 
the doctrine of the Trinity in the twentieth century, starting with Barth but 
reaching a peak during the last three decades in particular (with Moltmann, 
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Gunton, LaCugna etc.). This revival of the doctrine and its development through 
the twentieth century arguably has its first roots in the work of Schleiermacher 
and Hegel.393  
Volf himself has no interaction with Schleiermacher other than to note his views 
on ecclesiology in After Our Likeness.394 However, he clearly stands within a 
theological lineage for whom Schleiermacher had been influential. 
Schleiermacher emphasised the need to think theologically of God in terms of 
experience and God’s relationship with the world (stressing what came to be 
called the economic Trinity) rather than primarily in rational or dogmatic terms 
(or, for that matter, solely immanently).395  Whilst Schleiermacher saw the 
Trinity as the conclusion rather than the centre of theology, the ‘revolution in 
theology’ which his approach signalled would pave the way for a doctrine of the 
Trinity founded in God’s revelation of himself to the world (centred on Christ’s 
death) which has been a central point of the development of the doctrine in the 
twentieth century.396 The understanding of the Trinity, not as an additional 
convenient theory to explain God’s persons, but as fundamental in 
understanding God’s self-revelation perhaps sees its ultimate expression in the 
‘social Trinitarians’, defined (broadly) by Volf as those who ‘root the doctrine of 
the Trinity in the history of the mutual engagement of the persons of the Trinity 
in the economy of salvation’ and who think in ‘Trinitarian terms [because of] the 
specific character of each actor in the drama of divine self-revelation and the 
nature of their relations.’397 Interestingly Volf uses this definition to exclude 
Barth and his emphasis on knowledge of God through the logic of revelation, 
but suggests both Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine might be understood as 
fitting within this ‘social Trinitarian’ grouping. 398 
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Barth, as arguably the most notable German theologian since Schleiermacher, 
interacts with him in a way that Moltmann does not (for Moltmann the notable 
figure to react against or move on from is Barth himself). Barth’s chief complaint 
against Schleiermacher is that he is simply speaking of human beings in a loud 
voice and calling it God.399 That is, Schleiermacher is relying too greatly on 
human experience and drawing analogies from that to determine who God is. It 
is a similar accusation to Volf’s criticism of Barth – that of projecting onto God. 
That such a criticism keeps appearing in theologies of the Trinity indicates that 
projection and the issue of the knowability and unknowability of God is a 
constant weakness for any theological proposition founded on the Trinity. Barth 
also reacts against Schleiermacher’s theology as having little or no space for 
the immanent Trinity (God as God apart from the world) which becomes 
absolutely central to Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity and his emphasis on God’s 
freedom and Lordship.400 Similarly Moltmann critiques Barth for his prioritisation 
of immanence and freedom over love and the Trinity’s entwinement with 
creation.401 It is interesting with this history of reaction against the perceived 
(over)emphasis of each previous generation that Volf follows Moltmann 
relatively closely and underplays differences such as the level of emphasis on 
God’s reliance on the world which in Moltmann’s work verges on 
panentheism.402 
Moltmann notes that Schleiermacher saw the need, or at least strong possibility 
for a renewal of the doctrine of the Trinity which would transform the doctrine 
from the beginning.403 Moltmann sees himself as undertaking this project, noting 
that ‘we cannot say of God who he is of himself and in himself; we can only say 
who he is for us in the history of Christ which reaches us in our history.’404 
Moltmann takes Schleiermacher’s challenge and sees himself as going back to 
the beginning, the cross of Christ, and working out his understanding of God as 
                                            
399
Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, quoted in Louis Berkhof, Systematic 
Theology, William B Eerdmann, Grand Rapids, 1996, 105  
400
 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/1, T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1994, 307 
401
 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 52f 
402
 ‘In this sense God ‘needs’ man’ Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 58 
403
 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 238 (drawing on Schleiermacher’s The Christian Faith). 
404
 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 238. 
160 
 
triune, and the nature of that trinity from there.405 In his approach Moltmann 
follows Rahner’s premise that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity – an 
idea which arguably has roots in Schleiermacher’s understanding of the eternal 
God as inseparable from God’s work of redemption.406 In this sense we might 
align Moltmann more closely with Schleiermacher’s broad themes than with 
Barth. In following on from Moltmann and maintaining this cross centred, 
salvation history approach to the Trinity, Volf too then stands in the wake of 
Schleiermacher. 
The reaction of Barth to Schleiermacher, in rejecting close analogies between 
human and divine and choosing to focus on the immanent God, and Moltmann’s 
countermove in focusing on the economic Trinity and human experience of 
God, certainly influences the issue of analogy in Volf’s own work, a key 
consideration for my proposal that the Trinity as understood by Volf can be the 
foundation of our understanding of justice.  
It is widely noted that Moltmann has a significant relationship with Hegel and 
therefore some of this influence filters through to Volf’s work. There is clear and 
direct influence from Hegel in Volf’s presentation of the practice or ‘drama’ of 
embrace which is set out in dialogue (mostly disagreement) with Hegel’s 
master-slave dialectic (see chapter 2).407 Hegel’s philosophy of reality and 
thought found an ultimate expression in the Trinity.408 For him the internal 
dynamic of the Trinity was that in which ‘God makes himself an object for 
himself, then in this object, God remains the undivided essence within this 
differentiation of himself within himself, and in the differentiation of himself loves 
himself, i.e., remains identical with himself – this is God as Spirit.’409 This sense 
of internal relations of difference and unity bound by love can be seen to be 
influential on the later developments of the doctrine, even though they are not 
uncritically taken on.410 In particular, Moltmann notes that Hegel’s view of Trinity 
as absolute subject makes internal relations inherent to the Trinity, even though 
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he concludes that the subject model is insufficient.411 Hegel’s relation of logic or 
reason to reality and history is also influential most particularly for Moltmann. 
Moltmann’s ability to talk of the suffering of the triune God in the crucifixion of 
Christ owes an explicit debt to Hegel’s belief that the triunity of God is 
necessarily expressed in the world, in history.412  
Whilst Hegel and Moltmann are often linked, Barth also interacts with Hegel 
although primarily critically.413 Stanley Grenz notes that Barth’s understanding 
of God’s knowledge of God’s self and of ‘God’s self knowledge as a Trinitarian 
event’ which human beings are both observers of and secondary participants in 
appears to have origins in Hegel.414 Pannenberg sees in Barth too great a 
reliance on Hegel’s notion of God’s subjectivity such that not enough space is 
left for plural persons.415 Bruce McCormack highlights Barth’s critical approach 
to Hegel and key points of difference. Where Hegel believed God acts 
necessarily, Barth stressed God’s freedom and grace. In addition, whilst for 
Hegel God ‘becomes’ himself in the world, for Barth God is perfect in his 
immanent self without the world.416 These are key distinctions which 
interestingly mirror important divisions between Moltmann and Barth, with 
Moltmann’s theology appearing to align more with Hegel than with Barth. 
Hegel’s influence on key players in twentieth century Trinitarian theology means 
there are inevitably Hegelian influences in Volf’s work although almost entirely 
indirectly and primarily mediated through Moltmann. Hegel gets one extremely 
brief mention in After Our Likeness and only a little more attention in Exclusion 
and Embrace in the context of human identity and relations.417 
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Despite the importance of Schleiermacher and Hegel it was not until Karl Barth 
that the doctrine of the Trinity came to the front and centre of theological 
discussion. It is Barth who is seen as the main force in the renewal of the 
doctrine of the Trinity in the twentieth century.418 The return to the doctrine was 
characterised by a movement towards understanding God’s actions as defined 
by and inextricably linked to God’s triune nature. The Trinity was no longer a 
discrete doctrine. Instead Barth understood the triune God as the ultimate 
reality. ‘God is not “simply another object” to be interpreted or described by the 
human subject, but the most concrete Reality in light of which every facet of our 
understanding requires to be reconceived.’419 Whilst this ‘renaissance’ of the 
doctrine of the Trinity was understood in a variety of ways, Kӓrkkӓinen notes the 
common ground found in the wake of Barth (and Rahner), as signified in the 
fact that ‘both Moltmann and Pannenberg s[ought] to ground the Trinity in 
revelation and salvation history rather than in abstract speculation.’420  
 
1.2a Moltmann’s  and Volf’s engagement with Barth 
It is important to note this sense of continuity of emphasis on the Trinity as the 
centrepoint of theology and the key role of revelation in human knowledge of 
the Trinity for Barth, Moltmann and Volf. However, Moltmann and Volf do not 
tend to draw positively on Barth’s work. Instead they highlight the problems of 
his Trinitarian thought and their own responses to these problems. Moltmann 
references Barth a great deal. In The Crucified God he calls Barth’s work ‘not 
sufficiently trinitarian.’421 Moltmann argues that Barth fails to interpret Christ’s 
crucifixion as a fundamentally triune event and by relying on a simple notion of 
‘God in Christ’, fails to draw out the different roles of each person in the drama 
as Moltmann goes on to do. Similarly, Moltmann critiques Barth’s prioritisation 
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of the freedom of God at the expense of making God’s love intrinsic to God’s 
self.422 This is a key criticism since for Barth God is ‘the one who loves in 
freedom’.423 Moltmann instead suggests that the love of God for the world 
cannot be chosen but is a fundamental part of the triune life.424  
Volf references Barth infrequently but where he does so he also focuses on 
areas of difference. This attitude underlines the importance of Volf’s 
understanding of the Trinity as made up of distinct characters at work in the 
world and fundamentally open to creation. It is hard to imagine the notion of 
embrace emerging from Barthian theology since at its heart is an understanding 
of the Trinity opened up to the world, inviting creation in.  
Volf critiques Barth on two points. Firstly, he rejects Barth’s notion of divine self-
revelation in a sweeping statement. ‘Along with most social Trinitarians, I think 
that we should not root the doctrine of the Trinity in the character of divine self-
revelation [Barth] or self-communication [Rahner] – a move which owes too 
much to the metaphysics of subjectivity – but in the history of the mutual 
engagement of the persons of the Trinity in the economy of salvation.’ 425 There 
is no further explanation of this dismissal. The implication is that others, namely 
Moltmann, have done this work so Volf does not need to bother. Even so, Volf’s 
comment is not entirely self-explanatory.  
My proposed interpretation of this statement is that Volf is concerned that 
Barth’s notion of self-revelation makes the Trinity dependent on (human) 
perception. In this case it is entirely possible that the Trinity does not really exist 
or that the Trinity only exists in an economic sense, in God’s interactions with 
the world or for the purpose of revelation.426 The implication of this is that the 
triune nature of God is not integral to Barth’s notion of God since triunity has no 
role in the immanent Trinity, God apart from the world or God in God’s self. This 
would fit with Moltmann’s critique that Barth’s emphasis on Lordship and 
freedom mean Barth stresses God’s unity and distance at the expense of an 
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interpersonal triune God. If my reading of Volf’s brief comments is correct he is 
standing with Moltmann in stating that Barth’s theology is simply insufficiently 
trinitarian.427 Perhaps for this reason Barth is a little used source. 
Having so roundly dismissed Barth’s theology of the Trinity, Volf’s second 
critique seems less significant. This is that Barth wrongly projects human 
conceptions and experience onto the Trinity. Referencing Barth’s comments on 
Fatherhood and Sonship Volf notes that Barth’s ‘analogy goes from above – 
from God to human beings – but only after Barth has projected a patriarchal 
construction of masculinity onto God and tacitly declared it was there already 
from the beginning!’ 428 For Volf this undermines Barth’s own thesis that God is 
not known through ‘analogy from below’, a point with which Volf agrees.  
The differences which Volf’s criticisms highlight are hugely important, and will 
be discussed further throughout the chapter. Yet they signify in themselves the 
formative influence of Barth upon both theologians since pivotal points in their 
Trinitarian theology are formed around disagreements with Barth’s theology. For 
Moltmann the sense of God’s freedom as set out by Barth left the Trinity a still 
distant concept and failed to realise the full potential for the persons of the 
Trinity to be understood as bound to creation and as acting and relating as 
different persons within God’s engagement with the world.  
Volf’s critique of Barth’s notion of revelation appears to rely on Moltmann’s 
work. Yet the question of projection onto the Trinity of how triune and human life 
might intersect is a central one in Volf’s theology of the Trinity. Against these 
differences lies the fact that both men, along with many other 20th century 
theologians, follow in Barth’s wake in considering the Trinity as the centre point 
of theology.429 Their need to differentiate themselves on particular issues is 
perhaps best understood within this context.  
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Moltmann’s influence on Volf 
Whilst the Trinitarian nature of Volf’s work can be seen as influenced by Barth in 
the sense of him being both the originator of the 20th Century move towards 
theology centred on the Trinity and as a direct influence on Moltmann, the 
particular social model of the Trinity in Volf’s work comes from Moltmann 
himself. It is Moltmann who does the foundational work for Volf’s theology, 
moving away from the types of discussions which had dominated Western 
theology of the Trinity (within which we might include Barth) in favour of the 
Eastern understanding of the Trinity as fundamentally social or communal.  
Moltmann’s doctrine of God begins with a quite radical alignment of God in the 
world and God with the world. Where Barth is critiqued for dualism between 
God and creation, Moltmann’s understanding of history as reality, influenced by 
Hegel, led him to an understanding of God drawing the world into his triune 
self.430 Moltmann abandons the clear distinctions of immanent and economic 
trinities since the world is in God.431 The distinctions play no role in light of the 
crucifixion, he argues, which is not merely an economic event, but an event 
within the internal life of the Trinity.432 God does not act unitarily towards the 
world but in triunity and God is affected by his interaction with the world. This is 
a rejection of Augustinian tradition which, though it stresses the three persons in 
the interior life of God, sees God’s external actions as unitary.433 This 
contradicts criticism of Barth discussed above which is that Barth has room for 
triunity in revelation but not in the immanent Trinity. Alan Torrance argues 
against this type of charge however insisting that for Barth the triune revelation 
reflects only that which God is in himself prior to revelation - triune.434 In 
refusing to separate out God in God’s self and God in the world, Moltmann 
sidesteps both of these potential problems but leaves himself open to the 
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charge of panentheism.435 This is a charge which Volf makes some effort to 
avoid.436 
This lack of separation between God in the world and God outside of the world 
contrasts sharply with Barth’s theology which prioritised God’s absolute 
freedom. Barth states that God ‘could have remained satisfied with Himself and 
with the impassible glory and blessedness of His own inner life. But he did not 
do so. He elected man as a covenant-partner.’437 Barth’s notion of freedom, 
albeit coupled with love as ‘the one who loves in freedom’, has an implied sense 
of separation.438 For Moltmann God’s love is prioritised and forms God’s 
freedom since ‘God’s freedom can never contradict the truth that God is.’439 It is 
perhaps interesting to note, in terms of the subject of justice, that Moltmann 
rejects what he calls a formalistic legal notion of freedom for the Trinity in favour 
of a relational notion of freedom here.440 If Barth’s can be characterised as God 
loving in freedom then Moltmann’s is about God’s freedom in love. 
The prioritisation of love allows Moltmann to talk of human beings experiencing 
the Trinity in a way that Barth, arguably, cannot. Moltmann rejects power and 
Lordship as key elements of the Trinity since they impose from above to below. 
Instead he stresses the potential for God as love to be ‘experienced within the 
community of brothers and sisters through mutual acceptance and 
participation.’441 This emphasis on experience is important in Moltmann. It 
paves the way for a practical or analogous type of theology drawn from the 
Trinity. Ultimately it paves the way for Volf to use the language and metaphor of 
embrace. 
There are key distinctions between Volf’s work and Moltmann’s. In terms of the 
Trinity these mainly involve Volf’s attempts to place a little more distance 
between the Trinity and creation, perhaps to avoid the accusations of 
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panentheism levelled at Moltmann. He therefore rejects Moltmann’s agreement 
with Rahner’s understanding of the immanent and the economic trinity.442 Volf 
instead follows Congar in stating that the economic Trinity is identical with the 
immanent Trinity but that ‘there is always a surplus in the immanent Trinity that 
the economic Trinity does not express.’443 
 
1.3 Volf in a Contemporary Context 
 
Writing his key texts in the 1990s, Volf stands within a particular period of 
popularity for the social Trinity model. This reflects postmodern concerns with 
‘complex relationality’ and difference over universality – or, in this case, unity.444 
It is also a period which can be seen as reacting against, or rejecting, the (at the 
time) still dominant view of the Trinity which had seen the issue of three persons 
in one as a problem to be solved. Karen Kilby rightly points out the tiresome 
predictability of post 1970s theologians decrying the way in which ‘the Trinity 
has come to be regarded as an obscure and complex theological technicality, a 
piece of celestial mathematics with little relevance to the life of the ordinary 
Christian.’445 This point has been (or at least was) reiterated to the point of 
becoming a universally acknowledged truth. 
This perspective involved a rejection of Augustine’s apparent prioritisation of 
oneness (unity of God) over three persons (plurality of God). This Western 
approach to the doctrine is seen as making the concept of the Trinity inherently 
problematic, a logic puzzle needing to be solved. In contrast a social model of 
the Trinity derived ultimately from the Cappadocians (but more directly from 
Moltmann, or Zizioulas) emphasising three persons in unity through 
perichoresis (divine self-giving) was seen to avoid the logic problem of the 
Trinity and make the Trinity a much more accessible and applicable doctrine.  
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This widely accepted division of the theology of the Trinity into Western and 
Eastern models does not go uncontested. Historical theologians such as Michel 
René Barnes write scathingly against this type of dichotomous reading of 
Augustine and the Cappadocians. He argues that Catherine LaCugna, a key 
figure of 1990s Trinitarian theology, and others draw more on a late nineteenth 
century characterisation of the division between Greek and Latin doctrines of 
the Trinity by Théodore de Régnon than on nuanced readings of the original 
texts.446 Whatever the case, it stands that the interpretation of Augustine and 
the Cappadocians as divided in this way has been influential in the late 
twentieth century and tends to underpin social readings of the Trinity including 
Moltmann’s.447  
Volf has very little to say on the early Trinitarian work of Augustine and the 
Cappadocians themselves. Where he does enter into the debate is through his 
choice of Joseph Ratzinger and John Zizioulas as dialogue partners in his 
ecclesiological theology based on the Trinity, After Our Likeness. He 
assimilates his critique of Joseph Ratzinger’s understanding of triune persons 
as ‘pure relationality’ with LaCugna’s critique of Augustine that unless there is 
sufficient room for the ‘I’ of the persons of the Trinity then ‘the three persons of 
the Trinity are superfluous in the economy of salvation, and “the Triune God’s 
relationship to us is...unitary”’448. In this he seems to locate himself in the 
contemporary context as standing with the dominant critiques of Augustine as 
expressed by LaCugna. However, Volf also briefly critiques the clear cut 
division of Eastern and Western thought as ‘unproductive’ and ‘inadequate’ in 
that taking only one model forward fails to take account of the elements of truth 
in the opposing account.449 He also notes that his own social Trinitarian position 
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is so broad that it might arguably include both Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine 
within it.450 
Whilst these references suggest Volf has an acute awareness of the 
contemporary debates, he mentions those writing on the Trinity in the late 
1980s and early 1990s such as LaCugna, Sallie McFague and Leonardo Boff 
fleetingly, primarily in footnotes, and does not enter into detailed engagement 
with current debates.451 Instead Volf’s choice of dialogue partners are in this 
case figures he sees as having weight and standing who draw extensively on 
their respective traditions and provide ecumenical perspectives.452 In turning to 
Ratzinger and Zizioulas he is also addressing his contemporaries’ failure to 
engage positively with Western Trinitarian models. 
Despite this engagement, Volf rejects the Augustinian or Western Trinitarian 
heritage in stating that ‘Ratzinger locates the unity of the triune God not at the 
level of persons, but rather together with the whole of Western Trinitarian 
thought at the level of substance. The result, however, is that the one substance 
gains the upper hand over the three relations.’453 Whilst Ratzinger puts a little 
distance between himself and Augustine’s more extreme emphasis on God’s 
unity, Volf sees him as falling into the same trap.454 Volf argues that Ratzinger’s 
understanding of the persons of the Trinity as pure relations still leaves the 
Trinity acting externally as ‘one undifferentiated divine being...one “person”’.455 
Volf notes that the implications of Augustine’s theology are problematic in the 
same way. Nevertheless Volf engages extensively with Ratzinger (and thus with 
contemporary expressions of ‘the Western model’) finding his emphasis of 
relationality over substantiality within the Trinity useful despite rejecting the 
overarching emphasis on unity.456 In this interaction Volf is affirming that the 
Western model is not as redundant as might be claimed. Regardless of the fact 
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that Volf rejects Ratzinger’s conclusions, Ratzinger’s ability to find a coherent 
model of ecclesial relations grounded in a triune model with roots in the 
Western Church fathers perhaps contests the claims that the stress on unity 
over persons makes the Trinity an irrelevant logic puzzle.  
 The contemporary connection of social models of the Trinity with eastern 
Trinitarian theology might make Zizioulas appear a more natural dialogue 
partner for Volf.  Certainly the idea that ‘God’s being coincides with God’s 
personhood’ agrees with Volf’s own theology, but the hierarchical and 
asymmetrical relations of the persons which Zizioulas sees as necessary is 
rejected by Volf.457 It is hard not to see the disagreement in terms of projection 
and each theologian’s desired ecclesiological outcome. Volf certainly presumes 
this of Zizioulas stating that he is ‘projecting the hierarchical grounding of unity 
into the doctrine of the Trinity from the perspective of a particular 
ecclesiology.’458 This problem of projection is a key problem in Trinitarian 
theology and is of particular importance in taking Volf’s theology forward as 
discussed in section 2.1 of this chapter. 
The primacy of persons in Zizioulas’ theology does give more space than 
Ratzinger to an understanding of distinct personhood within the Trinity and 
therefore greater scope to the possibility of developing an understanding of 
human personhood grounded in the Trinity. Yet Volf sees much of this work 
undone by the insistence on hierarchy which in translation to human 
personhood promotes the communal above the individual to a degree which 
Volf sees as problematic. Nevertheless it is clear that Volf is in broad terms 
closer to this Eastern model than to the Western. Ratzinger does not go far 
enough in distinguishing persons or relations from the unity of God. Zizioulas 
does leave sufficient space for persons but ruins it for Volf in suggesting their 
asymmetrical, unequal nature. Volf therefore ultimately rejects both Ratzinger 
and Zizioulas on similar grounds: neither leaves sufficient space for equality of 
difference and unity. For Volf Moltmann remains ‘the most notable 
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representative of Trinitarian thinking, which both refuses to dissolve persons 
into relations and seeks to affirm their equality.’459 
Volf’s interactions with his contemporaries demonstrate the unrivalled 
importance of Moltmann to his theology of the Trinity.460 They also demonstrate 
a strong push towards understanding the doctrine’s implications for areas of 
human life and practice rather than entering into extensive debate about the 
doctrine in its own right. This approach makes Volf’s Trinitarian theology appear 
accessible and dynamic, firmly avoiding the problem of seeing the Trinity as a 
“logic puzzle”. However, Volf’s efforts to emphasise the equal measures of both 
personhood and unity, difference and equality within the Trinity are potentially 
problematic. His treatment of the doctrine always has in mind its implications for 
human life to such an extent that it is difficult to be certain that his 
understanding of the Trinity is not formed partly in order to understand human 
identity in these same terms, and thus present his treatment of other issues 
which rely on these triune analogies as ‘grounded’ in the Trinity. It is to these 
problems of projection and analogies that we now turn. 
 
Section 2: Key Issues in approaching the Trinity 
 
Volf’s interests do not lie in seeking to understand what the Trinity is or how the 
Trinity works for its own sake but in what the Triune God has to say to a 
particular context of human life and experience. The key issues in addressing 
his theology are therefore firstly the question of the knowability of God 
(including the particular problem of projection onto God) and secondly, the 
possibility of drawing analogies to human life from what we do know of God.  
The first of these questions is given scant attention by Volf whilst the second is 
more considered. These issues, particularly of analogies - the possibility, type 
and extent of analogies between the triune God and human beings - is also 
crucial to pushing forward with an understanding of the how the Trinity might 
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impact on our understanding and practice of justice, the focus of the final 
section of this chapter. 
 
2.1 Knowledge of the Trinity 
 
Volf largely presumes that talk about the Trinity must be possible if Christianity 
is to have anything meaningful to say at all. He summarily dismisses Kant’s 
position that we do not know enough of divine life to draw any real conclusions 
as to how the human life should be lived.461 He forgoes the more detailed 
engagement that Moltmann has with Kant.462 It is likely Volf feels the arguments 
have already been made. 
Nevertheless, dealing with this issue is important, since even if we affirm with 
Volf the possibility of speaking of the Trinity as both Biblical and necessary in 
the Christian understanding of God, the extent to which God’s triunity can be 
spoken of is still very much an open question. It is a question that necessarily 
precedes that of divine-human analogies. In order to talk about how human 
beings are like God and in what ways they might act in light of this, we must first 
understand what we can know about God himself. 
For Volf, knowledge of God is only though God’s self-revelation.463 Debates 
about the nature of that revelation aside, in this belief Volf stands firmly within a 
long tradition from the Church Fathers, through Barth and onwards.464 For Volf, 
this revelation is understood as ‘the history of mutual engagement of the 
persons of the Trinity in the economy of salvation’.465 It is this revelation of ‘the 
specific character of each actor in the divine drama of self-revelation and the 
nature of their relations’ which means that all knowledge of God can only be 
understood in Trinitarian terms.466 In this sense then for Volf there is no 
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separation between knowledge of God and knowledge of the Trinity since God 
reveals himself as triune because that is his very nature or being.  
Volf’s approach to the Trinity reflects Moltmann’s, in that it centres on the 
crucifixion as the ultimate revelation of God’s triune nature in the world.467 He 
writes that  
‘At the heart of the cross is Christ’s stance of not letting the other 
remain an enemy and of creating space in himself for the offender 
to come in....The goal of the cross is the dwelling of human beings 
“in the Spirit”, “in Christ”, and “in God”....the arms of the crucified 
are open - a sign of a space in God’s self and an invitation for the 
enemy to come in.’ 468 
 
The cross in this reading is the opening up of the triune life of embrace (mutual 
self giving and receiving) to the world. It is the ultimate moment of insight into 
who God is and how God’s life is both constituted in itself and how this life is 
related to human life. Volf’s evangelical roots mean that he is keen to ground 
this understanding of the crucifixion as a triune event in biblical texts, 
particularly John’s gospel (‘the Father is in me and I am in the Father’ John 
10:38).469 He drops in biblical references throughout his work and also explicitly 
notes that his role as a theologian rather than biblical scholar does not remove 
him from the need for strong biblical engagement.470 
It is therefore fair to say that for Volf the triunity of God is fundamental to his 
reading of scripture and his interpretation of God’s revelation. This indicates 
why he gives little time to the question of whether talking about the Trinity is 
possible since for him orthodox Christian beliefs necessarily speak of the 
Trinity. However, the question of the extent or limitations of human knowledge 
of the Trinity remains. This is most easily understood in terms of the debates 
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around the economic and immanent Trinity, although the language itself has 
come into question.471 
 
2.1a Economic and Immanent Trinity 
If knowledge of the Trinity is located in revelation it is firstly bound up with God 
in creation or the economic Trinity. The relationship between the revealed God 
and the eternal immanent God is open to significant debate. There is a range of 
possible perspectives. Firstly if one sees clear distinction between the economic 
and immanent Trinities one might either follow Sallie McFague in stating that 
there is ‘no way in which assumptions about the inner nature of God are 
possible.’472 This position means that all we can know is the economic Trinity 
and thus we can’t ultimately know God in the sense of who God is eternally in 
Godself. Alternatively one might follow Barth, who is also critiqued as one who 
leaves too great a distinction between the immanent and economic. His stress 
on the immanent Trinity potentially disconnects it in some ways from the 
economic, leaving the economic Trinity as a sort of presentation of God’s self to 
the world rather than a complete engagement of the eternal God with the world. 
A second approach is to marry the economic and immanent Trinities more 
closely. In this case one might move towards panentheism, God related so 
closely to creation as to become to some degree reliant on creation and 
perhaps even determined by creation’s perception of him.473 At its most extreme 
this view leads to a negation of God as any discernible reality in God’s own 
right.474 Alternatively the marrying of the two might be done in the way Volf 
proposes which allows for continuity between the economic and immanent but 
which preserves a fullness and ultimate mystery in the immanent Trinity.475 It is 
obvious that the relations of the economic and immanent Trinity and the 
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emphasis placed on either one have a great impact on the type and extent of 
our knowledge of God. 
Volf is certainly open to talking about God apart from creation.476 He sees the 
language of immanence and economy as potentially unhelpful and inadequate 
in that the terms suggest a polarity or clear-cut distinction between two aspects 
of God but argues that in their most basic sense the terms are necessary.477 He 
stresses a continuum between the two terms and also follows Moltmann in 
adding the term ‘Trinity in glory’, referencing the Trinity’s eschatological 
existence.478 Volf argues that, whilst we only know God through his self-
revelation, which is his history within the world, there is sufficient continuity 
between God in the world and God apart from the world that 
‘as we explore the relation between the Trinity and the shape of 
human living, we should primarily build on the claims of the 
economic Trinity and venture into the territory of the immanent 
Trinity more tentatively and only as necessary – a procedure I will 
follow below. But venture into the territory of the immanent Trinity 
we must. If we were not entitled to make claims about the 
immanent Trinity on the basis of the economic Trinity’s 
engagement with the world, then in the encounter with the 
economic Trinity, we would not be dealing with who God truly is.’479  
 
Volf presents a relatively nuanced position in this text. He is well aware of the 
criticisms of Moltmann (and of Volf’s own contemporaries) which focus on the 
lack of space for a truly immanent God and a God too dependent on creation.480 
Volf goes some way to redressing the issue, siding not with Karl Rahner as 
Moltmann does, but with Yves Congar’s moderated formulation on economy 
and immanence.481 Where Rahner states that ‘the “economic” Trinity is the 
“immanent” Trinity, and vice versa’, Congar disagrees that the statement can be 
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reversed and that the immanent Trinity is limited to the economic Trinity.482 Volf 
states that ‘There is always a surplus to the immanent Trinity that the economic 
Trinity does not express’ and that ‘something new is introduced into the life of 
the Trinity with creation and redemption.’483 To be fair,  Moltmann also attempts 
to clarify his position stating that he merely wishes to emphasise that ‘God’s 
relationship to the world has a retroactive effect on his relationship to himself – 
even though the divine relationship to the world is primarily determined by that 
inner relationship.’484 Nevertheless, Volf goes further in clarifying that there is 
more in the immanent Trinity than is revealed in the economic Trinity, although 
that which is revealed entirely points towards and is a part of the immanent 
Trinity. Volf leaves a greater space for God apart from creation and thus allows 
room for a greater sense of unknowability and mystery.485 
Certainly Volf follows a closer line to Moltmann than to the Barthian tradition of 
emphasising immanence and thus ultimately a greater stress on the 
unknowability of God. Yet Volf is clear: what we do know of God is what he 
reveals in creation. Whilst that revelation reveals God’s eternal self, making 
claims beyond that revelation is hazardous and unwise. Even making claims 
based upon revelation is fraught with difficulty since although ‘God’s revelation 
is complete and trustworthy, there is no such thing as an infallible interpretation 
of this revelation.... Every denial of such provisionality and every fascination 
with certitude betray a dangerous proximity to blind fundamentalism.’486  
Ultimately, we can know God because he has made himself known to creation 
in creaturely terms. For Volf the larger part of the problem of knowing God lies 
in the next step, that of human interpretation and understanding of God’s 
revelation of Godself. It is in interpreting and attempting to understand that of 
God which is revealed and therefore knowable that we encounter the pervasive 
problem of projecting human ideas and ideals onto God.  
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2.1b The Problem of Projection 
Karen Kilby’s brief essay on projection and perichoresis cuts to the heart of the 
potential issues of projection and social trinity models. In it she notes that the 
problem of projection onto God is a significant one, and more so for social 
Trinitarians, with whom Volf would loosely class himself.487 She writes that 
projection ‘is particularly problematic in at least some social theories of the 
Trinity because what is projected onto God is immediately reflected back into 
the world, and this reverse projection is said to be what is in fact important 
about the doctrine.’488 Whilst she acknowledges that all theology may in part be 
projection, the problem of social models of the Trinity is that they tend to 
imagine an ideal human social relationship, project that onto God and then use 
the projection to legitimise and uphold models of human relations and 
practices.489 This critique cuts to the heart of the issue and is potentially 
applicable to Volf’s work. 
Whilst Kilby certainly has a point in regards to some social Trinitarian projects, it 
is not necessarily true that the social model requires such levels of projection, or 
that other models are more immune to the problem. Whilst some theologians 
working with a social trinity model might legitimise the idea of projection, Volf 
stresses that ‘We should not proceed “by analogy from below” and construct 
God in the image of human beings; we should proceed “by analogy from above” 
and learn who human beings ought to be considering who God is.’490 Of course 
such a declaration (drawn from Barth) does not mean he manages to live up to 
his promise. Indeed we have already mentioned Volf’s criticism of Barth’s 
projection of Fatherhood onto the Trinity and his subsequent support for a 
particular vision of fatherhood and gender roles has already been noted.491  
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Volf is similarly critical of Ratzinger’s derivation of hierarchy and the primacy of 
unity from his model of the Trinity. Volf notes that, whilst his approach offers 
perichoresis as grounded in God’s self-revelation and proceeds from this more 
solid ground towards more conceptual ideas, Ratzinger’s understanding of pure 
relations ‘must proceed first through the conceptual labyrinth in order to arrive at 
the story of revelation in the first place.’492 For Volf grounding one’s claims 
about the Trinity in revelation is the starting point for protecting oneself against 
entirely subjective projection. It is a point also made by Molnar (that claims to 
knowledge of God must be grounded in Jesus Christ), yet this point only serves 
to exclude the extremes of Trinitarian thought; there is still a great deal of 
conflict and debate amongst those who begin with Christ.493 These critiques 
suggest that a range of models of the Trinity are prone to the problem of 
projection. 
Kilby’s solution seems to take account of this. She doubts the scriptural 
evidence for placing the Trinity so centrally and instead argues that the doctrine 
is of the second order.494 Essentially perhaps the problem is not so much with 
social models (although their prevalence is perhaps why they become the focus 
of her critique), but with the renaissance and centrality of the doctrine of the 
Trinity in all forms. For Kilby, the Trinity explains the relationship of Father, Son 
and Spirit, but is not a central doctrine upon which other theological propositions 
should be built. If the Trinity is ‘fundamental to Christianity, this is not because it 
gives a picture of what God is like in se from which all else emanates, but rather 
because it specifies how various aspects of the Christian faith hang together.’495 
This relegation of the Trinity to a grammatical function as an alternative to the 
problems of the doctrine of the Trinity and projection is unsatisfactory.  
Reducing the Trinity in this way fails to take full account of the triune nature of 
God’s revelation. It also seems unnecessary. Whilst Kilby rightly highlights the 
problem of projection and the tendency of social Trinitarians to project social 
visions on to God in order to legitimise their own ideology, this is not inevitable. 
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Certainly it is something Volf’s work seems to counteract. His work would 
suggest that grounding statements and beliefs about the Trinity in scripture and 
revelation is perhaps the first step to guarding against such practices. In 
addition limiting the types of knowledge claims made (leaving room for the 
unknowability and mystery of God) and being aware of the tendency to project 
is part of the solution. In some ways Volf’s whole approach to the Trinity is in 
part an attempt to respond to the existing positions and critiques and to find a 
way to make legitimate (partial) knowledge claims about God without 
overreaching himself. Volf is clear that God’s revelation in human terms means 
that speech about God in human terms is also legitimate, although subject to 
certain limits.496 Kilby’s proposal by comparison entails a refusal to engage fully 
with the God who reveals himself as Father, Son and Spirit - which seems an 
unwise and unnecessary step. 
The issue of projection is closely tied to problem of analogy since the issue 
seems to be about projecting in order subsequently to draw particular 
analogies. It is therefore helpful to turn to this issue next and to examine if 
limitations on analogies might go some way towards ensuring space for Godself 
whilst also being able to affirm the likenesses between God and humanity. 
 
2.2 Trinity and Analogy 
 
Volf’s proposals on analogous limitations do not draw primarily on a wider 
discussion of analogy, but seem to emerge as a natural progression within his 
own theology from his understanding of revelation and the Trinity’s relationship 
with the world which is thereby entailed. In the collected volume of essays 
‘God’s Life in Trinity’, Volf’s chapter is entitled ‘Being as God Is’.497 The title 
choice suggests links to theological writings on analogy which Volf does not in 
fact mention or consider. Most particularly, it suggests his approach may have 
reference to Aquinas’ notion of analogia entis (analogy of being) and Barth’s 
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rejection of Aquinas’ approach.498 Volf makes one reference to Barth on this 
subject, noting (in a footnote) that ‘These two qualifications of correspondence 
between the Trinity and the character of human life echo Karl Barth’s claim that 
all speech about God is characterized by “twofold indirectness” – it takes form in 
a medium that is both “creaturely” and that “contradicts God”.’499 This is perhaps 
surprising given Volf’s critiques both of Barth’s analogies in practice and of 
Barth’s understanding of revelation which prioritises the immanence, otherness 
and unknowability of God.  
In proposing his own understanding of the limits of analogies from divinity to 
humanity, Volf presumes that we can make claims about who God is and about 
the Trinitarian way of life based upon God’s self-revelation. The next question 
then is how these claims might affect human ways of living. This is of central 
importance to both the types of projects Volf undertakes – rethinking 
ecclesiology, human identity and relations, reconciliation, and the meaning of 
work etc. – as well as the task of this thesis to rethink the subject of justice in 
light of Volf’s theology. It is an issue we will return to in section 4 as I translate 
Volf’s work on the Trinity into characteristics for human action. 
Volf engages most fully with the issue of analogy and the potential for the Trinity 
to shape social practice in his paper ‘“The Trinity is Our Social Programme”: 
The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape of Social Engagement.’. In this text he 
engages two potential responses, firstly Nicholas Fedorov’s understanding that 
human participation in divine life extends to allowing the Trinity to become ‘our 
social programme’. That is, human beings can participate in the triune life in the 
present and thus the triune life should directly dictate all present action.500 
Secondly, Ted Peters argues that ‘God alone is God’ and that ‘we as creatures 
cannot copy God in all respects.’501 Volf agrees that Fedorov goes too far in 
claiming fully realised present participation in the Trinity and agrees with Peters 
that human beings are not as God is. However he asks ‘Would it not be odd to 
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claim that there are no analogues to God in creation and yet to maintain, as 
Christian theologians must, that human beings are made in the image of 
God?’502 Drawing on Matthew 5:48 (Be perfect as your heavenly father is 
perfect) Volf sets out to find a position that sits between a ‘blatant disregard of 
the fact that we are not God and…respecting our creaturely difference from God 
but failing to pursue our most proper calling to be like God?’503 Volf does not 
want to say that we can be as God is, nor does he want to say that we cannot 
be like God in any way. Instead he seeks to find a position that sees human 
beings as able to be as God is within the limitations of humanness. 
Identifying this aim, that is to sit between two opposing and (to Volf at least) 
unattractive positions is important in identifying the tension in Volf’s theology 
between ways in which humans can mirror God’s action and ways in which 
human beings are unlike God and therefore should not attempt to “be as God 
is”. This translates strongly into areas of practice both in the actions of God that 
humans cannot mirror (such as actions of final judgement and just punishment) 
and in the ways in which human beings can seek to be like God (love, 
forgiveness, communion). This understanding is then central in shaping the 
theology of embrace. 
Volf places two constraints on the analogies we can draw. That is that analogies 
may only be made within the confines of our “historical” and “creaturely” 
limitations.  
‘As creatures, human beings can correspond to the uncreated God 
only in a creaturely way; any other correspondence than creaturely 
ones would be wholly inappropriate, not because God is governed 
by “petty and passionate” jealousy…but because human beings 
should not jump over their own shadows. 
 
Sinful and “fleshly” as they are (Isaiah 40:6ff; 1 Peter 1:24), human 
beings can correspond to God only in historically appropriate ways; 
any other correspondences than historically appropriate ones 
would be misplaced, not because human beings should put up with 
evil, but because the struggle against it will be effective only if we 
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recognise the depth of its entrenchment in persons, communities 
and structures.’504  
 
In these descriptions of the limits of analogies between God and human beings 
we can see a clear distinction between the two limitations. The first limitation is 
to do with a permanent category difference between God and creature. This is 
not a difference that will be overcome eschatologically. The second difference is 
about a present, and therefore limited, distinction between what is possible 
within the confines of a sinful world and what is possible in the sinless world to 
come. 
Separating these two limitations is important in that the first is used to 
permanently exclude those actions that require the characteristics of God 
(omniscience, omnipotence etc.). These actions include just judgement, 
punishment and violence. The second limitation is less about excluding certain 
actions and more about an acknowledgement that present efforts to “be as God 
is” are only partial. The pursuit of embrace is not excluded on the grounds that 
human beings are sinful, but it is a practice that cannot be perfected or 
completed due to the limits of the present state of humanity. 
In limiting the ways in which we can draw analogies from the triune life to 
creaturely and historically appropriate ways, Volf suggests that direct analogies 
of practice are inappropriate. Instead a broader understanding of who we are 
(as created in the image of the triune God) informs what we do.  This suggests 
that we are made to be as God is - not to do as God does. We are to draw 
analogies from God’s way of being, not God’s doing. Since he is not as we are 
in the sense of creatureliness and historical situatedness he has abilities which 
we do not have and cannot and should not seek to replicate. God can do as we 
cannot. But God is as we can be. In the triune engagement with the world at the 
crucifixion Christ does not impart divinity to human beings but instead calls 
them to enter the Trinitarian mode of life.  
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This idea is successful in that it refuses to view the revelation of God from a 
distance and to abstract from revelation in order to draw relevance for human 
life from the God who is revealed. Instead Volf’s theology of embrace suggests 
that human beings are called to live within the revelation of God and that in 
doing so they begin to correspond to God. His understanding of analogy is 
concurrent with his understanding of revelation in that it is the ‘character of the 
divine actors’ which shapes the analogies drawn.505 It is this understanding of 
revelation and analogy which will shape the characteristics of human justice 
drawn from the Trinity as proposed in section 4. 
This idea of entrance into the Trinitarian mode of life is potentially problematic. 
In emphasising the human entrance into the divine life of the Trinity, Volf goes 
so far as to beg the question in what sense the Trinitarian communion remains 
distinct from the broader communion which now involves Father, Son, Spirit and 
all humanity. Whilst Volf stresses personhood to a sufficient degree that 
prevents a dilution of the divine persons, in what sense does a Godhead remain 
when all humanity has entered into the communion which binds the three divine 
persons? Can there be a communion within communion? If so then what are 
the boundaries of communion beyond which human beings are not called?  
Volf writes that ‘It is a different sort of communion than communion among 
divine persons. Still, it is a communion across the chasm that divides humanity 
from divinity.’506 This relates to the problem of Moltmann and his subsumption of 
creation into God which is critiqued rigorously by Molnar and others as 
panentheistic. (And also perhaps to the broader problem from Hegel and his 
subsumption of everything into the spirit.507) However, it seems that for Volf 
such sidestepping is even more problematic since the central point of his 
theology of embrace is precisely built upon the notion of Trinitarian embrace 
and of human beings’ entrance into that embrace. Whilst it is clearly acceptable 
for theologians to designate aspects of the Trinity (or indeed the whole of the 
Trinity) as unknowable, to base a human theology of practice upon an element 
of the Trinity which causes such problems would seem to weaken Volf’s 
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theology considerably. If the human communion must be different from the 
divine communion (in order to avoid human beings essentially becoming divine) 
in what sense is it like the divine communion? If the relationship is all that 
constitutes the oneness of the Trinity, then in entering into relationship we enter 
into the Trinity and the Trinity is thus no longer triune but multiple. If we do not 
enter into the Trinity, then we must be in a different sort or category of 
relationship and thus reflection on the immanent Triune relationship is not of 
consequence - since it is not that sort of relationship that we enter. Again, Volf’s 
parameters of creatureliness and historical situatedness are helpful here. 
Using these parameters it is possible to understand Volf’s point that human 
beings are called into the communion that is different from that of the three 
persons of the Godhead. The difference is in type, not degree. Creatures are 
still creatures. Their difference from God remains and is perfected, appreciated 
and celebrated. In this sense they cannot but have a ‘different sort of 
communion’ because they are a different sort of being. Again, this reflects a 
meeting of sameness and difference. The difference of the creature is not 
eradicated on entry into the communion yet there is a oneness (or sameness) 
with God in the communion. 
 
 
Section 3: Justice within the Trinity 
 
Having set the scene in terms of Volf’s theology of the Trinity and the key issues 
he addresses, this section of the chapter will seek to be more constructive. I will 
argue that, using the parameters set out by Volf to determine the limits and 
possibilities of engagement between the doctrine of the Trinity and human 
practice, it is possible to push towards a consideration of justice in light of the 
Trinity. This is not something that Volf fully explores. I will take his model of 
engagement and seek to apply it in a new direction. In particular I want to pose 
the potentially controversial question of whether justice might exist within the 
triune relationship itself.  
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I will argue that there is justice within the Trinity. Drawing on Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, I will suggest that it is a state of justice between the persons of the 
Trinity. If we can make this claim we can follow on to question how this state of 
justice might serve as a fruitful focal point for further reflection on the aims and 
purposes of human justice. 
I will suggest that reflection on Trinitarian justice is important because it 
provides a deeply theological grounding for an account of justice centred on 
restoration of relationships. It moves us beyond a focus on just actions towards 
an idea of just living. It informs our understanding of eschatological justice and 
thus fleshes out that towards which current justice practices should be 
orientated.508 
 
3.1 Is there Justice within the Trinity?  
 
The idea of justice within the Trinity is perhaps a controversial one. There is not 
a great deal written about it. Nicholas Wolterstorff’s chapter on the subject 
(within a volume edited by Volf) notes that ‘Most Christians, ancient, medieval 
and modern, but especially modern, if they heard of the topic justice in the 
Trinity would regard thinking and writing about it as appalling. How dare one 
even think of justice in the Trinity? Love is what resides within the Trinity. Love 
casts out justice.’509 Such an aversion to the idea of justice within the Trinity is 
based upon an understanding of justice as primarily corrective, about ‘meting 
out justice’ or ‘rendering judgement’.510 In this sense of course there is no 
justice within the Trinity because there is not wrongdoing. Yet even Volf, who 
rejects these types of emphasis in justice discourse, does not speak of justice 
within the Trinity. I am moving beyond Volf in this section. 
                                            
508
 This idea of practices orientated towards eschatological reality is explored in section 4.1 
509
 Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Is there Justice in the Trinity?’ in ed. Miroslav Volf and Michael 
Welker, God’s Life in Trinity, Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 2006, 177. 
510
 Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Is there Justice in the Trinity?’ 177. 
186 
 
 
Whilst this idea of justice as corrective of injustice tends to dominate, and for 
good reason, here I will argue that it is not the whole of justice and that it is 
actually only the secondary element of all that the umbrella term ‘justice’ refers 
to. I want to reject the idea that ‘justice has room only when love breaks down’, 
and instead look at another side of justice, justice as a state of being which 
precedes transgressions (or exists after transgressions have been finally dealt 
with).511 It is a justice which can only be found within the Trinity and which might 
be defined as perfect giving and receiving. 
 
3.1a Love and Justice 
In examining the potentially problematic relationship between love and justice, 
which is particularly pertinent here because of the definition I want to give to 
justice, I want to push forward with two lines of argument. Firstly I want to 
demonstrate that it is reasonable to read Volf’s work in Exclusion and Embrace 
as offering the basis for an understanding of justice existing within the Trinity 
due to the close assimilation of love, embrace and justice. Secondly, in 
suggesting the possibility of this reading, it becomes apparent that the close 
connection of love and justice means that if we are to ground an understanding 
of justice in the Trinity (as I will do in section 4) this justice will be shaped by 
and emerge from the life of the Trinity which is love. 
There are two potential problems with the definition given above of justice as 
perfect giving and receiving. Firstly it might sound too much like love. Whilst 
perfect love is required to enact perfect justice, love is more than justice 
alone.512  Justice may therefore be a part of love and in this sense inseparable 
from love but it is distinct from love in that it is not the whole of love.  
This indistinction or blurring of boundaries may be problematic for some. 
However, if justice is to be centred on the life and character of God it would 
seem odd if we could pull each characteristic apart and define it individually. 
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Karl Barth’s work on God’s perfections is helpful on this point. He writes that 
‘every distinction in God can be affirmed only in such a way as implies at the 
same time His unity and therefore the lack of essential discrepancy in what is 
distinguished. Our doctrine means therefore that every individual perfection in 
God is nothing but God Himself and therefore nothing but every other divine 
perfection….each individual perfection is identical with every other and with the 
fullness of them all.’513 The reason Barth gives for maintaining such a unity of 
God’s perfections is in order to reflect and maintain the unity of Godself.  
As has already been noted, Volf is critical of what he sees as Barth’s 
overemphasis on oneness at the expense of the individual persons of the 
Trinity. Yet it is possible to take Barth’s comments on the essential oneness of 
the attributes of God within the context of Volf’s more social reading of the 
Trinity. Indeed Terry Cross notes that Barth’s understanding of ‘the relations of 
the perfections is described in a manner similar to that which Barth uses in 
discussing perichoresis of the Trinity…. God’s perfections do not exist side by 
side in sentinel-like rows, but rather within and throughout each other.’514 If the 
unity of the perfections lies within the perichoresis (or mutual self-giving as Volf 
would render it) of the Trinity then this seems an appropriate understanding to 
take to Volf’s conception of the Trinity and the way in which he sees the 
embrace of the Trinity as love and justice as contained within this love. The 
overlap in definition of love and justice can therefore be seen as appropriate 
without making the term justice meaningless. It is a justice which can exist only 
where there is perfect love, but which nevertheless is distinctive.  
This problem of definition between love and justice is perhaps a more general 
problem of justice being defined by its good. If we want to talk about justice as a 
state of affairs rather than a process to achieve that good it is always going to 
be to difficult to define justice apart from the good. For example where the good 
of justice is equality and perfect equality exists we might say there is a state of 
justice. It might therefore be possible to argue that the good of justice will 
inevitably define justice (Volf briefly refers to the reconciling embrace of the 
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triune God as the good of justice) and that if we want to talk about a state of 
justice then it will always be difficult to define this apart from the good to which it 
refers (in this case the loving embrace of the Trinity).515   
On this first point then, that justice sounds a lot like love, there are good 
theological reasons for this. God is love and God defines the content and the 
good of justice. That justice should be understood as subsumed into love is 
therefore unsurprising. This does not exclude the idea that justice can be a 
distinct part of the triune life of love. 
The second problem identified is that this definition might not sound enough like 
justice. It may appear to stretch the language of justice too far. Subsequently 
Volf does come to a rejection of the ‘enlarged’ understanding of justice which I 
am proposing and which has roots in Exclusion and Embrace.516 Yet this 
rejection is unnecessary; the idea of a state of justice proposed by Wolterstorff 
and implicit in Exclusion and Embrace is not unfamiliar.517 Similarly, justice as a 
form of giving is not a new idea. The notion of justice as giving of dues 
(however those dues may be conceived) is widely held.518 In this thesis I simply 
want to enlarge the idea of justice as giving to include a sense of abundance. 
Following Volf in Exclusion and Embrace, I want to suggest that the justice of 
the triune God as revealed in Christ is a justice which gives human beings what 
they do not deserve, what they are not due.519 This is because, following the 
argument made above, divine justice is bound up with God’s grace. The ‘giving’ 
that is justice is not bound by what is owed but is shaped by grace. Thus the 
definition of justice required to make the step from God as doing justice to 
justice as existing within the Trinity is not such a complete departure from 
common understandings of the term justice as to make the use of the term 
questionable. It is instead an expansion (or enlarging) of the term justice which 
retains much of what we know justice to be, but reshapes the terminology in 
light of the justice of the Trinity. 
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In this chapter rather than defining the language of justice anew, I will simply 
seek to centre all that the term justice encompasses around this idea of justice 
as a state of being rather than justice as corrective action (or judgement). In 
focusing on this idea of a state of justice and locating it within the Trinity I will be 
attempting to clarify and move forward from Volf’s own work on the subject of 
justice. Whilst his work certainly offers an enlarged view of justice, bound up in 
love, he does not draw out the full implications of his position or fully explicate 
the relationship between justice and the Trinity. 
Wolterstorff’s work seems a helpful starting point for tackling this subject since 
he brings clarity to subject areas that Volf seems to overlook. Wolterstorff 
designates these different types of justice — justice that precedes transgression 
and justice which responds to injustice, as primary and secondary justice.520 
Secondary justice is the justice that seeks to right injustices which have 
occurred. It involves judgement and the naming of injustices as unjust. In doing 
so secondary justice implies that there was a state of affairs which could have 
occurred and which would have been just. That is, secondary justice points to a 
state of affairs where judgement would have been unnecessary;it points 
towards a state of perfect justice. It is this justice that Wolterstorff calls primary 
justice and it is this primary justice that we see in the Trinity.521  
Wolterstorff writes:  
‘Suppose the judge determines that the accused …acted unjustly 
toward someone and committed an infraction of justice. To declare 
that the accused treated someone unjustly is to imply that there 
was a way of treating the victim that would not have been unjust, a 
way of treating the victim which would not have been an infraction 
of justice. There was a way of treating the victim that would have 
been just. Let us call such justice primary justice. The justice that 
consists of rendering just judgement is secondary justice, in the 
sense that it deals with infractions of primary justice, accusations of 
infraction, or disputes over what would be an infraction….If there is 
justice in the Trinity it will be primary justice….so too if there is 
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justice in the eschaton, and in this present age as it was meant to 
be, it will be primary justice.’522  
 
It is clear from this description that primary justice and secondary justice are 
inextricably linked and that secondary justice must rest on a foundational 
understanding of the primary justice that it is constantly pointing towards. In this 
sense then a turn to look at justice within the Trinity is not a turn away from the 
type of justice we encounter daily in a fallen world. Instead the secondary 
justice we are familiar with can only be properly understood in relation to 
primary justice, the perfect state of justice found within the Trinity. 
A similar idea of primary and secondary (or first and second) does appear in 
Volf’s writing. In ‘“The Trinity is Our Social Program”’ in the context of divine 
love and human practices of love, he writes of two loves. ‘The first is the perfect 
love of the world to come; the second is that same love engaged in the 
transformation of the deeply flawed world that is.’523 He goes on to question the 
relationship of the two deciding that they are not identical, although they are 
“the same”.524 The difference comes in that the second love is ‘reactive’ to the 
antithesis of love in the world.525 It must reckon with the opposition to love which 
it encounters.526 This idea appears to resonate with Wolterstorff’s idea of 
primary and secondary justice, where secondary justice is that which must deal 
with the reality of injustice in the world, although in essence it remains the same 
as primary justice. 
Whilst Wolterstorff did not have Volf’s work in view when making such 
distinctions, they are nevertheless of unusual pertinence when approaching 
Volf, who does not tackle the subject nearly so clearly. Wolterstorff is unusual in 
touching on the subject so explicitly. Indeed it is unclear from Exclusion and 
Embrace whether he does in fact see justice as existing within the Trinity. This 
is partly due to the fact that Volf is not specifically concerned with the interior life 
of the Trinity in this text. However, the main problem is a lack of clarity due to a 
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constant merging, interchanging and subsuming of the terms love, embrace and 
justice with and into each other. He writes that ‘If you want justice and nothing 
but justice, you will inevitably get injustice. If you want justice without injustice, 
you must want love.’527 He also suggests that love overwhelms justice to the 
point that ‘it is indistinguishable from embrace’ and that ‘justice is outside of 
itself in love.’528  
Volf has since become aware of the overintegration of the term justice into love 
in this text and has subsequently indicated that he now sees justice as more 
distinct. In interview he commented that ‘I have shifted my thinking on justice, 
yes I think I have.... I did not conceptually provide sufficient space for justice 
qua justice. It was almost subsumed into love.’ 529 He cited his main influence in 
this shift as being Nicholas Wolterstorff. Indeed, Volf has followed Wolterstorff 
towards stressing justice as dues and as inclusive of human rights stating that 
‘love is not opposed to justice, indeed you cannot pursue justice without love 
because love motivates for justice and human rights and it is not opposed in its 
content but it goes beyond justice. The gratuity and the gift character of love 
ought to be preserved as distinct from the demands of justice.’530 Most 
remarkable is that in Volf’s review of Nicholas Wolterstorff’s Justice: Rights and 
Wrongs Volf praises Wolterstorff for having ‘gotten justice right’ but then goes 
on to make ‘mild criticisms’ which seem to return to a much greater emphasis 
on the integration of love and benevolence with justice than Wolterstorff puts 
across.531 Yet again the little Volf has written on this subject lacks clarity and it is 
not a direction I wish to pursue. Rather than rejecting the notion of justice 
touched upon in Exclusion and Embrace I think there is much to build upon 
whilst taking on board Volf’s critique of his own previous work that it lacks 
distinction in terminology. 
Therefore, whilst there is a lack of clarity in Exclusion and Embrace and it is 
possible to read this text as suggesting that love cancels out justice in the 
Trinity, I will suggest that this is not the most fruitful reading. In reading Volf’s 
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work in terms of justice within the Trinity I will be pushing at the boundaries of 
what he writes. However, this is precisely the purpose of my thesis, to build on 
Volf’s theology of embrace towards a clearer account of justice than he offers. 
So why might Volf’s theology in Exclusion and Embrace suggest the possibility 
of thinking about justice within the Trinity? Firstly it is perhaps important to note 
that where Volf touches on the subject in previous work he has tended to 
suggest a more conventional notion of justice, that is based upon dues and 
rights. In After Our Likeness he writes (drawing on Wolterstorff) that  
‘It would be utterly inappropriate to ascribe rights to the divine 
persons in an effort to ascribe them analogously to ecclesial 
persons as well. “Rights legitimate the social practice of claiming 
goods on moral grounds.” For the divine persons, however, such 
“practice of claiming goods” is inconceivable, since they live in 
perfect love; they are internal to one another as persons and 
mutually give everything to one another....These rights presuppose 
the possibility of persons being abused, and they are meaningless 
without this possibility. With regard to the divine persons, however, 
this presupposition is counterfactual.’532  
 
In one sense this seems to remove the possibility of talking about justice within 
the Trinity. Volf is right to note the impossibility of rights within the Trinity. 
However, it seems that his argument only removes the possibility of a particular 
conception of justice from the Trinity, a conception of justice focused on 
secondary justice, justice which addresses injustice where rights exist because 
needs go unmet. Similarly in Work in the Spirit brief references are made to 
human practices of justice in terms of law and rights.533 It is only in Exclusion 
and Embrace that the vision of justice beyond injustice emerges.534 It is only this 
type of justice (which Volf calls ‘perfect’ and which Wolterstorff calls ‘primary’) 
which might translate to the Trinity.  
It is a (temporary) experience of this perfect justice in the world which Volf’s 
reflections on Pentecost touch upon. He writes ‘Here, then, is the justice of 
Pentecost that is indistinguishable from embrace: All have their own needs met 
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and the deep desire of people to be themselves to act in their own right and yet 
to be understood and affirmed, is satisfied.’535 It seems appropriate to read this 
Pentecostal justice as a temporary state of justice. It is the Spirit inspiring each 
to give and receive. It is only once injustice is done that ‘justice had to come 
down from its ecstatic heights’ and judgement is required. It seems that 
Wolterstorff’s designations of primary and secondary justice fit this account. The 
brief experience of perfect justice through the Spirit gives way to the necessity 
of secondary justice as injustice breaks in. Yet this secondary justice is to be 
done ‘in the same Spirit of embrace’ as that experienced at Pentecost and with 
‘practical wisdom, not abstract calculation’ in order to ‘connect the vision of 
“justice that has become love” to the concrete situation of conflict.’536 This 
Pentecost experience suggests that for Volf perfect justice is a state of affairs of 
perfect giving and receiving inspired and enabled by the Spirit. It equates to 
embrace. Justice is not primarily, or only, about judgement. Judgement is that 
which is necessitated by injustice breaking into this state of justice which exists 
all too briefly at Pentecost.   
This experience of justice occurring at Pentecost signifies that human beings 
experience justice only when filled with the Spirit. In a sense through the Spirit 
they are experiencing the embrace of the Trinity and within that they find justice. 
It seems clear then that within the triune embrace human beings experience a 
state of justice. It seems reasonable to conclude, given the relationship of 
immanent and economic Trinity discussed in section 2, that this state of justice 
is also a part of the triune embrace apart from the world. 
The Pentecost reflections show that justice, for Volf, is not other than love. 
Justice does not exist where love is not but it is found in love, in embrace. He 
writes that ‘Justice will be done…in the embrace of the triune God.’537 And, ‘For 
only in our mutual embrace within the embrace of the triune God can 
we…experience perfect justice.’538 This containment of justice within love is 
potentially problematic in that it does not leave room for ‘justice qua justice’, and 
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the language here is of human experiences of justice, but it does suggest that in 
some sense, if the Trinity is love and the triune life is a life of embrace, there is 
also justice within the Trinity.539  
The state of justice experienced at Pentecost is similar to Volf’s vision of justice 
which appears to be an eschatological vision of a new world. It is a ‘world of 
perfect justice…. with no ‘legitimate entitlements’ because everything is given 
and nothing withheld.'540 Since Volf’s understanding of eschatological life is of 
human participation in the triune life, it is possible to conclude that this perfect 
justice is found within the life of the triune God.541  
There are some potential problems with my argument. Firstly, the Pentecost 
story (as narrated by Volf) uses the term ‘need’.542 If need is a necessary part of 
justice then can there be justice in the Trinity? Perhaps justice is only an 
element of human embrace and not of the triune embrace. Yet it is possible that 
this need is related to the still imperfect nature of the Pentecost justice. In a 
fallen world need exists where justice has not been fully enacted. Need is linked 
to secondary justice in that it exists where justice has not been fully realised. 
Need implies injustice which requires action. In a state of primary justice there is 
no need since as Volf’s vision of perfect justice (which I am equating to primary 
justice) states ‘everything is given and nothing is witheld’.543 The need that is 
fulfilled in Pentecost justice is the reminder that this is not the perfect or full 
experience of the primary justice of the Trinity: it is the closest, a fallen, pre-
eschatological world can get to primary justice. It is the justice of the Holy Spirit 
in the World and so it bears the marks of primary justice but does not have the 
fullness of justice of the Trinity in which need which springs from injustice not 
only does not, but never existed.  
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Secondly, Volf ends his vision of justice with the idea that justice is 
transcended. This may mean there is actually no justice in the Trinity or 
eschatologically since as soon as it is achieved it is not. If this is what Volf 
intends to say it seems problematic since it makes it unclear when or whether 
justice actually exists. However, we might also read into this statement that 
‘secondary’ or human justice is transcended and the primary, perfect justice of 
God takes over.  
As has been noted earlier in this chapter, Volf has also argued that ‘the Trinity 
should shape our social vision.’ It contains ‘the contours of the ultimate 
normative end to which all social programs should strive.’544 In this sense at 
least the end of justice is to be found within the Trinity. This is certainly an idea 
supported by Exclusion and Embrace.  However it does not necessarily imply 
that there is justice within the Trinity, merely that the triune life must shape a 
vision of justice.  
We can certainly take from Volf that the human pursuit of justice (Volf’s work 
suggests that human beings can’t achieve justice or act justly, but can only 
pursue justice) is rooted in the triune life. The problem of establishing whether 
Volf sees justice as existing within the Trinity seems largely semantic. Volf’s 
lack of clarity on the distinctions between embrace, love and justice mean it is 
impossible to be clear on what Volf thinks on this point.  It is clear that Volf 
believes that the goal of justice is embrace and that the two are essentially the 
same. If then embrace is the triune mode of life it seems reasonable to suggest 
that Volf’s theology can be read as suggesting the existence of perfect justice 
within the Trinity.  
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Section 4: Pursuing Triune Justice  
 
This thesis has made a movement from suggesting that justice is inherently 
connected to identity (chapter 1) towards suggesting that human identity should 
be rooted in an understanding of human beings as inescapably relational 
(chapter 2) and that justice is therefore also primarily concerned with 
relationships. Finally I have argued in this chapter (chapter 3) that human 
relationships are founded in the Trinity and that the Trinity is our primary source 
of justice.  
In section 3 of this chapter I have argued that justice exists within the Trinity. 
This final point is particularly important for what is to come. For if justice exists 
within the Trinity and is an intrinsic part of that triune life which Volf calls 
embrace, and (as was set out in section 2) analogies can be drawn between the 
triune life and human life, then it is the life of the Trinity which will inform our 
understanding of human justice. Human justice will be derived (carefully) from 
our knowledge of the triune life of embrace revealed to us primarily at Christ’s 
crucifixion.  
The first question at this juncture, then, is how we can come to an 
understanding of human justice which is founded in the triune life and, secondly, 
what that justice will look like. 
Some of the material needed to answer these questions has already been 
touched upon. In section 2, I raised Volf’s categories of creaturely and historical 
limitations which draw parameters around what types of analogies can be 
drawn between Trinity and humanity. In section 3, I suggested that the 
difference between triune justice and human justice can be understood in terms 
of primary or perfect justice (which exists within the Trinity) and earthly justice 
which deals with injustice and which we might call secondary or imperfect 
justice. Most importantly, I proposed that secondary justice must always be 
understood in light of, orientated towards and in pursuit of, the ultimate primary 
justice of the Trinity. Primary and secondary justice should be related to each 
other and share a certain “sameness” whilst also understanding their 
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difference.545 Volf notes that ‘the Trinitarian cycle of self-donation cannot be 
simply repeated in the world of sin; the engagement with that world entails a 
process of complex and difficult translation.’546 The same is true of triune 
justice. The task in this section is to carefully translate what we can know of the 
just life of the Trinity into meaningful practices in a world of sin.  
In order to proceed with the process of translation I will deal firstly with the 
question of how human justice can correspond to triune justice. I use Volf’s 
word translation here, but it is not meant in a technical sense of transposing 
from one directly onto another, rather that the contours of the triune justice will 
shape the character of human justice. As well as returning briefly to the areas 
noted above, I will also look to Volf’s notion of eschatological minimums and 
maximums. This part of Volf’s theology offers an understanding of continuity 
between human practice in a fallen world and the triune life which human 
beings are called to enter eschatologically. The three ideas of creaturely and 
historical limitations, primary and secondary justice and eschatological 
minimums and maximums can work together to provide clear parameters which 
begin to indicate the way in which human justice should be shaped, as well as 
precluding specific actions of (final) judgement and violence. 
To answer the second question (‘what will human justice modelled on triune 
justice look like?’) I will seek to draw on the parameters of translation set out in 
section 4.1. I will refer to the triune life of embrace (which brings about the 
triune state of justice) and will draw on it to propose corresponding 
characteristics of human justice.547 As I have argued throughout this thesis, 
drawing on Volf, a new ethical code of justice is not what is required to tackle 
problems of justice, particularly those encountered within the post-conflict 
context of Croatia and Bosnia. What is required is a way of orientating justice 
processes and practices towards the ultimate justice of the triune God. What I 
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will propose are therefore only characteristics which might be considered in any 
situation where justice needs to be pursued.   
In this section I will be following Volf in terms of the understanding of the triune 
way of life (embrace) which he sets out. I will also be synthesising strands of his 
work which set up parameters for progressing from an understanding of the 
Trinity to an understanding of human life and action. I will then be going further 
than Volf does in proposing my own understanding of specific characteristics of 
human justice which can be drawn from Volf’s theology of the Trinity within the 
various parameters he sets out. In this sense I hope that the conclusions I draw 
will show themselves to be firmly rooted in Volf’s theology, whilst going beyond 
it and thus show the potential of his theology for impact in the contexts of post-
conflict justice discussed earlier in the thesis.  
 
4.1 How should we pursue the Justice of the Trinity? 
 
In answer to the question ‘How should we pursue the justice of the Trinity?’ I 
want to propose that human beings should pursue it carefully, with 
acknowledgement of who they are and where they stand in relation to the 
Trinity. This involves acknowledging parameters within which human beings can 
seek to image the Trinity. Volf has noted that the life of the Trinity cannot be 
simply repeated in the world; it requires a process of translation.548 (This reflects 
his understanding of the relations of immanent and economic Trinity noted in 
section 2.1a.)  To begin the process of ‘translation’, moving from knowledge of 
the life of the Trinity that is revealed to humanity in salvation history, to human 
life and action we require an understanding of the ways in which Trinity and 
humanity are different and the ways in which they are the same - ultimately, the 
ways in which they are related both now and in the world to come.  
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The sense of difference is underlined primarily by Volf’s understanding of 
creaturely and historical limitations noted in section 2. Creaturely limitations in 
particular point towards the actions of justice which are permanently reserved 
for God. Historical limitations also mark difference, serving to remind us of the 
impossibility of perfect justice in the present and thus the need for temporary, 
imperfect human justice. Yet the impermanence of historical limitations also 
hints at a sense of sameness between the life and actions of the Trinity and the 
life and actions of humanity. The idea of eschatological minimums and 
maximums found in Volf’s work (an idea which ties in with the sense of primary 
and secondary justice found in section 3) takes this sense of sameness further 
by emphasising the continuity between historically limited actions and the 
unlimited life of the Trinity and the world to come. It is a concept which 
illustrates how present (secondary, imperfect, historically limited) justice and 
future (primary, perfect or eschatological) justice should relate to one another. 
 
4.1a  ‘Being as God Is’ 
In section 2.2 I noted Volf’s assertion that human beings are called to live as 
God lives rather than to do as God does.549 In making this point, Volf draws us 
towards reflection on the character of God revealed in God’s actions in the 
world as that which human beings are called to image, rather than a focus on 
the acts of God as pure actions. This builds on Volf’s understanding of God’s 
acts of revelation as revealing the ‘character of each actor in the drama of 
divine self-revelation and their relations’.550 The actions are important, but their 
importance comes in that they are shaped by and reveal the character of God. 
This view contrasts, for example, with Barth who prioritises God’s freedom in 
God’s self-revelation and thus inserts a greater sense of distance between 
God’s character and God’s actions in the world.551  
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It is the character of God’s actions which reveal Godself to us. I want to assert 
in this section that creaturely limitations in particular mean that justice should be 
shaped by the character of God rather than the actions of God. Of course God’s 
character and actions are not two separate entities; that is a view which Volf’s 
understanding of revelation rejects. Nevertheless, for clarity this slightly 
dichotomous language is helpful here in differentiating the content of God’s 
actions (for example death of God incarnate on a cross) which I will label 
‘actions’ and the character of God’s actions (self-giving love) which I will label 
‘character’.  
Volf writes that ‘the nature of God fundamentally determines the character of 
the Christian life’ but also that ‘we cannot simply proceed from the divine to the 
human, saying “This is how God is; therefore, this is how humans should 
be.”’552 The process of translation from Trinity to humanity and the exploration 
of how that translation should occur in itself illuminates the characteristics of 
justice. To begin with it demonstrates that human justice founded in the Trinity 
will seek to reflect God through the character of the human pursuit of justice, 
rather than by direct correlation between God’s acts of justice and human 
actions.  
Volf is clear that appropriate correspondences between human beings and God 
can and should be drawn. He notes that revelation and scripture show that 
human beings are created in God’s image and called to be like God.553 Yet Volf 
also asserts that it is correspondence and analogous likeness which is called 
for, not sameness or complete identity of created and creator. In addition he 
reiterates the problem of projection and analogy which means that ‘human 
notions of the triune God do not correspond exactly to who the Triune God is, 
Trinitarian concepts such as “person”, “relation”, or “perichoresis” can be 
applied to human community only in an analogous rather than a univocal 
sense.’554 This demonstrates that as well as the acknowledgement of 
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created/creature difference, Volf is aware of the related issue of incomplete and 
misconceived knowledge of the very concepts we use to talk about God.555  
The idea of creaturely limitations is perhaps the most important consideration in 
limiting and defining human actions of justice. Creaturely limitations are 
permanent limits of human abilities. They more often require human beings to 
actively limit their own desire to overstep creaturely boundaries and instead to 
recognise the permanence of human non-divinity and difference from the 
absolute divinity of the triune God (for example lack of omniscience and 
omnipotence may mean restraint from attempts at final judgement or just 
violence).556 Volf notes that this limitation on correspondence requires that 
‘human beings should not succumb to the pathetic and self-destructive 
temptation to jump over their own shadows.’557 This limitation suggests that 
understanding justice must begin with an understanding of human 
creatureliness and non-divinity. The recognition of human limitations of justice 
may even require faith, a proposition which reflects Barth’s thought. He writes 
that ‘faith is acknowledgement of our limit and acknowledgement of the mystery 
of God’s Word’.558 Certainly Volf has this in mind, although a lack of faith is not 
necessarily prohibitive to the pursuit of justice as I will suggest in the following 
section.559 
I have noted above a key idea in Volf’s theology which informs how we might 
begin to understand the justice of the Trinity in creaturely terms, that is, Volf’s 
assertion that human beings are called to live as God lives rather than to do as 
God does.560 In terms of justice this notion suggests that we need to look 
beyond a simple reflection on God’s actions of judgement in the world and 
instead seek to understand the ways in which the triune life is a life of justice. 
As we have seen, for Volf this triune life is known through God’s revelation of 
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himself in the world. The possibilities for creatures to ‘be as God is’561 lie largely 
in the character of God which is revealed rather than through particular actions.  
A good example of this idea of imaging the character revealed rather than the 
action itself is found in Volf’s understanding of human giving (which is a 
significant part of the enlarged justice I am proposing). Volf argues that creation 
demonstrates that God gives freely ‘when the plenitude of divine love turns 
away from itself towards the nothingness of nobeing.’562 It seems clear that 
God’s creation ex nihilo is not what we are called to imitate since the action is 
not predicated on creaturely abilities but on divine ones. Instead, Volf focuses 
on the fact that ‘since God gives freely, we should too.’563 He cites the free 
giving of financial assistance advocated in 2 Corinthians 9:5 as an example of 
the type of giving which might image the giving of the Trinity in this case. It is 
the character of the giving (being freely given) which makes it godly not the 
content of the action (financial donation). It is this character of God’s giving 
which is appropriate for creatures to correspond to. It is not a call for creatures 
to attempt to take on the divine role of creation from nothing, a project doomed 
to failure. For Volf this way of creaturely correspondence to the Trinity both 
draws human beings into Godself and the triune life and is possible only 
because of God, not because of innate human abilities or resources.564 Perhaps 
we can say that appropriate creaturely correspondences to God are the 
reciprocal response required to participate in the triune way of life. However, 
such reciprocation is only possible because of the initial giving of the triune 
God. 
Here I have focused on creaturely limitations. Before turning to consider how 
human beings can enter into the imaging of the Trinity, it is important to note the 
role of historical limitations. Historical limitations differ from creaturely limitations 
in that they can be seen as largely imposed by a sinful and fallen world. 
Historical limitations tend to be limits which we naturally encounter (such as the 
reality of injustice in a fallen world) and are often limitations which should be 
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recognised, but which should be striven against. Volf suggests that ‘any 
correspondences other than historically appropriate ones would be misplaced, 
not because human beings should put up with evil, but because the struggle 
against it will be effective only if we recognize the depth of its entrenchment is in 
persons, communities and structures.’565 This limitation suggests a check is 
needed on any pursuit of triune justice or eschatological life which fails to take 
account of the realty of a fallen world. It links with the concept of eschatological 
minimums and maximums which Volf proposes and which I will turn to in 
section 4.1b. This idea seeks to find a balance between taking account of 
historical limitations whist maintaining a movement towards the triune life and 
the world to come. 
 
4.1ai The Role of the Spirit  
It is at this juncture that the role of the Spirit is of particular importance. We 
have noted the limitations of correspondence and that correspondence to the 
Trinity comes in the form of character likeness rather than likeness of attributes 
and actions. Here it is important to note how human beings can image the triune 
character. Volf is clear that it is through the power of the Spirit that this imaging 
is possible. In After Our Likeness Volf notes that ‘Trinitarian relations can serve 
as a model for the institutions of the church because the triune God is present in 
the church through the Holy Spirit, shaping the church in the image of the 
Trinity.’566 Without this the command to ‘Be as God Is’ becomes oppressive.567 
He also writes  
‘Human beings receive themselves as created in the image of the 
Trinity by the power of the Spirit. Their imaging of the Trinity is the 
gift of God’s movement out of the circumference of the Trinitarian 
life to create human beings and, after they have sinned, to restore 
them by dwelling within them and taking them into the perfect 
communion of love which God is.... [O]ur human tasks are not first 
of all to do as God does – and certainly not to make ourselves as 
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God is – but to let ourselves be indwelled by God and to celebrate 
what God has done, is doing, and will do.’568 
 
In this sense then the idea that human beings can correspond to the 
Trinity becomes less surprising since this is possible because human 
beings can be indwelled by the very same Trinity, not through their own 
abilities or self-improvement. This means that, in imaging the Trinity, 
human beings are essentially passing on only that which has been shared 
with them. This suggests that the embrace of the Trinity is both the means 
by which human beings image God and the way in which human beings 
image God. Yet human beings can image God’s justice only in so far as 
they have received it in the triune embrace. Thus the contours of human 
justice which seeks to image the justice of the Trinity will be shaped by 
embrace. 
The content of justice is therefore also the means by which justice can be 
pursued. The will to pursue justice is also tied up with the indwelling of the 
triune God. Volf writes that the human will to image God comes from the Spirit: 
‘God does not first and foremost command human beings to work, 
but empowers and gifts them for work. They work not primarily 
because it is their duty to work, but because they experience the 
inspiration and enabling of God’s Spirit and can do the will of God 
“from the heart”.’569  
 
If both the will to image triune justice and the contours of triune justice require 
the indwelling of the Spirit it seems that the possibilities for the type of justice 
founded in the Trinity which I am proposing are limited to those who accept the 
embrace of the triune God. Yet Volf’s understanding of the role of the Spirit is 
not limited to Christians. In Work in the Spirit, Volf explores the ways in which 
human pursuit of the eschatological life and, ultimately, correspondence to the 
Trinity, is dependent on the work of the Spirit in creation at large and in 
individuals in particular. In this text Volf’s understanding of the Spirit at work in 
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the world includes the Spirit at work in non-believers as well as believers. He 
writes that  
‘if we affirm that Christ is Lord of all humanity – indeed of the whole 
universe and not only of those who profess him as Lord, and that 
he rules through the power of the Spirit, then we must also assume 
that the Spirit of God is active in some way in all people.... There is 
an important sense in which all human work is done “in the power 
of the Spirit.”’570  
He goes on to note that the differences in the work of the Spirit come in the 
reception rather than the purposes or means for which and by which the Spirit 
works. In this sense both Christians and non-Christians can image the Trinity 
and pursue triune justice through the same Spirit even if they are unaware that 
that is what they are doing.571 
 
4.1aii The Preclusion of Final Judgement and Violence572 
It is useful to turn now to examine the attempts at correspondence which Volf 
precludes and the practices of justice which are therefore not appropriate for 
creatures. These practices might be understood under the heading ‘do as God 
does’ and stand clearly counter to the maxim ‘live as God lives’. Volf is clear in 
Exclusion and Embrace that, whilst God also reveals himself as the ‘rider on the 
white horse’, the bringer of violent judgement, this is not a way in which human 
beings should attempt to image God. Here the language is less about 
correspondence to the Trinity and has a more practical slant. Volf emphasises 
that human beings do not have the capacity to implement final judgements and 
violence without a descent into injustice and prioritising the self over the other. 
This can be understood within the context of the call to embrace the other as 
paramount - and violence is incompatible with this. In this sense then the idea of 
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correspondence to the Trinity is still implicit since it is the call to live as God 
lives (the life of embrace) which both precedes and defines action. Furthermore 
there are implicit references to the fact that (final) judgements are reserved for 
God and prohibited for humans because of creaturely difference. Volf reiterates 
that ‘humans are not God. There is a duty prior to the duty of imitating God, and 
that is the duty of not wanting to be God, of letting God be God and humans be 
humans.’573 
Volf’s refusal to see final judgement and violence as within the proper remit of 
creaturely correspondence to the Trinity might appear to rely on an arbitrary 
interpretative distinction between the actions of God and the character of God.  
Certainly in Exclusion and Embrace where the technicalities of his Trinitarian 
position are not dealt with, this can appear to be the case. The exclusion of final 
judgements and violence appear to be made on pragmatic grounds. ‘The only 
way in which nonviolence and forgiveness will be possible in a world of violence 
is through displacement or transference of violence [to God].’574 This 
pragmatism may be an understanding of the historical limitations. Yet with the 
wider context of Volf’s theology of the Trinity in view it is also possible to see his 
parameters of analogy at work. Firstly, the pragmatism relates to contending 
with the historical limitations of a fallen world. Volf suggests that human beings’ 
sinfulness means that we are unable to be violent rightly.575 The act of final 
judgement is shown to be predicated on God’s ability to be perfectly partial in 
his judgements. ‘God sees each human being concretely.... God notes not only 
their common humanity, but also their specific histories, their particular 
psychological, social, and embodied selves with their specific needs.576  The 
actions, we are unable to mirror; the character, we are. However, reflecting on 
the parameters set out above and the Spirit’s role in the very ability of creatures 
to image the creator then the reason for the distinction appears less arbitrary. 
Volf’s understanding of creaturely limitations has already suggested that the 
character of triune justice rather than the actions of triune justice are to be 
imaged. Final judgements and violence require divine attributes which are not 
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shared with creatures, they are not gifts of God shared with human beings in 
the embrace of God. In addition, in a fallen world human beings are unable to 
control the impact of final judgements and violence. For each of these reasons, 
these are not a part of the human pursuit of justice.  
This section has demonstrated that in terms of justice the creaturely and 
historical limitations mean that human attempts at justice are limited. They also 
suggest that justice practices should seek to image the triune character, rather 
than the actions of God which are predicated on literally infinite abilities. Volf 
reinforces this message, specifically precluding judgement and violence. Both of 
these ideas are reinforced by the means by which human beings are able to 
image the Trinity, that is through the opening of the triune embrace to the world 
and the invitation to participate in it through the Spirit. Human beings can only 
give that which they have received and the justice which is offered to the world 
on the cross is the justice of embrace, thus it is only the justice of embrace 
which we can offer to each other, as the gift of God. It has also been important 
to note that the failure to respond or receive the justice of God does not mean 
that the Spirit of God is unable to work, thus leaving open an important avenue 
by which the justice of the Trinity, the justice of embrace, can be seen to have 
implications beyond the Christian community. 
 
4.1b Historical Minimum and Eschatological Maximum 
 I turn now to the question of historical minimums and eschatological 
maximums, an area of Volf’s theology which works in a similar way to creaturely 
and historical limitations, in setting out parameters for understanding the 
possibilities of human action which seeks to image the Trinity. In particular it 
seems to be an extension of the idea of historical limitations. 
Volf briefly uses the language of ‘historical minimum’ and ‘eschatological 
maximum’ in his After Our Likeness.577 This language can be hugely useful in 
indicating why justice should extend beyond the law, rights or philosophical 
notions centred on distribution of dues. It potentially supports my argument that 
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present understandings and practices of justice should be orientated towards an 
enlarged sense of justice founded in the Trinity. Here the language used helps 
to marry the idea of justice within the Trinity with the eschatological participation 
of human beings within the life of the Trinity and thus their eventual participation 
in the triune justice. The language also goes some way to suggesting the way in 
which a vision of justice founded in the Trinity might be pursued in practice.  
The language of historical minimum and eschatological maximum suggests that 
human life has in some senses two measures of action. Its appearance in After 
Our Likeness is similar to the related language of 'ethical minimum’ and ‘ethical 
maximum’ in the context of eschatology in Work in the Spirit.578 The same idea 
can be read implicitly in Exclusion and Embrace where eschatological vision 
informs present action.579 In After Our Likeness the language appears within the 
context of a discussion of human correspondence to the Trinity and is almost 
interchangeable with the idea of minimum and maximum correspondence of 
human life and action with the life and action of the Trinity. The language is also 
strongly related to the understanding of analogies between God and human 
beings who are limited by their permanent creatureliness and by their 
impermanent place within history. The language of minimum and maximum 
helps to explain the relationship between the reality of human historical 
limitations and the eventual overcoming of these limitations in the participation 
of human beings in the eschatological life of the Trinity. It is a step on from the 
issue of analogy in that Volf’s use of this terminology helps to tackle the 
question of how correspondence to the Trinity can be understood as concrete 
practices.580  
Volf writes that there is an  
‘inner dynamic between historical minimum and eschatological 
maximum....If the church remains at a statically understood 
minimum of correspondence to the Trinity, it misses possibilities 
God has given it along with its being; if by contrast it reaches for a 
statically understood maximum, it risks missing its historical reality, 
                                            
578
 Volf, Work in the Spirit,82f 
579
 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace, 165 for example. 
580
 Volf, After Our Likeness, 200 
209 
 
and certainly if it claims to realize this maximum, its self-
understanding turns into ideology.’581  
 
The key point for this discussion is that historical minimums stand in dynamic 
relationship with and should be understood in light of eschatological maximums. 
It indicates that the justice of the Trinity as discussed above (section 3.1) is not 
offered as a command to be fulfilled in the present but is that which constitutes 
the eschatological reality of human life. It is in this sense that the triune justice 
which constitutes eschatological justice informs human practice, as it becomes 
that towards which all presently historically limited practices (minimums) should 
be orientated.582 
In Volf’s Work in the Spirit he brings the language of love and justice into this 
context of minimums and maximums. He suggests a distinction between justice 
and love which seems to associate the former with the historical minimum and 
the latter as the eschatological maximum.583 It is not the same as his position in 
Exclusion and Embrace which sees a much stronger and inseparable 
relationship between justice and love.584 This seems to go against the larger 
point of his argument which is for a great sense of continuity between present 
action and future reality. Volf’s eschatology is one of transformation rather than 
annihilation.585 The separation of justice and love in Work in the Spirit means 
that there must at some point be a disconnection between historical (or in this 
case ethical) minimum and eschatological maximum. In Exclusion and Embrace 
the sense of continuity is greater, with Volf stating that ‘justice will be done to 
them when they find themselves reconciled with us in the embrace of the triune 
God.’586 This statement potentially supports the idea of a state of eschatological 
justice found in the Trinity. It is closer to suggesting a primary justice of the type 
I have argued for above (section 3). Volf’s notion of justice bound with love in 
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Exclusion and Embrace appears to fit with his eschatological theology more 
closely and is the basis upon which I seek to build my own proposal. 
Nevertheless this earlier text (Work in the Spirit) is helpful in setting out the 
parameters of human action. Volf writes that ‘All responsible Christian 
behaviour has to satisfy the ethical minimum and, inspired by the sacrificial love 
of Christ demonstrated on the cross and guided by the vision of the new 
creation, move towards the ethical maximum. The ethical minimum is the 
criterion for structuring the world of work, and the ethical maximum the 
necessary regulative ideal.’587  This has perhaps the strongest and widest 
practical implications of all Volf’s work. The language of ‘ethical’ perhaps 
demonstrates Volf’s slightly more practice centred focus in this text. The idea 
remains the same throughout his work, however: that is, present action is to be 
orientated in reference to eschatology (or ‘new creation’).588 It is helpful to see 
this idea situated in the context of work rather than the life of the Church since it 
demonstrates that this notion of minimum and maximum can be understood in 
terms of extra-ecclesial practices.  
 
4.1bi Eschatology and Trinity  
It is important to note here the strong correlation between what Volf alludes to 
as the eschatological life and the life of the Trinity. So far I have argued that 
justice practices should begin with a consideration of, and ultimately be derived 
from, the justice found in the Trinity. The language of eschatological maximums 
seems perhaps a tangent from this. However the close relationship between the 
Trinity and eschatology in Volf’s work means that any understanding of 
eschatological justice (or eschatological reality as a whole) is necessarily 
defined by triune justice (or the life of the Trinity). In many ways for Volf, as for 
Moltmann, eschatology is the Trinity, or at least is defined by it since it is human 
participation in the life of the Trinity (or for Volf the embrace of the Trinity). 
Moltmann describes ‘the eschatological kingdom of glory in which people will 
finally, wholly and completely be gathered into the eternal life of the triune 
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God.’589 Volf similarly defines the new creation as ‘the mutual indwelling of the 
triune God and his glorified people in a new heaven and a new earth’ and as ‘a 
totality in which God, his entire people, and the entire cosmos will constitute a 
differentiated unity, a communion, such that the triune God will be “all in all”’.590   
Eschatology and the Trinity are closely bound in Volf’s work as in Moltmann’s. 
The third designation of the Trinity as the ‘Trinity in glory’ is language proposed 
by Moltmann and used on occasion by Volf.591 It particularly illustrates the way 
in which eschatology and Trinity are linked in that the eschatological life of 
creation constitutes life in the Trinity. It is creation swept up into and perfected 
by, and fully participating in, the perichoretic life of the triune God. It is therefore 
possible to read this language of minimum and maximum as also about 
minimum and maximum correspondence to the Trinity. Certainly we could read 
the eschatological maximum as defined by the triune life (as set out above) and 
the eventual participation of human life in that. It is the eschatological maximum 
which is the fixed and permanent measure of justice. The historical minimum is 
only ever temporary and thus could not be held up as finally definitive of justice.  
Volf is clear that new creation/eschatological reality is that which provides 
‘universally valid normative principles’.592 These are then to be interpreted 
within given historical contexts. In this way then justice is firstly defined by the 
eschatological life, which is human participation in the life of the Trinity. It is 
secondarily understood in concrete practices within historical contexts. It is the 
future reality of perfect justice which precedes and defines present practices. In 
this sense individual practices cannot claim to be good in and of themselves; it 
is their orientation towards and derivation from eschatological/triune norms 
which gives them value and legitimacy. 
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4.1bii Implications of Eschatological Minimum and Maximum in Practice 
The central question driving this chapter is ‘How can Volf’s theology of the 
Trinity contribute towards an understanding of justice which addresses the 
problems of post-conflict Bosnia and Croatia?’ This notion of minimum and 
maximum offers a helpful perspective on how the notion of justice within the 
Trinity which I have proposed can be understood in terms of concrete practices. 
The historical minimum in terms of justice might be understood as obeying the 
law, giving each their due, and the eschatological maximum as that which 
justice should be and will be, the perfect mutual giving and receiving of all 
things (which Volf calls embrace) in which human beings will participate in the 
Trinity. The best way to understand the eschatological maximum (or perfect 
justice) is to turn to the Trinity since the eschatological life is, for Volf, 
essentially life in the Trinity or ‘the community of love in the Triune God’.593  
In terms of post-conflict Bosnia and Croatia, this language might suggest that 
the historical minimum is the minimum requirements of the law and the 
provision of refugee rights or non-discriminatory employment practices. The 
ethical maximum would be the eschatological reality of that situation swept up 
into the communion of the Trinity. It is perhaps the right relationship of perfect 
giving and receiving of all things between war criminal and victim.  
To assist in drawing out the practical implications it is perhaps helpful to turn to 
Matthew 5, a text which Volf sees as offering insight into the ways in which the 
Trinity is to be imaged in the ‘deeply flawed world that is’.594The Sermon on the 
Mount might also help decipher what the minimum and maximum 
correspondences might look like. Matthew 5:21-48 can be read as expanding 
the historical minimum requirements ‘Do not murder, do not commit adultery, do 
not swear falsely’ with the commands not to be angry, not to look lustfully, not to 
swear at all. The passage seems continually to enlarge the demands or the 
vision of justice with the command to ‘Love your enemies and pray for those 
who persecute you’, and finally to ‘be perfect as your heavenly Father is 
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perfect’. Justice here is expanded from the minimum requirements of the law 
towards the just life of the Trinity. 
The passage might further be used to illustrate Volf’s notion of historical 
minimum (which here I am suggesting correlates with law) and eschatological 
maximum (the commands of Jesus). It demonstrates that the law is rightly 
understood as pointing towards these maximums as a way of life, not as an end 
in itself. In particular we see that the laws are not necessarily permanent goods 
in themselves (demonstrated by the temporary nature of some laws), but are 
good only as they are engaged with or point towards ways of orientating 
towards the maximum vision of the justice of the Trinity (in this passage the 
Father is the perfector of and the Son the fulfiller of justice).595 The justice 
revealed by and in Jesus is the fulfilment of the law rather than a separate 
justice. This sense of fulfilment demonstrates a continuity between historical 
minimum and the eschatological maximum embodied in Jesus.  The text ends 
with the point that these commands for just living should ultimately end in 
human beings corresponding to the perfections of their heavenly Father. In two 
senses then this text potentially points to a justice of the Trinity which is fulfilled 
and perfected in the Trinity rather than a justice which is ended. 
Volf’s references to the passage might support this reading. Firstly, he sees it 
as having an eschatological focus and uses it to support his eschatology of a 
transformed earth and an earthly location for God’s kingdom.596 Volf’s reference 
to Matthew 5 in Exclusion and Embrace places the passage in the context of 
Christ as the ‘ultimate example’ of his new commands in the crucifixion.597 If we 
read this alongside Volf’s understanding of the crucifixion as the ultimate action 
and revelation of the triune God it is possible to link these ideas together. That 
is that: the enlargement of justice spoken of in Matthew 5 is enacted in the 
revelatory act of the Trinity. If Christ crucified embodies the enlarged commands 
of justice, then the triune God is also the one who embodies this justice. If we 
follow the line of argument in section 1 of this chapter which demonstrates that 
Volf sees the revelation of the Trinity in the crucifixion, not as an external act of 
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God or a presentation of himself, but as the opening up of the Trinity to the 
world, then there are good grounds for linking the internal life of the Trinity 
opened up to the world with the enlarged sense of justice Jesus both speaks of 
and embodies. The crucifixion is the Trinity opening its embrace of mutual 
giving and receiving to the world, and what the Trinity gives is (in part) this 
enlarged justice. 
It is important to note the sense of continuity of historical reality with 
eschatological reality which Volf’s theology proposes and which is most clearly 
set out in this text. It supports my argument that any historical minimum 
practices of justice we propose must be orientated towards and consistent with 
the eschatological maximum and the reality of justice within the Trinity. If we 
follow Volf in supporting a sense of continuity between present reality and future 
hope, then present action must also be consistent with that future vision. It is 
only if we see a radical discontinuity between the fallen world and the new 
creation that we might be satisfied with or supportive of justice practices in the 
present which do not seek to draw closer to the justice of the Trinity in which 
creation hopes to participate.  
Taken into the context of justice I have suggested that the minimum 
correspondence is the law. Whilst legal processes and human efforts to account 
for justice in terms of rights or philosophical rules have a place in demonstrating 
the minimums of justice, to make this the primary or end focus of justice is to do 
as Volf says – that is to miss out on God given possibilities for more justice, 
better justice, or most accurately a justice which more closely corresponds with 
divine justice. Nevertheless, we must be aware of Volf’s warning too. That is, 
that if one ‘reaches for a statically understood maximum, it risks missing its 
historical reality and certainly, if it claims to realize this maximum, its self-
understanding turns into ideology.’598   
It is interesting to note here that Volf does apply this critique of eschatology 
becoming ideology in his comments on Daniel M. Bell Jnr’s work. He notes that 
Stanley Hauerwas and his students (including Bell) have come to overstate the 
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role of the Church, seeing it not only as community but as polis. Whilst Volf 
believes the state and Church will be united, ‘to unite them today is falsely to 
identify the present-day church with the eschatological reign of God.’599 Volf’s 
criticisms of the implications of this move are practical ones.600 The central 
problem, which these criticisms seem to address, is that when human beings 
overreach themselves in trying to bring about that which is not yet, there will be 
a sense of enforcement.  Volf writes that ‘Bell’s awfully pretentious 
church...threatens to make God dispensable because it has inserted God into 
the workings of its own “technology” and it wants to abolish everything (society, 
state and economy) but itself.’601 That which will be brought about through 
God’s grace is attempted through the imposition of a system - a step which in 
itself contradicts the very God it seeks to honour and image. The imposition of 
eschatological realities in the present tends even towards the violent identities 
discussed in chapter 2. 
Here my tendency is to emphasise the eschatological maximum as a way of 
understanding the end and content of justice. Yet earlier in the thesis I have 
fully recognised the historical reality of imperfect justice. Even so in this section 
I may be going slightly beyond what Volf would see to be a reasonable 
emphasis on the eschatological maximum. He himself rejects (using different 
language) his own emphasis on the eschatological maximum in Exclusion and 
Embrace- an emphasis upon which I am nevertheless building. Instead he 
reverts to talk of the ‘classic notion of justice’ remaining and being overridden by 
grace.602 This retraction appears to run entirely counter to the notion of 
historical and eschatological continuity which Volf advocates now, as before.  
Counter to Volf’s revised views, I propose that the eschatological emphasis can 
be maintained if the parameters outlined here are also kept in mind. Indeed I 
want to argue that a tendency towards emphasising the eschatological 
perspective is precisely what is needed in the context of concern here. 
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Following my arguments in earlier chapters, the problems of tackling justice in 
post-conflict Croatia and Bosnia appear to be bound up with a limited vision of 
justice centred on processes or, in Volf’s language, a historical minimum. My 
(over)emphasising an eschatological vision of justice is therefore a corrective. 
Certainly Volf’s critique of Bell illuminates the problems of this position, yet if 
Volf’s other parameters are adhered to and my proposals take shape as 
characteristics rather than systems, this should be avoided. Most important, is a 
constant emphasis on the temporary and imperfect nature of all human actions 
including those efforts to image the Trinity. There is a risk that the notion of 
enlarged justice I am proposing turns into an ideology, yet it seems clear that 
the real risk in the context of post-conflict justice is that, in efforts to reach the 
bare minimum requirements of justice, the transformational possibilities of 
justice are missed. 
To avoid the pitfall of a focus on triune justice (or the eschatological maximum) 
becoming an unhelpful ideology, I will propose a set of basic characteristics 
which might help translate the justice of the Trinity into human terms and which 
might shape the perspective of justice processes and practices without running 
the risk of setting down simply an alternative code or process. Equally, the limits 
of human correspondence to divine justice outlined above (section 4.1a) are 
necessary in order to be clear that human justice practices can never reach the 
eschatological maximum but are always limited. 
So what will practices formed with this eschatological perspective look like? 
Volf’s reading of the Prodigal Son helps here. He writes that, where the brother 
prioritises ‘fixed rules and stable identities’, the father, whilst not giving up ‘the 
rules and the order [is] guided by the indestructible love which makes space in 
the self for the others in their alterity, which invites the others who have 
transgressed to return, which creates hospitable conditions for their confession, 
and rejoices over their presence, the father keeps re-configuring the order 
without destroying it so as to maintain it as an order of embrace rather than 
exclusion.’603 The eschatological vision of human participation in the embrace of 
the Trinity and the relationship of justice which that entails are always the end or 
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aim of any rules, any law, any justice process and are always to proceed and to 
be prioritised over any justice practices we seek to enact. 
 
4.2 What is Triune Justice? What is Human Justice?  
 
In the previous section I set out the parameters within which we might begin the 
task of translating triune justice into human justice. I suggested that this can be 
done through seeking to live as God lives in creaturely and historically 
appropriate ways and thus seeing justice as a way of life bound up with God’s 
way of life. I also suggested that to understand further what this might look like 
in practice, the concept of eschatological minimums and maximums offers an 
understanding of the orientation of present and future (triune) justice. With this 
in mind I will conclude this chapter by asking what the justice of the Trinity looks 
like, proposing some corresponding characteristics for human justice practices. 
The term ‘characteristics’ is used here to indicate that what I am doing is not 
setting up a new scheme of rules, nor an alternative ethical code which if 
followed will equal justice. Volf is clear that yet another prescription for justice is 
not what is required. I have argued in chapter one that this perspective is borne 
out by the failure of justice practices to bring about justice or promote 
reconciliation or lasting peace. Instead, both my contextual research and Volf’s 
theology suggest that what is needed is a consideration of the characteristics 
which secondary justice practices should have in order to point effectively 
towards the future justice of the eschaton and the justice of the Trinity.  
In section 4.1 above I have noted that the parameters within which divine-
human analogies can be drawn themselves shape the contours of what human 
justice should be like. Before drawing out the characteristics of justice 
suggested in the triune life of embrace, I will briefly return to these elements in 
order to place them clearly within my proposal for the shape of human justice 
practices. 
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Firstly, the limitations of human analogy discussed above have shown that 
human justice must be understood as temporary and limited. Human pursuit of 
justice will not and cannot bring about the justice of the triune God because of 
our creaturely inabilities and the reality of our historical situatedness in a world 
of injustice. Secondly, any account of human justice must be translated from 
and understood in dynamic relation to the justice of the Trinity, which is the 
justice in which human beings participate eschatologically. Thirdly, justice is 
found within the open arms of embrace offered on the cross and is made 
possible through the indwelling of the Spirit. The character of the eschatological 
maximum of justice and the justice of the Trinity, is to be found in the embrace 
of the triune God, and the pursuit of this justice is made possible by that same 
embrace of the triune God. Finally, final judgement and violence are not a part 
of this shared embrace and are therefore the type of activity reserved for God 
and precluded for human beings. 
 
4.2a Embrace and the Characteristics of Justice 
I noted in the introduction to this chapter that the key problems of justice 
processes are that they tend towards adversarial antagonistic relationships and 
that they are focused on justice being achieved through discrete actions.604 
Here I am going to suggest a number of characteristics found in Volf’s theology 
of embrace which we might hold to be true of triune justice. It is not an 
exhaustive list, but I will seek to highlight particular areas which demonstrate 
key points of difference between the type of justice which can be derived from 
Volf’s theology and the type of justice practices currently in action. Whilst these 
characteristics emerge in Volf’s discussion of the life of embrace, I will translate 
them into the language of justice. As has already been noted in this thesis, the 
metaphor of embrace is used to illustrate the triune way of life and thus, 
following the arguments of this chapter, justice is integral to it. It is in the 
embrace of the triune God that we know justice and are enabled to pursue it. 
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The first notable characteristic of embrace (and therefore of triune justice) is 
that it is initiated by love;605secondly, that it is constituted of perfect giving and 
receiving;606 thirdly, that it is a continuous activity.607 Each of these attributes 
also contributes to the idea of justice in its primary form as a state of being, as 
argued in section 3.  Each of these attributes implies corresponding guidelines 
which might help direct human practices of justice towards the goal of perfect 
justice.  
Firstly I will turn to the initiation of justice through love.  In discussing the 
language of love and justice (section 3.1a) I noted that love is larger than 
justice, but that justice is a distinct part of love. I have also noted (section 4.1) 
that the human pursuit of justice, the will and ability to pursue justice, come from 
the Trinity — both the Spirit at work in the world regardless of belief and through 
believers’ participation in the Trinity through Christ.608 I have argued both that 
the content of justice is defined by love and that the will (or desire) to do justice 
begins with love. It is love which ultimately defines the Trinity for Volf: God is 
love, and it is love which therefore begins every movement of the Trinity. Volf 
uses the term ‘desire’ in expounding his understanding of the movement of 
embrace in human terms.609 He notes that the desire for the other (which comes 
under the umbrella of love) arises when we notice the ‘the void’ which the 
other’s absence engenders.610 It is ultimately a recognition that human beings 
are designed to live in communion, to mirror and to participate in the embrace 
(and therefore love) of the Trinity.  
Any practice of justice must therefore have at its heart an understanding of 
human identity as expounded in chapter 2 and as grounded in the triune life of 
love as referenced in chapter 3. It is clear in Volf’s work that it is the love which 
God shows us which enables us to love others and thus, to pursue justice. As 
indicated in chapter 2 unless we know our neighbour as one whom we are 
called to love as ourselves we cannot act justly towards them. Whilst at the 
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beginning of this chapter I have suggested that a relational understanding of 
justice points us towards the Trinity, similarly the triune life shows that justice is 
inescapably relational. There is justice within the Trinity because nothing is 
withheld from one another and all is freely given. This points us towards the fact 
that there is no justice for the self, only justice between the persons. 
This understanding of love, identity and the Trinity suggests that the first 
characteristic of justice is that it should be relational and participatory.  Justice 
which is shaped by and almost subsumed into the love of the Trinity is justice 
which seeks to embrace the other. It desires a response of love and for right 
relations to be established. This does not mean we must love our neighbour 
before we can pursue justice; this would be failing to take account of creaturely 
and historical limitations. Instead, it means that moves towards justice are 
predicated on understanding that we should (and will) love our neighbour, that 
is on understanding their rightful place as ones who are called to enter into the 
embrace of God and whom we too must seek to embrace in order for love and 
justice to prevail. In practice this involves a shift in attitude, an openness and 
willingness towards one’s enemy or adversary.  
Secondly, justice is perfect giving and receiving. Justice is classically 
understood as the giving of that which is due. In this thesis I have proposed that 
justice needs to be enlarged beyond this understanding. The understanding of 
the justice of God encountered in the revelation of the Trinity in the cross of 
Christ is one which goes far beyond dues. Indeed the cross appears to give 
precisely that which is not due.611 Instead the triune life, which includes justice, 
is one of abundant giving. Where dues may correspond to a historical minimum 
of justice, the eschatological maximum is the self-giving of the Trinity. Justice 
should therefore be characterised by an understanding of self-giving made 
possible through the self-giving of the Trinity and the sustaining power of the 
Spirit. It is a giving beyond dues. Although dues may be a helpful way of 
underlining the minimum level of giving which should be our historically limited 
norm, that which is due is not the character of justice; it is not a part of the final 
justice and therefore dues can only be a pragmatic consideration. 
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Thirdly, justice is continuous. I have noted that the human pursuit of justice is 
never complete in itself and is always in pursuit of the perfect justice of the 
Trinity in which human beings participate eschatologically. Therefore justice in 
the historically limited present is never ‘done’, it is only ever pursued. This 
characteristic of human justice should counter tendencies to see an event of 
judgement or punishment as ‘doing justice’ and should instead see events such 
as criminal trials as contributing to the pursuit of justice (although not achieving 
it) and perhaps helping to ‘anticipate the new creation in a real way.’612 
Similarly the role of the Spirit and the fact that the very ability to pursue justice 
originates with the triune movement towards us and is sustained by participation 
in the life of the Trinity (whether that be as happy recipients of the triune 
embrace or as unknowing participants in the work in the Spirit) means that 
justice is part of a way of life. In the new creation human beings participate in 
primary justice. Similarly the character of justice in an unjust world should be of 
justice as a way of life (embrace). 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have presented the idea that Volf’s theology of the Trinity can 
be read as offering a number of resources which serve to underpin an 
understanding of enlarged justice. Whilst rooting an understanding of human 
practices of justice in the Trinity encounters problems of both projecting the 
desired outcome onto God and overestimating our abilities to know the triune 
God or to image him, I suggest that Volf is well aware of these issues and 
navigates them carefully. Indeed the parameters for analogy which he offers in 
themselves contribute to our understanding of what the characteristics of 
human justice might be. 
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Whilst Volf’s theological parameters mean his theology cannot offer a 
comprehensive system of how justice can be enacted, this is precisely what I 
have identified as problematic in the current situation of post-conflict justice. 
Instead, Volf’s theology can offer overarching characteristics of justice which 
can be used to respond to the particularity of injustice. 
 The key point of this chapter in moving forward has been to bring the ideas of 
primary justice (or what Volf might call the eschatological maximum) into the 
centre of reflection on present practices of justice. This might serve to move 
away from an overemphasis on justice as judgement and as distribution of dues 
and reaffirm the notion of justice as primarily relational. Whilst historical realities 
may demand secondary justice including temporary judgements, legal action 
and punishment, they can only rightly be understood within the framework of 
eschatological justice. Whilst Volf makes it clear that it would be wrong to 
uphold eschatological justice as the norm for human life and action. It should 
nevertheless be upheld as that which human justice should pursue. In this way 
judgement, legal processes and imprisonment may gain a temporary legitimacy 
in so far as they pursue eschatological justice - that is the relational, self-giving 
life of the triune God which human beings are called to image.  
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Chapter 4: Practicing Enlarged Justice: Concluding 
Reflections 
 
Introduction 
 
This concluding chapter attempts to relate the findings of this thesis back to the 
issue of practices of justice in post-conflict Bosnia and Croatia. I suggest that 
practices should be considered in light of three key characteristics of human 
justice. These three characteristics emerge at the end of the previous 
chapter.613 There they are offered as characteristics of human justice which are 
founded in reflection on triune justice. I suggested that present human justice, 
understood in light of triune justice, was relational and participatory, perfect 
giving and receiving and a continuous process with an eschatological 
orientation. These are the characteristics of human justice, which I have sought 
to draw out from Volf’s theology. They constitute the ‘enlarged justice’ this 
thesis has been aiming towards. Here, I want to restate these characteristics in 
different terms, that is in terms of how they might shape justice practices. This 
chapter is a continuation of the same understanding of human justice arrived at 
in chapter three. However, here it is explored in light of the question ‘What does 
Volf’s theology of embrace mean for practices of justice?’  
Drawing on Volf, these characteristics may, at their broadest, be understood in 
relation to all practices of justice. They are criteria which may help assess ways 
in which justice practices may or may not be in pursuit of or facilitate movement 
towards the justice of the triune God. The characteristics suggest prioritising 
right relations as the goal of justice through a mutual pursuit of justice rather 
than an adversarial approach, through limiting claims to do justice rather than 
claiming to do justice in the present, and through seeking practices that 
prioritise justice as a continuous process rather than a discrete action.  
In the first section of this chapter I will define these characteristics drawing on 
the work of this thesis. I will then move on to engage the characteristics of 
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justice with current practices of justice in the Balkans. I will seek to show that 
these characteristics might call for practices to be reshaped, re-orientated, or for 
alternative practices to be implemented.  
1. The Characteristics of Justice 
1.1 The Characteristic of Mutual Justice 
 
In chapter three I concluded that justice should be relational and participatory. 
This assertion is founded in the proposal that human beings are called to image 
the justice of the Trinity and that the way to do this is through seeking to live in 
the way that God lives, rather than to seek to act as God acts.614 I suggested 
that the character of divine actions are primarily determined by who God is; 
three persons bound in mutual, free, self giving. It is this life of mutual self-
giving by which human justice should be characterised and toward which it 
should be oriented. Triune justice characterises justice as inescapably 
relational. More than that, it suggests those relations are characterised by 
offering something of the self to the other  
The centrality of mutual relationality to justice stands in contrast to 
understandings of justice as an adversarial process.615 It suggests that justice 
practices should avoid being adversarial in nature or reinforcing adversarial 
relations. Instead justice processes need to prioritise practices which encourage 
a mutual pursuit of justice, offering greater opportunities for opposing parties to 
be drawn together into relationship.  
The first step in drawing individuals together is through a reforming of identity as 
advocated in chapter two.616 This means offering opportunities for opposing 
communities and individuals to hear from the other, to take in their perspective 
and to allow it to begin to reshape their own perspective. The most obvious way 
in which this process might begin is through dialogue and truth telling exercises, 
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where perspectives are shared in the hope that understanding of each other 
increases and perceptions of the other are reshaped in light of what is heard. 
It is only after right recognition that self-giving can occur. As discussed above, 
the most likely way for self-giving to occur in the Balkan context is through the 
giving up of one’s own self-interest in favour of mutually agreeable goals.617  
Justice processes should offer opportunities for right recognition to progress 
towards the establishment of ongoing, mutual relationships. Reshaping political 
and educational structures may be seen as necessary in order that barriers to 
pursuing ongoing relations and mutual goals are removed. 
In the following section I will seek to assess post-conflict practices in light of the 
ways they can pursue the characteristic of mutuality. This will be through 
reducing the focus on adversarial practices, increasing opportunities for right 
recognition of the other, and facilitating the pursuit of just relations which do not 
prioritise self interest, but which pursue the good of the self and the other 
together. 
 
2.2 The Characteristic of Limited Justice 
 
In chapter three I noted that justice is to be understood as ‘perfect giving and 
receiving’.618 This indicated that justice should be understood as extending 
beyond a conception of a debt owed, or a right to be claimed. Instead justice 
becomes free-giving. This free-giving can only be understood in practice in 
relation to present limitations of justice. That is, free-giving can be upheld as 
that which constitutes justice through refusing to allow anything less to be 
named ‘justice’. For this reason the second characteristic of justice I propose is 
that of ‘limited justice’. Limited justice seeks to recognise the fullness of what 
justice will be eschatologically (free and perfect giving) primarily through limiting 
claims to do justice in the present. 
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In chapter three I suggested that present practices need be understood in light 
of eschatological justice, which is human participation in the justice of the 
Trinity.619 This suggests that present practices are not just in themselves and 
cannot be so. They gain legitimacy through being understood as ‘in pursuit’ of 
the perfect justice of the Trinity which human beings enter into eschatologically.  
This theological understanding of justice, centred on the Trinity and orientated 
towards an eschatological end suggests that a central concern of justice 
practices should be limiting claims to do justice in the present. In practical terms 
this may appear to reflect the position of almost all NGOs, interviewees and 
other observers who are clear that justice had not been done in Bosnia and 
Croatia. 620 Yet for many there is a sense that if processes were followed 
correctly and the right processes were in place justice could be done.621 This is 
not the point being made here. This characteristic of justice is about clarifying 
the present limitations of justice which exist because of our historical 
situatedness (limited perspective) and our creaturely limitations.622  
In addition to limiting claims to do justice, the characteristic of limited justice 
also entails remembering that the eschatological vision of justice (triune justice) 
does not become a regulative ideal.623 Minimum accounts of justice still have 
their role. The judicial system may therefore still have a role in upholding the 
minimum standards of justice. That is primarily in naming injustice and 
recognising the value and significance of what has been lost. Temporary 
judgements are possible within this category of maintaining the minimum 
account of justice. The maintenance of the minimum also suggests the 
necessity of addressing the problem of the misnaming of injustice as justice.624 
The characteristic of limited justice suggests that justice practices should be 
orientated towards the eschatological maximum. In light of this justice practices 
and processes should limit the claims they make to do justice, justice processes 
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should seek to reduce injustices which occur in the name of justice and 
processes should work to name and value injustices suffered.  
 
2.3 The Characteristic of Continuous Justice 
 
In chapter three I noted that justice is continuous. This characteristic draws on 
two elements of the justice of God. Firstly, that human justice relates to the 
triune justice because triune justice is that in which human beings will eventually 
participate.625 Following an understanding of new creation rather than an 
eschatology of destruction, there is a theological basis for understanding 
present justice as in ‘pursuit’.626 The language of pursuing justice is preferable 
to the language of ‘doing’ justice in order to keep this eschatological end in 
focus.  
Secondly, the continuous character of justice is reflected in the relational 
understanding of justice founded in the Trinity. Volf’s metaphor of embrace 
which is in constant motion, which re-opens in order that embrace might be re-
entered indicates that just human relations which seek to image the Trinity are 
dynamic relations.627 This understanding of justice as a continuous process 
stands in direct contrast to an understanding of justice as brought about as the 
result of discrete actions. This does not necessarily rule out all processes which 
involve one time actions, such a structural reforms. Indeed, remaking structures 
in order to facilitate embrace reflects the flexibility and adaptability of relational 
justice since justice is not found through specific structures or processes.628 
The characteristic of continuous justice suggests that justice practices should 
have long term goals beyond their own existence. Processes should not exist 
for the sake of the process itself, but should expect to contribute to an ongoing 
pursuit of justice. Justice practices should facilitate just relations rather than 
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enact justice. Justice practices should seek to enable relationships which 
become sustainable beyond the time of interaction with the process itself. 
 
3. Practices of Justice for Post-Conflict Bosnia and Croatia 
 
3.1 Reshaping Criminal Processes 
 
Criminal processes are currently seen by many as the primary mode of 
achieving justice.629 The characteristics outlined above could be seen to 
suggest that this should not be the case. Firstly, because they focus on an 
understanding of justice achieved by due process not through right relations, 
secondly, because they are adversarial in nature, and thirdly, because they do 
not focus on a continuous, ongoing pursuit of justice.630 In addition criminal trials 
have accounted for numerous injustices, through failure to try or convict in the 
ICTY and through failure to combat bias and to protect witnesses in the local 
courts. 
The goals of a truth commission are more obviously compatible with the 
demand for justice to prioritise right relations. It might be argued that a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as in South Africa would offer a better 
way to pursue the type of justice which is orientated towards the Trinity. 
However, in implementation the processes can be equally fallible. It has been 
noted that ‘pseudo-confessions and narcissistic confessions are rife’ in the 
TRC.631 Such a process may also be criticised for legislating for forgiveness 
through the forgoing of sentencing.632 This may overstep the requirement for the 
self-giving of justice to be freely given. Whilst there may be a place for a truth 
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commission (an idea returned to below), it is also possible to reshape existing 
criminal processes in line with the characteristics of justice outlined above. 
 
Criminal trials and justice as limited 
Criminal trials can be seen as in pursuit of triune justice. This is because trials 
may be effective in upholding the historical minimum of justice.633 The 
characteristic of limited justice noted the importance of recognising the 
constraints of human justice. I suggested that maintaining the historical 
minimum of justice serves the maximum of eschatological justice by allowing 
the latter to be properly viewed as the ultimate goal of justice. This avoids the 
problem of the justice of the triune God becoming the ‘criterion for action’ rather 
than the ‘regulative ideal’.634 If law is understood as the minimum account of 
justice which points towards the maximum justice of the eschaton, then it is 
possible for the practice and enforcement of law to occur in pursuit of the justice 
of the Trinity. Legal processes may be useful in order to indicate where injustice 
has occurred and to acknowledge the significance and value of that which has 
been lost. To fulfil this role however, trials need to be understood as a minimum 
account operating within a context of the maximum, eschatological account of 
justice. Criminal processes and practices need to explicitly serve relational 
goals. 
Criminal trials may therefore have an ongoing role in acknowledging the 
limitations of human justice and in naming and valuing injustice. However, the 
difficulties of criminal trials in relation to the understanding of justice offered 
here (noted above) still remain. Therefore, trial processes still need to be 
reshaped in order that the characteristics of mutuality and continuity might also 
be pursued.  
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Criminal trials and justice as mutual 
The adversarial nature of trials needs to be addressed. A first step would be for 
reconciliation to be an explicit goal in the aims of the ICTY. Extending 
possibilities for testimony might also be appropriate in order to facilitate right 
recognition. Truth telling may offer the opportunity for right recognition of the 
other, which is foundational for the pursuit of right relations.635 In incorporating 
truth telling into justice processes there is a greater emphasis on the future 
value of the trial beyond the immediate processes of judgement and sentencing. 
This fits with the characteristic of continuous justice which suggests that trials 
should lay groundwork for the further pursuit of right relations. Truth telling at 
the ICTY has been limited in that only some victims were called to testify, and 
then only in response to prosecution questioning.636 Pre-trial investigative 
processes surveyed a greater number of victims. These processes could 
perhaps have been adapted to offer a greater opportunity for public testimony.  
Sentencing options should support the aim of facilitating long term just relations. 
Sentencing should be given in the hope that the recognition of the weight of 
injustice it entails might make relational restoration more likely in the future. 
Penal sentences seem unavoidable in the cases of multiple and systematic 
killings, rapes and destruction of whole communities. Forgoing punishment in 
these cases may involve the difficult notion of legislating for forgiveness and 
further wounding victims, impacting negatively on the possibility of future 
relations.637 Yet in national courts involving smaller scale crimes, penal 
sentencing might not be the best way to acknowledge victims’ loss and to gain 
acknowledgement of the weight of crimes committed by the perpetrator. 
Communal sentences, offering tangible benefits to victims such as the 
rebuilding of destroyed homes and landmarks might be more appropriate.638  
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Criminal trials and justice as continuous 
The characteristic of continuous justice, outlined above, suggests the need for 
trials to offer opportunities for justice which extend beyond the occasion of the 
trial itself. Trials should contribute to an ongoing pursuit of justice. Relational 
justice models suggest that participation in justice processes is greatly improved 
through accessibility of courts and local accountability.639The goal of restoring 
relationships may have been hampered by the distance of the ICTY from the 
communities involved. The problems of injustice are currently greater in local 
courts due to failures in witness protection and tendencies to bias.640 Yet the 
rewards of successful local trials would be a much greater resource for just 
relations than successful trials at the ICTY. One interviewee told me of the 
opportunity offered for a Croat to witness the killing of a Serbian man which was 
sadly not followed through due to an unhelpful court room setting.641 Yet with 
improved processes, there is greater potential for trials to offer the beginnings of 
a long term, continuous process of renewing relationships. Where Croats are 
prepared to witness to the atrocities suffered by Serbs a dialogue is opened up, 
an acknowledgement of the culpability of one’s own group is made and there is 
potential for just relations to be pursued as each party begins to see each other 
‘rightly’. 
A regional level interethnic tribunal may be the best option. That is a tribunal 
administered by Serbian, Bosniac and Croatian judges located within the 
Balkan region, but independent of national processes. It would address the 
central problems of bias and witness intimidation at local level, whilst also 
allowing a greater sense of participation in the pursuit of justice. In this instance 
judgements would also become an occasion for the pursuit of mutual justice. 
The decisions made might have greater validity in the eyes of victims and 
perpetrators, if they were arrived at through the collaboration of a multiethnic 
judiciary. This regional tribunal might also address the problem of injustices, 
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named as justice with less likelihood of bias. This fits with the concern to limit 
the occasions of misnaming justice. Whilst such a proposal does not exist 
currently, a proposal for a regional truth commission may offer similar benefits 
of mutuality and continuity.642  
Beyond criminal trials 
Criminal processes need to limit claims to do justice. That is they should not 
claim that correctly administered, criminal processes will lead to justice. One 
way of doing this might include taking the focus off criminal proceedings, 
allowing them to be seen as one element of a much broader range of practices 
and processes which seek to pursue justice.643 That would include elevating the 
status of other practices such as community dialogue and interfaith dialogue 
and supporting the development of a regional truth commission (as has been 
proposed). 
Non-trial processes such as mediation/conferences or truth commissions should 
be central process in pursuing justice. They offer a preferable option for ‘lower 
level crimes’ and for ordinary combatants, offering victims the opportunity to 
know what had happened to family, friends and homes. They offer the first step 
in a possible dialogue.644 This would have offered the opportunity for 
communities to hear from all sides to understand the impact of the conflict, 
aiding the goal of a mutual approach to justice. This approach would also serve 
to limit some injustices of the court system where trials without sufficient 
evidence were not heard or failed to achieve convictions.645 That is not to say 
that a truth commission would offer a ‘just process’. Nevertheless, the 
opportunities for justice to be pursued through such processes seem more 
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extensive than the alternatives (criminal trials or no public acknowledgement of 
the initial injustice).   
Bosnian leadership should support the proposed truth commission. Efforts are 
still being made for a regional truth commission to be recognised by all parties 
and look likely to be successful, although Bosnia is yet to confirm agreement.646 
That these efforts are being made almost twenty years after the conflict signals 
a desperate need for justice despite the ICTY coming to a close. Such a 
commission, supported by all governments could be the most significant step 
towards justice in the Balkans. It could address the needs for mutual and 
continuous justice as well as recognising the limitations of the justice processes 
enacted so far and the impossibility of just judgements. 
 
3.2 Justice through Dialogue 
 
Dialogue which engages self-perception and identity must be the foundation for 
the pursuit of justice. The characteristic of mutual justice is perhaps one which 
takes precedence over limited justice and continuous justice. As argued in 
chapter two, the justice suggested in this thesis hinges on a recognition of the 
other as part of the self, the need for justice to be pursued for the self and the 
other, and the impossibility of justice for the self alone. Without this recognition 
any progress towards pursuing the type of justice advocated in this thesis will 
be limited. The pursuit of mutuality in justice is perhaps the most difficult to 
pursue since it relies most heavily on a changed attitude and perspective on the 
part of individuals.  
In chapter two it was noted that perception of the self and the other precedes 
action.647 If this basic mutuality is established, the other characteristics of triune 
justice may begin to fall into place. In practice the best means by which this 
might be achieved is through mutual recognition of the facts of violence and 
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injustice on all sides. Even before dialogue, the acknowledgement of ‘non-
knowledge’ of the other may be the first step towards pursuing justice.648 
The first practice which must be central to the pursuit of justice is therefore 
dialogue. Many forms of community dialogue have been promoted by peace 
organisations and NGOs throughout Bosnia and Croatia.649 These have had 
mixed success. Men in particular have been less likely to become involved.650 
Dialogues with middle level leadership have not only worked towards pursuing 
right relations for participants, but have produced resources to assist others in 
the pursuit of justice. For example, in Sarajevo leading religious leaders 
produced a document stating shared moral commitments which members of 
each faith community should uphold.651 This indicates that dialogue at its best 
not only facilitates mutual justice but also contributes to an ongoing justice, 
continuous justice. 
The characteristic of limited justice suggests that dialogues should be given 
more formal endorsement. This is in order that justice might be seen to be 
pursued through a number of practices beyond those of criminal justice. 
Dialogue needs to be seen as central to justice. Several efforts to set up a 
formal process for truth telling have been made. Current efforts involve 
representatives from each regional president.652 This type of recognition is 
important in indicating the multiple ways in which justice should be pursued.  
Dialogues should be set up with clear goals and processes. The United States 
Institute of Peace has assessed a range of interfaith dialogues in post-conflict 
situations, including Bosnia. Their recommendations include the ideas that 
dialogues should be centred on story-telling, should focus on identity formation 
(in order to confront both sides understanding of themselves as victims), should 
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take place amongst lay people and leadership (offering both immediate 
relationship building and longer term practice orientated outcomes) and should 
be offered as longer term projects rather than one time events.653 These types 
of requirements suggest that dialogues can clearly assist in the pursuit of justice 
through refusing to lay claim to judgement (acknowledging the limited nature of 
human justice), assisting in the right recognition of the other (assisting in the 
pursuit of mutual justice) and through contributing to future progress through 
agreements, proposals and joint statements on behaviour (understanding the 
need for justice to be continuous). The understanding of justice outlined in this 
thesis suggests that such dialogues should clearly be understood as part of the 
pursuit of justice however, rather than as secondary to justice. 
 
3.3 Justice and Political Structures 
 
Political structures should not reinforce ethnic divisions. The current situation in 
Bosnia requires voters to vote for a candidate of their own ethnicity and requires 
candidates to stand as ethnic candidates. Whilst initially this served to offer all 
parties a political voice, in practice this is now a very divisive practice.654 
Minority ethnic groups are reluctant to relinquish their right to a designated 
candidate of their own ethnicity as they fear their voices will not be heard in a 
free voting system.655 Politicians benefit from entrenching ethnic divisions to 
secure a portion of the vote. Desire to hold on to power may also be linked to 
significant corruption.656 The divisions which currently exist do not serve the 
pursuit of justice since, whilst they require some degree of political 
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collaboration, they are a greater force in reinforcing divisions in voters. The 
political system relies on political messages which offer an adversarial view of 
ethnic relations.657 The characteristics of justice suggest that the adversarial 
nature of the current structure needs to be tackled.  
Enlarged justice may suggest the imposition of structural change. Viewed 
through a lens which prioritises freedom, this seems directly counter to 
justice.658 However, if we seek to pursue enlarged justice, through prioritising 
mutuality and the pursuit of continuous relations, this might not seem unjust. 
Since existing structures also forgo the demands of limited justice through 
allowing severe injustices in terms of corruption and inadequate policing to 
continue unchecked, the case for imposing a new structure may be strong.  
If this is the case however, no structure could be imposed which would be of 
greater detriment to existing relations. That is changes should move towards 
right relations rather than adversarial relations. An acceptable compromise 
would be the requirement that the ethnic labels attached to the existing system 
are dropped. This is a minor change, yet it is a move which still stands in pursuit 
of justice.  It removes the first barrier towards a politics which involves right 
recognition of the other. The minor nature of the change would have support 
even in the Republika Srpska.659 Many in the Federation support the imposition 
of a new political structure.660 It may therefore be right for the EU and other 
influential third parties to push strongly for the imposition of a limited (widely 
acceptable) degree of structural change in order to move forward in pursuing 
just relations beyond the political realm. This could override political 
machinations and self-interest in favour of a reform which would pursue the 
goals of justice. 
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The international community should mediate in the process of political 
restructuring. Whilst international parties (the EU primarily) are involved in 
assisting Bosnian constitutional reform, there is an increasingly hands off 
approach.661 The characteristic of mutuality suggests that just relations need to 
be pursued between all parties, justice cannot be dispensed by one party to 
another. Motivations of third parties should be the pursuit of good relations 
between Bosnian peoples and future flourishing rather than personal political or 
economic interests particularly in regards to EU membership. Current dialogues 
are so focused on meeting minimum EU requirements that greater opportunities 
for encouraging just relations within Bosnia might be missed.662  
 
3.3 New Language 
 
Justice processes need to state their aims in language which acknowledges the 
limitations of the process. Campaigns for reforms need to be couched in the 
language of a better pursuit of justice, not read as a formula for achieving 
justice. There needs to be less adherence to a formula and a greater flexibility 
which asks ‘what is the most just outcome in this situation?’ rather than ‘what 
does justice demand?’. The greater proliferation of justice options outlined 
above including (dialogue and a truth commission) and the allocation of greater 
emphasis on non-trial processes might be a good way of pursuing this goal.  
Non-legal processes need to be given higher status. In order to pursue the goal 
of limited justice, recognition needs to be given to all processes which are in 
pursuit of justice. Giving higher status to community dialogue projects through 
greater government recognition and through increased links between 
administrators of such projects would increase the sense that they are part of 
the country’s pursuit of justice. Such a move would suggest that justice is not 
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primarily bound to judgement and criminal proceedings but that it can be 
pursued in a multiplicity of ways. This equal weighting of a number of justice 
practices would demonstrate that the process itself is not the key to justice. The 
high status of the proposed truth commission could be beneficial in this regard. 
 
3.4 Ending Segregation 
 
 Reforming education practices should be a key objective in pursuing justice. 
The Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) states that 
‘education reform is widely regarded as critical to the long-term stability of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.’663 Current educational practices reinforce inaccurate 
accounts of recent history and teach ethnic groups only their own traditions. It is 
a system which reinforces adversarial relations. The pursuit of justice through 
right recognition suggests that a joint curriculum should be taught which 
acknowledges the plural narratives and allows each ethnic group to encounter 
the other. These opportunities would have a significant impact on longer term 
relationships extending beyond the time spent at school, contributing to a 
continuous pursuit of justice. 
Ethnic educational segregation should now be made illegal. A recent court 
ruling dictated that two schools close to Mostar should no longer be 
segregated.664 However, the position is not consistent and many schools are 
still segregated. Like the political structures, segregated schooling under one 
roof may have been a good approximation of justice in the past. In the current 
context it is a system which stands in the way of the further pursuit of just 
relations. Injustices such as exclusion and school violence are allowed to 
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continue unchecked.665 The characteristic of limited justice suggests that these 
issues should be tackled in order that a minimum justice is established. 
 
3.6 Mutual Goals 
 
The desire to build relations is central to the understanding of justice grounded 
in the Trinity. Yet the motivation for action remains to some extent, a 
problematic issue. Theologically, the motivation for action must be the 
transformation of the heart and mind by the Spirit. 666  The understanding of the 
self, Trinity and justice set out in this thesis are all entirely Christian in nature 
and depend upon a faith commitment in order to be fully realised and enacted. 
In addition, the characteristics above instil the need for relations to go beyond 
short term collaborations on trial processes or even truth commissions. A key 
element in addressing motivation and in establishing long term positive relations 
could be through ‘common purpose’.667 
The areas on which most Bosnians currently agree are those of the need for 
economic growth.668 Common economic goals and anti-corruption stances in 
Croatia as well as ambition towards EU membership have been good 
motivators for change. Whilst Croatia’s path to political calm has been much 
easier because of the lack of ethnic diversity, nevertheless a common focus has 
been helpful in establishing a more moderate political discourse. The current 
President Ivo Josipović has recently been named as a bridge builder by Volf.669 
He has made positive overtures to the Serbian government regarding EU 
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membership. Pursuit of this membership was also a motivating factor in 
increased Serbian co-operation with ICTY efforts to track war criminals.670  
Economic troubles and high unemployment are directly related to issues of 
political structure and segregation in Bosnia. This means that progress in these 
areas is certainly harder than in Croatia and Serbia. However, it does mean that 
the desire for economic progress can become a significant, common motivating 
factor for change. Mutual economic goals may be helpful in drawing ethnic 
groups together and serve to demonstrate the need for a mutual pursuit of 
justice in other areas such as the reform of the constitution, local government 
and policing. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The characteristics of mutual, limited and continuous justice offer more defined 
ways of assessing the ways in which current practices of justice in Croatia and 
Bosnia may be reorientated towards an enlarged justice founded in the triune 
God. These characteristics help to translate the excess of free self-giving which 
is at the heart of enlarged justice into guidelines for practising justice. The 
account of justice I have proposed, founded in Volf’s theology of embrace, does 
offer resources which can impact future practices of justice in post-conflict 
Bosnia and Croatia. 
The complexity of the current situation discussed in chapter one and re-
engaged here suggests there is a real need for reshaping justice practices. 
Whilst the situation in Croatia is more positive due to fewer challenges, 
commentators offer a bleak picture of the current situation in Bosnia. The over 
reliance on criminal trials as a means of pursuing justice and an entrenchment 
of existing divisions in political and educational life have been key factors in the 
failure to effectively pursue just relations. Currently, justice practices in Bosnia 
often impede the enlarged understanding of justice offered in this thesis. The 
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account of justice offered here has great potential to reshape current practices 
in ways which open up the possibility of a mutual, flourishing future. 
 
242 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In concluding I want to draw together the most significant proposals for justice 
which have been brought to light in this thesis and propose a way of pursuing 
justice which might address the problems of post-conflict Bosnia and Croatia. 
To do this I will firstly revise the key points made in this thesis, linking them to 
the enlarged sense of justice I want to propose. I will then conclude with the 
overall shape and character of justice which I believe can tackle the problems of 
justice in post-conflict Bosnia and Croatia. This conclusion draws together the 
work of this thesis which has been to draw out material found in Volf’s theology 
of embrace, engage it with the post-conflict context and in doing so to find a 
new sense of justice which goes beyond the limitations of justice processes and 
philosophical theories. Here I propose a sense of enlarged justice rooted in the 
eventual participation of human beings in the triune life of justice which is 
embrace. 
 
Section 1 – Key Contributions to Enlarging Justice 
 
1.1 Justice 
 
In chapter one I noted the key problems of post-conflict justice in Bosnia and 
Croatia. I suggested that Volf’s critiques of justice made a contribution to 
understanding the problems and that his vision of justice shaped by love might 
offer the basis for a new approach. 
This chapter suggested that justice processes in Croatia and Bosnia are 
focused on criminal trials and legal processes. The problems of bias and 
negative perceptions of justice were noted by NGOs, but the solution has 
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tended to be seen in terms of better practices.671 In proposing an ‘enlarged’ 
sense of justice, I want to suggest that improving existing practices is not 
enough, if it is still believed that the processes and practices themselves will 
achieve justice. At the same time, the processes are not necessarily redundant. 
Instead, they can be transformed if viewed not as the way to achieve justice, but 
in a more limited fashion as part of a much broader pursuit of the justice that is 
love and embrace.  
The problem of injustice named as justice and the way in which this feeds into a 
cycle of violence or at least exclusion noted in this chapter, means that limited 
claims to justice are a significant part of the enlarged justice I am proposing. In 
locating his vision of justice in eschatological life and, in my reading the triune 
God, Volf’s work makes this limitation of claims a natural step. However, 
whether one takes on the full theological implications of Volf’s work or not, the 
limitations of human justice must be recognised and regularly acknowledged in 
order to avoid injustice being named as justice. 
The failure of justice processes to achieve restoration of relationships, which in 
some cases, such as that of the ICTY, as a distinctly expressed purpose, 
means post conflict justice has failed on its own terms.672 In offering a vision of 
justice founded in love, Volf ensures that non-contractual relationships are at 
the heart of this understanding of justice.673 Justice must pursue right 
relationships first, and these are to be defined in reference to the ultimate 
relations of the divine Trinity. In a practical sense the basic prioritisation of 
reconciliation as a good which is already acknowledged as having some role to 
play in the justice processes would be a positive beginning. 
Highlighting the divisions of justice and the problem of victim and perpetrator 
divisions, demonstrated the need for a reconfiguration of justice, and identity, 
rather than simply a redistribution of power or goods. In practice asking victims 
to consider themselves as in one sense indistinctive from perpetrators is 
difficult. Dialogue projects such as that run by the Osijek Centre for Peace, Non-
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Violence and Human Rights might be the answer here, engaging with a process 
of ‘enlarged thinking’ as advocated in chapter two.674 
 
1.2 Identity 
 
In turning to identity I suggested that problems of justice require a rejection of 
identities based upon assertion of difference or assimilation of the other into the 
self. I suggested that the chief problem of identity in post-conflict Bosnia and 
Croatia were exclusionary identities. I argued that this form of identity is 
expressed in a range of ways, but these have a common element in that they 
seek to exclude the other and foster hard boundaries. These rigid identities 
result in or are perhaps reinforced by, rigid claims to justice and few attempts to 
find a common way to pursue justice between groups.  
Volf’s work highlighted the need for proper recognition of the other, not as an 
imagined other, but as they are. The reality of multi layered identities needs to 
be accounted for in that recognition. The right recognition of the other in this 
way contributes directly to the pursuit of justice as a mutual relationship. Seeing 
the other rightly allows for the other to shape one’s own identity and 
consequently, one’s own claims to justice. This reshaping takes place in the 
hope that ‘competing justices may become converging justice.’675  In light of 
Tania Wettach’s research on the divided notions of justice which form alongside 
identity groupings. Volf’s view of right recognition seems a much needed 
contribution to the pursuit of justice.676 
Volf’s main proposal of embrace as an alternative way of constructing identity 
is, in the same way as the enlarged justice I want to propose here, beyond any 
conventional identity theory in that it is shaped by the love of the Trinity. Volf’s 
view is not simply an understanding of identity as formed in relations, or even 
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adding that those relations should ideally be truthful and harmonious. Rather, 
Volf proposes that love of the other extends to ‘decentering’ the self and making 
room for the other to come into the self and reshape one’s identity. The sense 
of hospitality this implies in contrast, the self-imposed segregation of Vukovar, 
for example, shows Volf’s theology to be in radical opposition to the current 
practices of Bosnia and Croatia. An enlarged sense of justice then perhaps 
includes refusal to segregate, and a hospitable welcome to one’s enemy. 
Embrace as in opposition to exclusion requires a movement from the victim 
towards the perpetrator. At the same time, if we are to view the movements of 
embrace as integral to justice, which I do, then the victims also become 
empowered to pursue justice without the need to appeal to outside agencies or 
those in positions of power. Volf’s embrace stops the problem of damaging 
cycles of power noted in chapter 1. The reaching out of embrace also seeks to 
end the problem of injustice named as justice. 
The sense that embrace cannot be imposed upon another, and the space for 
not knowing discussed in chapter two section 3.2 suggests that a new 
understanding of justice cannot assert itself over unwilling participants. There is 
a sense of mutual giving and receiving of self which lies at the heart of this 
understanding of justice as embrace. Of course, as Volf notes at the end of 
Exclusion and Embrace ‘Tyrants may need to be taken down from their thrones 
and the mad men stopped from sowing desolation.’677 Yet the pragmatic need 
to stop perpetrators perpetrating is not to be called justice. In some ways this 
suggests Volf’s theological propositions do not offer a practical response to 
violence in particular. However, what Volf is limiting is only the claims of justice 
applied to violence, not that violence can always be avoided. In making this 
move, he is emminently practical in that the refusal to name violence as justice 
helps to protect against a spiral of violence and conflicting justice claims. The 
exclusion of both violent identities and violence itself must be a part of a sense 
of enlarged justice. Instead it should be orientated towards the life of embrace 
which is mutual self-giving  
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1.3 Trinity 
 
In turning to the Trinity one comes to the heart of Volf’s theology. All things 
begin and end with the Trinity, including identity and justice.678 In dealing with 
critical issues of knowledge of God and the possibility of analogies, I sought to 
lay firm grounds for my proposal that justice can be seen as rooted in the 
Trinity. Seeking to ground justice in the Trinity is in itself a response to the 
problems of justice noted in the first chapter. If present justice is only partial and 
present practices are to be acknowledged as such, then to avoid critique 
becoming simply deconstruction and chaos, it becomes imperative that justice 
is grounded elsewhere. The firmest grounding for a Christian account of justice 
must be in the Trinity. Volf’s understanding of the Trinity suggests that if God 
acts with justice in the world justice must reside with God. Since God’s actions 
in the world are expressions of God’s mutual interior relations as Trinity, then 
justice must also reside within these relations.  
In this chapter I defined justice as perfect giving and receiving. This retains the 
traditional understanding of justice between individuals but gives it an infinite 
quality which is defined by love. It gives a sense of justice which is continous 
and never ending. It gives an understanding of justice which is to be pursued 
and not ‘done’. This sense of justice is perhaps reflected in Amos 5:24 where 
justice is said to ‘roll down like waters’. This contrasts considerably with current 
processes which seek to enact justice in a onetime event. Indeed the ICTY is in 
the process of bringing its mission to bring justice to victims to a close.679 Yet it 
is clear that the need for justice in relation to the conflict has not ended in 
Bosnia or Croatia.  
Having elevated justice in many ways, the possibility of actually pursuing the 
type of justice founded in the triune life seems problematic. Volf’s understanding 
of participation in the triune embrace and the role of the Spirit in the world 
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means a move from his theology towards an understanding of justice with 
implications beyond the Christian community is possible. Nevertheless the 
potential to pursue an enlarged sense of justice must be greater amongst those 
who acknowledge themselves to be participants in the triune life and respond to 
the offer of embrace.  
The exclusion of final judgment and violence as means by which human beings 
can pursue justice is important. Whilst limited, impermanent judgments will be 
necessary, knowledge of human limitations means that judgments cannot be 
just. For practices of justice this means that processes should not be focused 
on judgment as the central purpose or as an act which is expected to bring 
about justice. The temporary and partial nature of human judgments needs to 
be recognized in order, again, to avoid injustice named as justice. Justice 
focused on judgment also tends towards an understanding of justice centered 
on discrete actions rather than the sense of justice as continuous process which 
I wish to advocate here. Where judgments do take place they should also be 
acknowledged as an enacted in pursuit of justice and with the end of reconciling 
embrace in mind. 
The relationship of eschatological minimums and maximums reinforces the idea 
that whilst conceptions of justice as law, rights and procedures has a place in 
pursuing justice they do not constitute the end of justice or the whole of justice. 
Law can point the way towards the ultimate ends of justice as in Matthew 5. 
This means an enlarged sense of justice must encourage renewed reflection on 
the values and character of justice which law and other conceptions and 
processes of justice uphold. My understanding of an enlarged sense of justice is 
not necessarily about disposing of current practices in Bosnia and Croatia, 
although that might be necessary. What it does indicate is that their value lies 
solely in the ways in which they bring individuals and communities closer to 
embodying the justice which becomes embrace. 
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1.4 Practices of Justice 
 
In the concluding reflections in chapter four I sought to draw the understanding 
of enlarged justice arrived at in chapter three back into engagement with the 
current practices of justice as In Bosnia and Croatia. This thesis asked ‘’Can the 
resources found in Volf’s theology of embrace address the problems of justice 
found in post-conflict Bosnia and Croatia?’ Throughout the thesis I have sought 
to demonstrate that Volf’s work does engage the key issues and underlying 
problems of justice. In this final chapter I suggested that the characteristics of 
enlarged justice (which is rooted in Volf’s theology of the Trinity) can be 
expressed in ways which engage directly with issues of practice.  
I suggested that Volf’s work offers the foundations for understanding justice 
practices as best pursued through focusing on mutuality, and the pursuit of right 
relations. In addition justice practices should not lay claim to ‘do justice’ but 
should instead be ‘in pursuit’ of justice. Pursuing justice should be understood 
as beyond the scope of individual practices. Instead it is continuous, constantly 
being expressed through a range of actions, as right relations are pursued.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has suggested that Miroslav Volf’s theology of embrace has rich 
resources which directly address issues of justice in post-conflict Bosnia and 
Croatia. His work offers a fuller understanding of the root causes underlying 
failures of justice and the need for identity to be reformed, The roots of his 
theology lie in the Trinity which provides an underdeveloped resource for 
addressing the problems of justice in Bosnia and Croatia. This thesis has 
sought to demonstrate that Volf’s work can underpin an understanding of 
enlarged justice which addresses the root causes of justice (conflicting claims 
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and hard identities) and which does not remain abstract but can speak back to 
the context in ways which reshape and re-orientate current practices of justice. 
The account of justice offered here keeps in mind both a vision of the 
eschatological justice of the triune God, and the need for concrete practices 
which might pursue that future reality.  
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Appendix 1: Interview with Miroslav Volf, Yale Center 
for Faith and Culture, 26th August 2009 
 
BW. In Exclusion and Embrace you are talking to the victim…. 
MV. Yes. 
B. It is from a much more eastern European perspective, or to a European 
audience, it seems to me. How do you think your perspective has altered now 
that you are in the States? You seem to be writing to a more American 
audience. I am thinking of Free of Charge where you talk about the idea of God 
as Santa Claus. That seems to indicate a shift in perspective, although you are 
presenting many of the same theological ideas. What do you think about that? 
M. Yes. Well the idea for Exclusion and Embrace was born here. 
B. Yes but the intended audience seems to be different. 
M. Yes that may well be, and it was written in Germany. In a sense, in terms of 
the audience for Exclusion and Embrace, I did not have an audience in mind. I 
was writing a book for myself. This just pushes your question further out. What 
has happened to me? Because I have moved from there to the United States. 
Yes, there certainly is a shift, a shift of interest. The idea of God as Santa Claus 
is about the question of religion light, a question of the kind of self-orientated 
religiosity. But then, on the other hand, you know it’s analogous because one of 
them is very much individualistic use of religion for the interest of the self and 
the other one is kind of communal use of religion. So I think it has similarities 
but those differences are also marked. I do think that a major issue today 
…[pause]…there are two major issues with religion…[pause]…one is still 
religion and identity, communal identity and the consequent clashes around 
that. But I think a more significant issue than that, is a hollowing out of the 
sense of the meaning of life and a conception of human flourishing as 
experiential satisfaction, and then the drawing in of religion to support the sense 
of simple experiential satisfaction as a good life, and then Santa Claus comes 
in. I think that is really a major issue that is facing us now. 
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B. Do you think that is the key issue across the board or is it particularly 
because you have come to the States and the society here? 
M. I think I see it particularly in the States, but I don’t think it is simply the United 
States. I think it is a phenomenon of late capitalism spread through globalization 
processes and I think it characterizes many societies, different segments of 
societies but to the extent that the market has permeated societies and 
consumerism has permeated societies, I think it has become part and parcel of 
many cultures. 
B. Ok. I want to talk about identity. In Exclusion and Embrace you talked about 
gender identity. I think it is easier to talk about than ethnic identity. You talk 
about the ‘root’ and the sexed body as the ‘root’. In ethnic identity, what is the 
‘root’? Arguably there is no ‘root’, so how do you think you can talk about ethnic 
identity in relation to what you have written about gender identity? 
M. In some ways it is easier. It is easier to indicate the stable factor in gender 
identity. But my sense is I don’t necessarily need to identify what it 
is…[pause]…so the root functioned for me, in gender identity, simply to 
undermine the notion of a complete fluidity but I don’t think that the identity itself 
needs the root to be formed. There is more stability to gender than there is to 
national identities or communal identities but nonetheless in the self-perception 
of actors there is a sense of, and you can read, ethnic identities via religious 
belonging, via language, via common myths and history. Certainly they are fluid, 
more fluid than gender, but nonetheless identifiable, and the more there is a 
situation of conflict in which groups find themselves, the more stable and rigid 
those identities become. But you are right; it is tough to think of those group 
identities in a clear way, they are too amorphous for that. So you have self 
perception of a group and self identifications and yet you are not able, in a 
stable way, to impose the boundaries. So it is tough. 
B. Yes, especially in the Balkan where people have chosen ethnic identity. 
M. Exactly. I am struggling with that issue myself. At one point I wanted to write 
about nationalism but I’m not sure that I know how to write well about that. 
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B. Ok. So you don’t think we need to talk about the ‘root’ in terms of ethnic 
identity? 
M. I don’t think so. I think that it is formed through identification processes and 
so multiple things such as language, religious belonging, common history, 
common myths go into the identity but then there is always an element of self-
identification which you can see in the Balkans.  You can have two 
parents…[pause]… you can have somebody who is Hungarian but feels an 
awfully strong Serbian identity to make up for the marginality in which he or she 
finds themselves. 
B. You have described yourself as a ‘social Trinitarian of sorts’. Can you tell me 
a bit more about how you would want to qualify that label? I guess it is about the 
problems of analogy and the way some people have gone down a route in 
which God appears almost dependent on his creation…those kind of problems. 
Is that what you are trying to steer away from when you make that statement? 
M. Yes. Partly because in social trinitarianism the analogies being used are of 
three persons and I think there are cases, Al Plantinga is the best case, of 
almost having a tri-theistic understanding of God. Moltmann, I don’t think he 
sufficiently emphasizes the unity of God. It would seem to me that…[pause]…..I 
think the series of essays I edited for Moltmann [God’s Life in Trinity?] in which I 
talk about that very issue…. 
B. Ok, next question is about human rights. I think this is one of the areas 
where you seem to have moved on. In Exclusion and Embrace you say… 
M. I have shifted my thinking on justice, yes I think I have. 
B. How? 
M. I think I understood justice…[pause]…I did not conceptually provide 
sufficient space for justice qua justice. It was almost subsumed into love. I have 
come, in conversations with my good friend Nick Wolterstorff, to think differently 
about it. I think right now, and you can see that in Free of Charge, that there is a 
difference in my understanding of justice.  I think that something like a basic 
concept of what is owed to another is absolutely essential to 
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preserve…[pause]…and that love is not opposed to justice, indeed you cannot 
pursue justice without love because love motivates for justice and human rights 
and it is not opposed in its content but it goes beyond justice. The gratuity and 
the gift character of love ought to be preserved as distinct from the demands of 
justice.  
B. Ok. I think there was a difficulty in Exclusion and Embrace in that you had to 
carry a separate concept of justice as something owed at the same time 
because you needed that to determine the need for or value of forgiveness. So 
you have overcome that although I still think I prefer Exclusion and Embrace! 
M. Well I can understand that! 
B. That’s the area I would like to develop because I think in Exclusion and 
Embrace there were things left undone but I guess what I’m going to do is go off 
in a different direction to where you have gone now. 
M. Sounds good! Read Nick’s book on justice though. 
B. I have read some of it…He says when rights are fulfilled then there is justice 
[God and the Victim] do you agree with that? Because I don’t think that fits with 
what you have said before… 
M. I think part of this discussion is semantic. What is it that you will call justice? 
If you call justice that which is owed strictly to someone then I think that is right. 
Nick is right. But if you have a concept of justice as a right relationship then, in 
my concept, it merges with love. I personally think that you need both, but I 
think that it is useful to conceptually distinguish between these. What I haven’t 
done, in Exclusion and Embrace, is to conceptually distinguish, though the idea 
was operating in a subterranean way. 
B. Ok that’s very interesting. A small question – in Exclusion and Embrace you 
didn’t talk about original sin explicitly. Instead you used Suchocki’s phrase 
‘background cacophony of evil’. Do you find the notion of original sin in and 
Augustinian sense useful? 
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M. Yes. I do find it useful. Quite apart now from how it is there [or how] it is 
transmitted; those are distinct issues from one already finding oneself caught in 
the snares of evil and one always already bearing guilt for that reason. I think 
that is a very important concept to preserve. 
B. What do you think about the situation in Croatia and Bosnia at the moment, 
particularly in reference to justice? For example the ICTY and the judicial cases 
that are going through and also the Centre for Peace in Osijek and their projects 
for dialogue in Vukovar. What do these different processes contribute to 
establishing justice? 
M. That’s really a tough question. On the whole I think in abstract tribunals are 
useful. In terms of their specific effect on the population in Croatia…[pause]….I 
have less…[pause]… It is dubious to me. The population doesn’t identify with 
the tribunal. They see it as imposed from the outside. They are resisting. Many 
people consider folks who are being tried as war heroes. 
B. Like Gotovina 
M. Exactly. There is a segment of people who are in favour of it, but even there 
there is the question of whether they are in favour because they are interested 
in joining the European Union. You know an interesting person is xxxx he would 
be an interesting person to talk to. I was just with him in Mostar. You know a 
person who was really involved…[pause] xxxx She is in charge of Helsinki 
Watch in Belgrade. She would be good to talk to about this issue of war 
tribunals. She has very interesting perspective. She thinks there is not going to 
be a single Serbian actually condemned. Milosevic died 
before…[pause]…Karadic is…[pause]…and Serbians are speculating that the 
Russians are going to kill the Hague and that Mladic will be delivered at the end 
of the year but they are thinking that the Hague is going to close. Whether that 
is going to happen or not is a different matter! There is some debate.  
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Appendix 2: Questions for Interviews: Bosnia and 
Croatia December 2008 
 
Questions about communities and reconciliation work: 
In what ways do you think your community has been damaged by the 1990’s 
conflict? 
What do you see as the issues that need to be resolved now? 
Do you know of any reconciliation or peace projects in your area? Do you think 
they are successful? 
Would you want to be/are you involved with any of these? Why/Why not? 
Do you think religious communities have a (large/small) role to play in 
reconciliation work? 
Do you think local or community projects are more or less effective than 
national or government projects? 
Do you think that reconciliation and peace projects will have/can have a positive 
long term effect on your community or country? 
  
Questions about national/international processes and justice: 
What do you think the government is doing/should be doing to address post-
conflict issues like ethnic tensions, war crimes, victim support etc.? 
Do you think most war criminals have been or will be brought to court? 
Do you think that criminal trials are the best way to deal with war crimes? 
Do you think the Croatian/Bosnian courts are fair and just in their treatment of 
accused war criminals and victims? 
Do you think the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is are 
fair and just in their treatment of accused war criminals and victims?  
Do you think the ICTY is equally fair to Serbs, Croats and Bosnians? 
What do you think the courts will achieve - will they help to rebuild communities 
or will they cause further divisions? 
Would you change anything about the systems for dealing with war crimes trials 
that are currently in place? 
 
Questions about remembrance: 
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Do you think events such as Croatian Remembrance Day are important? Do 
you think they may cause Serb-Croat tensions? 
Do you think sites such as the Hospital Museum in Vukovar are helpful or 
unhelpful?  
Is it important to remember such events or to forget them? 
 
Church Questions: 
Does your Church play a role in peace or reconciliation work?/What project are 
you part of and what are its aims? 
Do you think the Church has a responsibility to promote reconciliation in this 
situation? 
Do you think religious groups as a whole should play a large or a small role in 
rebuilding communities? 
What role do you think religious groups played during the conflict? 
Would you say your Church is ethnically representative of your town/area? (free 
churches) 
Do you think that non-RC/ Orthodox Churches might have a big role to play as 
communities which are not primarily ethnically defined? (free churches) 
Do you think that the ICTY is achieving its goal of ‘Spearheading the shift from 
impunity to accountability, establishing the facts, bringing justice to thousands of 
victims and giving them a voice, the accomplishments in international law, 
strengthening the Rule of Law’? 
Would you say people are being held accountable for war crimes? 
Have the facts of the conflict been established? 
Do you think those in your community feel justice has been or is being done? 
Do you think that people in your community feel they have been heard? 
 
Legal questions: 
Do you see the war crimes trials as important in terms of moving on from the 
conflict and seeing Croatian and Bosnian communities reconciled? What do 
these trials achieve? 
Do you think the Croatian war crimes trials are just to all parties? 
Is there an ethnic bias in the Croatian courts? 
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Do you think that the ICTY is achieving its goal of ‘Spearheading the shift from 
impunity to accountability, establishing the facts, bringing justice to thousands of 
victims and giving them a voice, the accomplishments in international law, 
strengthening the Rule of Law’? 
Would you say people are being held accountable for war crimes? 
Have the facts of the conflict been established? 
Do you think Croats/Bosnians/Serbs feel justice has been or is being done? 
Do you think that Croats/Bosnians/Serbs feel they have been heard? 
What do you think are the strengths/problems of the ICTY and the Croatian war 
crimes trials? 
What do you think needs to be changed or done differently? 
Some Bosnians have been unhappy at the handover of Radovan Karadic as 
they believe the Serbs have only handed him over in order to get international 
political gain. Do you think the ICTY is particularly susceptible to political 
manoeuvres? 
Also, to what extent does it matter that there is a perception that justice is not 
being done? 
What role do you think local reconciliation projects have in terms of moving 
Croatia forward? 
Do you think such projects have more positive results/negative results than the 
war crimes trials? Do you think reconciliation projects have a complementary 
role to the war crimes trials? 
Do you think it is primarily the governments responsibility to initiate 
reconciliation or that of individuals? 
What would you like the government to do to address the ongoing issues of 
ethnic divisions, untried war criminals and the victims  of war crimes? 
What do you think are the main challenges that the Croatian legal system has to 
face in this respect? 
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Appendix 3: Interviews November 2007 
 
Transcript 1 
What do you do at xxxx, and why did you get involved? 
I am the programme manager for xxxx. I have two main projects: firstly peace 
building through inter-religious co-operation and secondly “a touch of hope” 
which is about healing personal wounds to heal the community. 
Building relationships can help community. We are concerned with the health of 
the body, soul and spirit together. Looking at these areas can help us to see 
where we are and what we can do to heal those parts that need healing. The 
aim is to help people to heal themselves. We run workshops with a mix of 
people and assess where they are individually. We have one of these projects 
in xxxx which has been particularly affected by the war, and get Serbs and 
Croats together. 
I think this relates to Volf’s idea of embrace. We see them sitting together and 
not interfering, but deciding to come together. They learn together and 
communicate with each other. 
The President of the xxxx xxxx group said to me she couldn’t go again and sit 
with Serbs because she had had an experience where people were pushed to 
communicate and it hadn’t been helpful. I explained to her that our workshops 
are about learning together and a secure environment where people won’t be 
wounded again, which is what people fear. 
It’s mostly women who take part and we have 10-12 in a group, that’s our 
optimum number. We also have a residential element which is two days where 
people socialise and relationships start to happen. 
We work by sitting in a circle and at the beginning Serbs and Croats sit in 
separate halves, but gradually they start to merge. The President of the xxxx 
xxxx said she was amazed that not only did they not fight but they actually 
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made friends and communicated about daily life. I see this as the will to 
embrace and to start communicating. 
In 1997 and 1998 we tried to organise conflict resolution training seminars but 
they didn’t go as well as we expected. There was too little forethought and 
international help wasn’t that helpful as they didn’t understand the culture and 
the real conflict issues. Also at the early stages people were too raw as many 
people were lost and missing after the war. There was uncertainty at this time 
because of this. 
We concluded that it is very important to start communicating with people from 
the other side as talking about personal stories makes each person aware that 
all sides in the conflict have had personal tragedies and identity issues. 
It’s about making ourselves aware of where we are before God and taking 
responsibility for identity, culture and faith issues which seem so closely linked 
and combined. 
People come out of the seminars differently. They see there are victims on the 
other side and that people share God on the other side too – they are all 
believers. 
We used biblical verses to explore faith commitments between an Orthodox 
priest and Catholic priests who had been in a concentration camp as well as 
others of mixed faith backgrounds. 
 
Who wants to participate in this type of workshop? 
Generally more women want to take part, also more laymen rather than clergy 
(those in power). Women are more open to admit they want extra education; 
they care about communication and reconciliation.  
One woman whose family members were killed went back to her village where 
the other side lived (her neighbours were on the “enemies” side). It was more 
important for her to find the buried bones of her family members. She wanted 
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honesty and a moment of admission and the right to bury her dead rather than 
revenge or unforgiveness.  
 
What are you looking for at the end of such a process or is reconciliation 
ongoing? 
A concrete end to the process would be that all the people are communicating. 
Communication is crucial, otherwise one side see the other as guilty and the 
other side have no place to speak back. Through communication everything can 
happen. Responsibility can be agreed through communication. Lack of will and 
lack of knowledge can be stumbling blocks. Knowledge and skills of non-violent 
communication are crucial for the process of reconciliation. How do you 
communicate in order to open up? Empathy and mutual caring are necessary. 
This builds trust and allows people to stand in their own understanding. 
Non-judging is crucial. Social behaviour is to say that if you don’t agree with me 
you are “them”, a particular group. Seeing all on the other side as “them”, a 
united one, means we demand knowledge of them. For example we demand 
from a Serb that they must know where the mass graves are because they are 
one of “them”. In response to this some people will shut done and others will 
enter into a violent defence of themselves and their side. We need to let the 
person talk in order to try and empathise in order to start relationship rather than 
judgement. 
I would agree with Volf about embracing truth [last paragraph Exclusion and 
Embrace p258] in trying to empathise we get closer to where truth really is than 
by passing initial judgement. 
Using skills of non-violence and this philosophy of paying attention to 
communication brings people to relationship and means they can embrace as 
equal in God’s sight. 
Workshops and training on non-violent action deals with personal behaviour in 
conflict and communication. How can I approach the other, how can I see my 
mistakes and see the conflict as a positive rather than avoiding the conflict? 
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I was working in a human rights office and was doing training on non-violence. It 
was my next big moment after my conversion; I saw how faith and obedience 
could marry with everyday life. Christians have a responsibility for the world we 
live in as a response to their faith. 
All people should learn communication. It enables conflict transformation in 
order not to fear. 
Life without conflict is a utopia. Conflicts are part of our lives. We must learn 
actually to transform them. To try and say we do have opposite views but how 
should I behave and communicate as we negotiate our way out of this. It isn’t 
about what happens but how – it is not resolution but transformation. People 
forget that investing in communication can lead to transformation of society and 
a better quality of life and community. 
 
How does forgiveness feature in your approach to mediation and 
reconciliation? What do you understand forgiveness to mean? 
There is a line between identity and forgiveness. First we must look at personal 
identity - that is understanding where you are standing. For example I wanted to 
call myself a Croat during the war although I am only half Croatian. I chose to 
want to do this. But I have many roles as a child of God, wife, mother, 
theologian and peace maker. Croat is only 5th or 6th position in line. It is 
important to identify these priorities first. Knowing myself to be a Christian and a 
mother first helps me to be able to forgive. It is easier to talk about forgiveness 
in personal context not as a theory. 
One man in xxxx got a parking ticket from an old enemy on the other side. He 
became suicidal as it was another wound. 
It takes courage to start the process of forgiveness and that is to ask things we 
hadn’t asked earlier. That means we know who we need to forgive and they can 
help them understand who and what they need to forgive and the truth from the 
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other side. The man in xxxx didn’t communicate and is wounded again without 
improvement. 
Forgiveness means being willing to live with the other, not just next to them, but 
to communicate and be happy to share space (e.g. town, café). 
 
Do you think individual reconciliations contribute to peace on a larger 
scale between ethnic groups, religions and countries? 
The xxxx group stuck together and now they are able to be a witness to what 
the group has achieved. That is that staying in one place but engaging with the 
other is possible and works. Testimony in public is the next stage. Admission of 
friendships can be difficult. All the pubs and cafés are today run by national 
groups and are segregated. People from the group want to organise mixed 
nationality groups though. The group in xxxx are inviting more people from their 
own ethnic groups to discuss and share. They are influencing those around 
them. 
 
Do you think war crimes trials are helpful? Why and what do they 
achieve? 
Nineteen Serbs were killed by Croats in a village nearby a few years ago. The 
court process began and two people were accused of being involved. Once this 
was made public a man came to the Centre as a potential witness. He wanted 
to go to Zagreb, to the public attorney, as he didn’t trust the local courts. He had 
been threatened and his grandchildren had been threatened. He got the local 
police to protect him, even though he believed them to be corrupt. The letter to 
invite him to court went “missing”. He heard of the court date from others but 
decided to give up as he was scared. I felt it was important for the victims’ 
families that the process occurred. I persuaded the man to go to Zagreb to 
testify and drove him there. The victims’ families were on one side of the room 
and on the other side were the accused with their supporters acting in an 
arrogant way. The witness was called to testify. He said that he was drunk at 
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the time and didn’t remember what had happened. He had backed out of telling 
the truth. The victims’ side cried out and the other side applauded. The judge 
said he would throw them out. I wish the process had been delayed or 
postponed until there was protection, and dignity for the victims could have 
been preserved. The process here failed. There should have been witness 
protection and name protection. The victims have the right to an honest trial 
regardless of the result. The victims have the right to be victims and not to 
victimise them again. Trials can cause more damage rather than leading to 
resolve.   
 
 Transcript 2 
What does your job involve? Why did you get involved with the peace 
centre? 
I worked in xxxx. It was very tense there. The aims of the work there were to try 
to help begin the process of reconciliation. It’s about people opening up and 
getting them involved. 
I see personal stories in the press and TV and they motivate me as I see their 
hurts from the past continue. 
The second area of my work is with interfaith and non-believers. My faith 
encourages me and can be used to encourage others. 
I studied theology. I wanted to be in involved in Church work. I went as a 
missionary to Bosnia (1996-98) I did a lot in the community – humanitarian aid, 
youth work and in conflict situations. I saw the importance of bringing people 
together. Croatia in 1998 was better (than Bosnia) but there were still problems. 
 
Why do you think people take part in the peace processes you offer? 
What motivates them? I have heard that more women participate is this 
true and why do you think that is? 
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People’s pain and need for help is their motivation for getting help. 
Women feel more of a need to communicate and to improve the situation for 
their families and communities. They want to believe things can be changed. 
Men perhaps are more focused on work and material things. They need more 
encouragement. They are also more worried about being exposed. 
 
What do you find are the most effective methods of mediation and 
reconciliation? 
Someone to facilitate opening communication is the best method. People say 
they want to but they don’t know how.  
The choice of topics to work on is important. More personal issues are the most 
motivating and helpful.  
People need to be sure they will be heard and that their problems and pain will 
not be taken lightly. 
 
How does forgiveness feature in this process? 
In these groups people tend to be from different sides rather than directly in 
conflict. Forgiveness is between specific people. 
Honesty is important and a secure place to express themselves. Confidence 
and trust are most important. 
 
How do you build that trust? 
They build trust by getting to know each other. It is a slow process – little by 
little. Group work is important. There must be space for everybody and freedom 
and lack of judgement. Free time after workshops helps to build friendships. 
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When people in the group admitted feeling badly/hurt about political situations, 
the group just accepted this. 
 
What are you looking for at the end of such a process, or is reconciliation 
ongoing? 
So many are involved I cannot see them getting to the end. The more people 
who can share or communicate however, the more others can be encouraged 
to do the same and to see the positives of this. 
 
How do you think countries or state should deal with peace building? 
The process of reconciliation changes people forever when they see the power 
of communication. It spreads to others. Mutual support is important. Change, 
real change, can only happen through individuals and people being willing to go 
through painful processes. Deep change is sustainable. Strong individuals can 
come up and change political and national issues. Look at Nelson Mandela. 
 
What do you think war crimes trials achieve? Do they help the victims? 
Victims and witnesses are not valued enough. In most cases with sentences 
and trials people are more hurt than ever.  
Of course it is important that the government to do this and people are glad, but 
it is not satisfying for victims. Victims need more support. 
 
Do you find that trying to find the truth of what has happened helps 
victims or perpetrators? 
People can share truth of their personal losses and their own problems. Sharing 
these kinds of truth is touching. It doesn’t happen very often. Often in the media 
people get attacked for sharing their views not the official view.  
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For some the truth is very important and they are not afraid to share it. 
Even those who work for peace struggle with inclusion. Sometimes people don’t 
want help. There is no black and white, it’s very grey and not always obvious 
what’s going on. 
I don’t hold many people who claim to be Catholic and Orthodox responsible for 
Christian living as they are about tradition. 
Churches have a responsibility or a chance for change yet they stick with their 
position and force that on people rather than trying to bring people together. 
Christians in Croatia don’t work on these topics enough. That’s why when the 
peace group comes they are hungry for changes and see the need. There are 
opportunities for us to look at these topics. 
Many Churches say God has accepted us and will accept you if you think like 
us. 
 
Transcript 3 
 
Why did you set up the centre and what are your motivations? 
War. When I realised war is going on, the crucial moment was that I had a 
degree of personal responsibility for the war. That is that there had been no 
political involvement by citizens before. There was a difference between the 
theory and the practise of socialism. I saw that changes were needed but I 
hadn’t got involved with them or with social or political engagement. Because I 
had been passive with many others, we were responsible. 
I had spiritual struggles in early war time. The atmosphere was going towards 
total war. There was only them and us. We had begun thinking ‘either they will 
kill us or we will kill them’. As a Christian I asked myself what does love your 
enemy mean in such circumstances, I didn’t find an answer but a friend and I 
prayed together. My friend said that in these circumstances love for enemy 
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meant killing the body so that the other could not sin any longer. This rang 
alarm bells. I decided I would not accept this logic. I thought no, I will not use 
violence even against my enemy. At the same time I wanted to open up to think 
‘what would Jesus do?’ This meant my life is not more precious than my 
enemies. What about if they threatened my children? It was difficult. So I 
decided if I was pushed to such a choice I would not say myself or my children 
are more important to God than my enemy. This made me feel free from this 
logic of violence. But I didn’t know how to proceed still. But I felt my heart was 
against this logic of violence. I was alone because everyone else was different 
in this. I wasn’t lonely though as I felt connected with them. I wasn’t 
judgemental. 
I met a man who was also a conscientious objector from a political perspective, 
not a faith perspective. He did not want a state based on repression and 
violence. It was good to meet each other, healing together, mourning that 
nobody had taught us what violence and war really meant. It was not realistic 
that we could stop the war, but we could look the future society and the state 
and how citizens (not as a political party, but individuals) could influence a new 
society and state and make them more resistant to violence. 
This was a 6-8 month process during the bombing of xxxx. 
The centre was informally set up in November 1991 and formally in 1992. 
 
How do you think war crimes trials may help the peace process? [The 
interviewee is primarily concerned with this field of work at the present] 
Struggling against impunity. 
All sides used to say that it was defensive even if it was clear that Serbia came 
into Croatia and Bosnia with an army (an aggressive war). There are 
justifications claimed on all sides. 
People thought the crimes committed by their own sides were normal, defensive 
or simply side effects. 
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It was important to change this perspective. For victims the facts about their 
suffering become known and official, and the perpetrators should be held 
responsible. 
It is just one part of the whole process of transitional justice that could and 
should be achieved post war. It is important both sides - victims, winners and 
losers - are included  
It seems sometimes that these verdicts disturb, they touch many groups. It is 
not a peaceful process but the achievements are valuable. 
In general, in Croatia particularly, but also in the other states, it is important that 
the awareness in public that war crimes are war crimes  and that they took 
place, rather than negation that they took place.  
It also opens up the questions of political responsibility and media responsibility 
even though these groups aren’t prosecuted. Awareness of responsibility is 
raised. 
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Appendix 4: Information and Consent Form 
  
I am undertaking a research project which looks at the theology of Miroslav Volf. 
The context of conflict in the Balkans is an essential part of this research. I am 
looking to examine how conflict such as that experienced in Croatia affects 
theology.  I am also looking at how theology may contribute to processes of 
reconciliation. 
The interview will contribute to this research by providing information on how 
reconciliation is put into practice and how conflict can affect a community. 
My research is funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council UK. It has 
no commercial interests in this material. The interviews will be used to inform 
the piece of research outlined above and any published articles, books or 
papers given on the subject.  
The use of the interviews as a contribution to understanding the realities and 
practicalities of reconciliation in Croatia means they will be included in my 
research as appendices and quotes may be extracted.  
Your interview will remain anonymous. It will be listed with an interview number 
in order to enable referencing. It may be stored for as long as is necessary for 
the completion of this research project and any subsequent publications or 
continued research. The interview details may also be shared with my research 
supervisors, examiners or similar research professionals assisting me. 
The interview will be informal. You will be able to refuse any questions you do 
not wish to answer and to talk about matters you believe are of interest. You will 
be given the opportunity to review your transcript once typed. If you do wish to 
remove any statement or rephrase anything you may do so. You may withdraw 
from participating at any time. 
I consent to an interview to contribute to the research outlined above.  
.................................................................................... Date:............. 
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